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THE COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE 
Peter Westen* 
T HE Supreme Court has begun to breathe life into a clause of the Constitution that has remained practically dormant since 
its adoption-the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. 
The defendant's right of compulsory process is a companion and 
counterpart to his sixth amendment right of confrontation. Together 
they guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
[and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor."1 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard Uni-
versity; J.D. 1968, University of California, Berkeley. 
The author is deeply grateful to his colleagues, Professors Frank Allen, Tom 
Green, and Jerry Israel, for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. 
Research for this paper was made possible by a generous grant from the William 
W. Cook Endowment Fund. 
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Forty-eight states (all but Nevada and New York) make 
some provision in their constitutions for compulsory process. Seventeen states guaran-
tee compulsory process with the precise wording of the sixth amendment. ALA. CONST. 
art. I, § 6; .ALAS. CONST. art. I, § II; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10; HAWAII CONST. art. I, 
§ 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; KY. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 11; ·LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; 
ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. 
art. Ill, § 26; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10; ORE. CONST. art. I, § II; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14. 
Six states use slightly different wording that does not appear to change the clause's 
m!!aning. CONN. CoNST. art. I, § 8 ("to obtain witnesses in his behalf"); DEL. CONST. 
art. I, § 7 ("compulsory process in due time, on application by himself, his friends or 
counsel, for obtaining witnesses in his favor"); IowA CoNST. art. I, § 10 ("compulsory 
process for his witnesses"); OKLA. CoNST. art. 2, § 20 ("for obtaining witnesses in his 
behalf"); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7 ("compulsory process served 
for obtaining witnesses in his behalf'). 
Fifteen states, with slight variations in wording, emphasize that the purpose of 
comp.ulsory process is to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 24 ("[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right • • • to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf"); 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 10; Mo. CoNST. BILL OF RTS., art. I, 
§ 18(a); MoNT. CONST. art. III, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M. CoNST. art. II, 
§ 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; Omo CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CoNST. art. I, § 12; 
WASH. CONST. art. l, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
Six states emphasize that the purpose of compulsory process is to enable the 
defendant to present evidence in his favor. Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
provide that "every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be 
favorable to him[self]." MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XII; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. 
Vermont provides that "in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person hath a 
right ••. to call for evidence in his favor," VT. CONST. ch. I, art. IO, and Virginia's 
provision is virtually identical. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. Georgia and North Carolina 
refer to the "testimony" of defense witnesses. GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 11 V ("com-
pulsory process to obtain the testimony of his own witnesses''); N.C. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 23 (the right .•• to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony"). 
[ 73] 
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The compulsory process clause differs in one significant respect, 
however, from the confrontation clause and the other procedural 
guarantees of the sixth amendment: The defendant's rights to be 
informed of the charges against him, to receive a speedy and public 
trial, to be tried by a jury, to be assisted by counsel, and to be con-
fronted with adverse witnesses are designed to restrain the prosecu-
tion by regulating the procedures by which it presents its case against 
the accused. They apply in every case, whether or not the defendant 
seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own. 
Compulsory process, on the other hand, comes into play at the close 
of the prosecution's case. It operates exclusively at the defendant's 
initiative and provides him with affirmative aid in presenting his 
defense. 
Despite its significance, the compulsory process clause for years 
failed.to fulfill its intended role in criminal procedure. Courts tended 
to construe its specific words without reference to their historical 
purpose, and assumed that the clause guaranteed the accused only 
the right to subpoena witnesses to appear in court. Too often courts 
searched the outer limits of due process and other provisions in the 
Bill of Rights for principles that lay throughout at the very core of 
the compulsory process clause. Only recently has this view begun 
to change. In a series of cases decided since 1967, the Supreme Court 
has rejected the narrow construction of the clause, and has recognized 
that compulsory process constitutionalizes the entire presentation 
of the defendant's case. 
Part I of this article traces the history of compulsory process, from 
its origin in the English transition from an inquisitional to an ad-
versary system of procedure to its eventual adoption in the American 
Bill of Rights. Part II examines the Supreme Court's seminal de-
Two states give the defendant compulsory process for witnesses whether or not 
they are in his favor. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("[i]n all criminal prosecutions the 
accused ... shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses .•• "); 
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("[t]he right ... to have compulsory process served for 
obtaining witnesses"). 
Texas adopts the wording of the sixth amendment, with the added provision that 
the accused in some cases be permitted to introduce deposition testimony. TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § 10 ("[The accused] shall have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the 
offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant 
and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by 
deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide .• ,"), 
Maryland explicitly guarantees the defendant the right to examine his witnesses 
under oath. MD. CONST. DEc. OF RTS., art. 21 ("in all criminal prosecutions, every 
man hath a right ... to have process for his witnesses [and] to examine the witnesses 
for and against him on oath ..• "). 
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cision in Washington v. Texas,2 which recognized after a century 
and a half of silence that the compulsory process clause was designed 
to enable the defendant not only to produce witnesses, but to put 
them on the stand and have them heard. Part III studies the impli-
cations of compulsory process for the defendant's case, from the 
discovery of witnesses in his favor to orders compelling them to testify 
over claims of privilege. 
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The constitutional meaning of compulsory process is deeply 
rooted in the history of English and American criminal procedure. 
While some constitutional problems may be resolved by the plain 
meaning of the words involved or by ordinary rules of construction,3 
most require a historical inquiry into the framers' intent.4 The evi-
dence of this original intent may prove ambiguous or otherwise 
inadequate, forcing one to rely on supplemental modes of interpre-
tation, such as the meanings ascribed by later generations.5 But 
whether or not history can answer every problem, every answer must 
come to terms with history. 
Historical inquiry is particularly important for understanding the 
compulsory process clause, because the clause is part of an institution 
that has survived the passage of time. The clause differs from pro-
visions (e.g., the second amendment "right ... to keep and bear 
arms") that have lost their original significance because of changes 
in underlying institutions.6 It is one of a handful of provisions that 
2. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
3. It is generally assumed that, unless obviously used in a technical sense, words 
should be given their common meaning; the whole should be read to be internally 
consistent; and all words should be construed to make sense. See Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527, 535-46 (1947). 
4. Of course it is true that the words used, e\'en in their literal sense, are the 
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of 
any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the 
surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress 
out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose 
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative disco\'ery is the 
surest guide to their meaning. 
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), afjd., 326 U.S. 404 
(1945). I am indebted for the quotation and for much in this historical discussion 
to C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 149-69 (1969). 
5. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (Holmes, J.). The task 
requiring the keenest judgment is to construe the Constitution when the various 
modes of construction produce contradictory meanings, as when the clear meaning 
of the words conflicts with their historical meaning or with pre\'ious interpretation. 
6. When the second amendment was adopted, there was no standing federal army, 
long distances required isolated communities to fend for themselves in emergencies, 
the most sophisticated weapons consisted of small arms, and members of the civil 
defense could be expected to supply their own arms. The right to bear arms was 
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were grouped together in the sixth amendment as a basic code of 
procedure for the criminal trial,7 which, as an institution, remains 
essentially the same as in 1791.8 
The compulsory process clause also differs from those constitu-
tional provisions (e.g., the fifth amendment's "due process" clause) 
that were framed in general terms and intended to carry an evolving 
rather than a historical meaning.9 The clause was framed in distinctly 
viewed as an alternative to a standing army; states were permitted to maintain a 
militia of citizen-soldiers as a first line of defense against invasions, Indian wars, 
and insurrections. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). See generally 
Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV, 46 
(1966); Rohner, The Right To Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 
16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (1966); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554, 665 
(1965). 
Since the eighteenth century the nation has gained a standing army and lost the 
original militia: "'\Ve may for a moment, pause to reflect on the fact, that what was 
once deemed a stable and essential bulwark of freedom, 'a well regulated militia,' 
though the clause still remains in our Constitution, both State and Federal, has, as 
an organization, passed away in almost every State of the Union, and only remains 
to us as a memory of the past, probably never to be revived." Andrews v. State, 50 
Tenn. 165, 184, 8 Am. R. 8, 17 (1871). The National Guard, which replaced the 
militia, is organized and funded by Congress, directed by officers of the United States, 
and supplied with complex and expensive weapons. It is unnecessary and impractical 
for national guardsmen to provide their own weapons. Today the possession of private 
firearms in the home or on the person is more likely to promote civil disorder than 
civil defense. R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF 
LIBERTY 91 (1957). 
The third amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers in private homes 
during peacetime, is also obsolete. See E. DUIIIBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT 
IT MEANS TODAY 60 (1957). 
7. J. GOEBEL, 1 HISWRY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 430,31, 
437-38, 442-43 n.162, 449, 455 (1971). James Madison drafted all of what eventually 
became the sixth amendment except for the pro\'isions pertaining to trial by jury and trial 
in the state and district of the crime's commission, id. at 438, and introduced it 
as a single proposed amendment. He also drafted a separate provision for trial by 
jury in criminal cases and joined it with a provision for indictment by grand jury. 
Id. at 431. During the debates, howe,·er, the last two provisions were se,·ered; the 
provision for indictment by grand jury was incorporated in the draft fifth amend• 
ment with other provisions concerning the initiation of criminal prosecutions, id. 
at 452, while the right to trial by jury was joined with the sixth amendment provi-
sions concerning trial. Id. at 455. 
8. See COLONIAL JUSrICE IN WESTERN MASsACHUSETIS 1639-1702, at 129-58 Q. Smith 
ed. 1961) [hereinafter COLONIAL JusncE]; COURT RECORDS OF PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, 
MARYLAND 1696-1699, at lxxii-lxxxii (P. Crowl & J. Smith ed. 1964) [hereinafter COURT 
RECORDS]; J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A 
STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 558-679 (1944); A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 
IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 50-136 (1930); R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY 
MARYLAND 21-27 (1938). See generally I P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER, SUPREME COURT OF 
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK, 1691-1704, at 141-244 (1959). 
9. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263-69 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring); 
408 U.S. at 321 n.19, 332 (Marshall, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100-01 (1958) ("The Court recognized in [Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 
(1910)] that the words of the [eighth amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punish-
ments"] are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
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narrow terms for rather narrow purposes. · Historical inquiry can 
shed light on what it means in specific cases because it was the 
product of specific grievances, and because many of the abuses that 
drew the framers' attention continue to occur.10 
The principal difficulty in determining the original understand-
ing of compulsory process is that the framers adopted James Madi-
son's draft of the sixth amendment, unlike other guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights, almost without debate and largely as proposed.11 The 
sixth amendment was noncontroversial (aside from the requirement 
that the jury be drawn from the district where the crime occurred) 
because its principles were already accepted at common law.12 It 
of a maturing society" (footnote omitted)). The guarantees of "due process" and 
"equal protection" are so deliberately generalized in terms and purpose that they, 
too, are deemed to represent continuing concepts of fairness: 
Broadly speaking two types of constitutional claims come before this Court. 
Most constitutional issues derive from the broad standards of fairness written 
into the Constitution (e.g., "due process," "equal protection of the laws" . • .) 
. . . . Such questions, by their very nature, allow a relatively wide play for 
individual legal judgment. The other class gives no such scope. For this second 
class of constitutional issues derives from the very specific provisions in the 
Constitution. These had their source in definite grievances and led the Fathers 
to proscribe against recurrence of their experience. These specific grievances and 
the safeguards against their recurrence were not defined by the Constitution. 
They were defined by history. Their meaning was so settled by history that 
definition was superfluous. Judicial enforcement of the Constitution must respect 
these historic limits. 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See 
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-63, 173-74 (1951); Hurtado v. 
California, ll0 U.S. 516, 528-36 (1884); Bickel, The 01·iginal Understanding and the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. l, 59-65 (1955). Discm·ery of how the framers 
would have applied some provisions in individual cases is therefore of little value, 
because they did not intend to incorporate their particular contcmpory standards 
into general constitutional concepts. See Dworkin, Nixon's Jurisprudence, N.Y. Review 
of Books, May 4, 1972, at 27, 27-28. 
10. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black J., dissenting). The 
Court uses history differently for different clauses of the sixth amendment. With 
some guarantees, such as the rights to a speedy trial and to confrontation of witnesses, 
the Court has said that the historical record is so bare as to be unilluminating. See 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314 n.5 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 176 n.8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). With respect to the right to jury trial, 
on the other hand, the Court purports to follow history faithfully. See Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968). But see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200 
n.2 (1968) ("In any event, the ultimate question is not whether the traditional doc-
trine is historically correct but whether the rule that criminal contempts arc never 
entitled to a jury trial is a necessary or an acceptable construction of the Constitu-
tion."). 
ll. See note ll5 infra and accompanying text. 
12. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 35-36 (1965). See 
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
361, 363-64 (1851). Edmund Randolph said of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
which served as a model for the sixth amendment, that it "reenacts in substance, 
modes for defence, for accused persons, similar lo those under the English law." 
1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 248 (1971). Trial by 
jury was also well accepted at common law and, indeed, was specifically protected 
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accepted the contemporary criminal procedure of George III, but 
rejected the earlier practices of the Tudors and Stuarts.ta The griev-
ances that produced it were suffered not by eighteenth century Amer-
icans, but by sixteenth and seventeenth century Englishmen. To 
discover what the framers intended by their silent adoption of com-
pulsory process, therefore, one must understand the prior history 
of English procedure. As shown below, compulsory process by 1791 
represented the culmination of a long-evolving principle that the 
defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a par 
with that of the prosecution, to present a case in his favor through 
witnesses. 
A. The History of Compulsory Process in England 
The history of compulsory process in England is one part of the 
more general development from an inquisitional to an adversary 
trial procedure. Criminal cases in the late medieval period were tried 
by jurors on the basis of their own prior knowledge of the facts 
without hearing from witnesses for either side.14 Later, as the jury 
began to consider independent testimony from prosecution witnesses, 
it still refused to hear sworn testimony from the defendant or his 
supporting witnesses.15 Not until the eighteenth century, as Alex-
ander Hamilton and his contemporary William Blackstone began 
their studies of the law, did the defendant finally receive an equal 
opportunity with the prosecution to present his case through wit-
nesses.10 
in article Ill of the Constitution. The debate over the sixth amendment did not 
concern the right to jury trial as such, but rather the right to have the jury drawn 
from the place where the crime occurred; it was designed by framers mindful of 
recent abuses by which defendants were transported at great inconvenience back 
to England to be tried by juries that knew nothing of the circumstances of the 
crime. As eventually adopted, it guaranteed the accused the right to a jury "of the 
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law," reflecting a compromise between those 
who preferred a jury drawn from the "vicinage" and those who would have omitted 
any specific venue pro\'ision. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 431, 438-39, 449, 453-55: 
F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
92-101 (1951). 
13. See I. BRANT, supra note 12, at 152-53, 163; F. HELLER, supra note 12, at 20: 
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1786 (1833): 
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851). English criminal procedure in 
the eighteenth century was considered the most enlightened in the world, and was 
emulated not only by the leaders of the American Revolution, but by other revolu-
tionary societies. II W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 580-81 (1938). 
14. See text at notes 22-24 infra. 
15. See text at notes 37-38 infra. 
16. See text at notes 73-76 infra. 
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1. The Emergence of Jury Trial (1066-1450) 
Although little is known about trial by jury during the medieval 
period (1066-1450),17 the royal common law courts were apparently 
only one of several tribunals with jurisdiction over criminal cases 
(breaches of the peace),18 and the petty jury was only one of several 
methods by which such cases were tried. Depending on the circum-
stances, charges could be brought in the common law courts by both 
the King and private parties;10 if brought by the King, again depend-
ing on circumstances, the charges could be tried by physical ordeal 
or petty jury; if brought by private parties the charges could also be 
tried by physical combat or compurgation.20 
The predominant mode for trying criminal cases by the middle 
of the medieval period was the petty jury.21 The composition and 
17. s. Mil.SOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE COMMON LAW 360 (1969). For a 
history of the jury during this period see J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47-182 (1898). 
18. It may be somewhat artificial to make a sharp distinction between "civil" 
and "criminal" cases during the medieval period. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 197-99, 357-69, 453-54 (4th ed. 1936). Nonetheless, in so far as "criminal" 
cases were cases resulting in loss of life, limb, or liberty, initiated by the King or of 
direct interest to him, they could be tried not only in the common law courts but 
in a variety of local .communal courts, I W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
71-72, 76-81, 135-37 (6th ed. 1938), county and borough courts, id. at 142-48, feudal 
manorial courts, id. at 176-78, ecclesiastical courts, id. at 615-21, itinerant royal com-
missions, id. at 264-76, the King's Council, id. at 477-80, and Parliament. Id. at 377-91. 
See also J. BELLAMY, THE LAw OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 
138-76 (1970). 
19. J. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 
121-31, 135 (1973); l J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 244-54 
(1883). 
20. J. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 130-44; I W. HoLDSWORT~, supra note 18, at 
298-312. Compurgation, or "wager of law," was a trial by oath. Each party produced 
witnesses who supported his version of events by testifying to his trustworthiness. 
See note 21 infra. There is some dispute as to whether trial by compurgation was 
used in criminal cases. Compare l J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 244 n.2, with 2 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 108-10. The answer may be that compurgation was 
not used in cases to which the King was party but was used in criminal cases initiated 
by private parties. See J. BELLAMY, mpra note 19, at 142-44. See also J. THAYER, 
supra note 17, at 26. 
21. J. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 142-44. See also I w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, 
at 302-05. The other modes of trial did not provide for independent testimony con-
cerning the facts. The defendant acted alone in trials by ordeal and combat, while 
his "compurgators" in trials by compurgation testified exclusively to his honesty, 
rather than to the events in question. J. BELLAMY, supra, at 131, 142-44; I W. 
HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 306-07, 309-ll, 321-31; 3 w. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 607 (5th ed. 1942). 
One reason, perhaps, for the predominance of trial by jury was that the King 
was taking an increasing role in the prosecution of criminal cases. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 18, at 197-98, 256-58, 360. Trials by compurgation and combat were not 
used in cases to which the King was a party. See J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 26, 
39-46. The only other form of trial was by ordeal, and that was abolished by 1215, 
id. at 37, leaving only trial by jury. 
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function of the medieval jury, however, were distinctly different from 
what eventually emerged in the modern period. Above all, criminal 
trials made no provision for independent witnesses;22 the primary 
witnesses were the jurors themselves, selected because of their knowl-
edge of the events and persons involved.23 They were summoned 
from the neighborhood where the crime occurred and placed under 
oath as a body of inquest to ascertain the facts. There were no rules 
of evidence to govern their deliberations.24 In the event of conflict 
between what the jurors believed to be true and what others reported, 
the jury was responsible for coming to its own verdict.25 Although 
the accused could be interrogated at trial,211 he could not give evi-
dence himself or call witnesses in his favor. It is said that he was not 
even permitted to make a statement, except to enter a plea of guilty 
or not guilty.27 
By the early fifteenth century, however, with increasing use, the 
jury trial had largely freed itself from the older trial procedures and 
had assumed its modern form.28 Two significant and related changes 
were the growing practice of calling independent witnesses to testify 
22. J. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 147, 160. See 3 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, 
at 638; 9 w. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 177-78 (3d ed. 1944). 
23. J. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 147; 3 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 616; 
1 J. STEPHEN, mpra note ,19, at 254-58. For a contemporary description of the 
fifteenth-century jury as a group of twelve witnesses, sec the cnconium by Chief 
Justice Fortescue (1395-1479), J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 59-63 (S. 
Chrimes transl. 1947). 
24. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 616. Rules of evidence came only when 
witnesses had become separate from jurors; they were designed to regulate the in-
teraction of witnesses and jury. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, mpra note 22, at 127-28; J. 
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 119, 123-24 (1974). During the 
earlier period, when jurors acted both as witnesses and as triers, their treatment of 
the facts in particular cases was regulated in several ways. They could be struck from 
the jury because of their ignorance of the facts, see l J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 
260; because of their personal relationship to the parties, 9 \V. HOLDSWORTH, supra, 
at 186; and because of their prior service on the charging jury. J. THAYER, supra 
note 17, at 83. In addition, they could be punished by "attaint" for returning a false 
verdict. Id. at 137-68. "Attaint" was used to punish jurors who (as witnesses) falsified 
the facts, much as perjury is used today to punish witnesses who falsify their testimony. 
25. l w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 336; J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 137-38. 
If the jury returned a verdict that was deemed false, they, not the witnesses, were 
subject to attaint. D. VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAw REFORM 1640-60, 
at 21 (1970). Indeed, not until 1670 (Bushel's Case) were juries wholly immune from 
punishment for Yerdicts returned on the evidence. J. THAYER, supra, at 166-70. See note 
82 infra. 
26. J. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 146-47. 
27. J. BELLAMY, supra note 18, at 166. The House of Commons in 1399 petitioned 
Henry IV to allow anyone accused in Parliament or in any other court to be heard 
and to defend himself. "Henry IV found it politic not to accede to the request." J. 
BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 169. 
28. l J. STEPHEN, mpra note 19, at 265. 
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for the Crown and the transformation of the jury from a group of 
witnesses into a group of judges. Finding twelve jurors with personal 
knowledge of the facts had become increasingly difficult by the end 
of the medieval period; nonobservers were more frequently called 
to complete the requisite body of jurors. Perhaps that experience 
explains the establishment of separate juries, and the practice of 
calling persons acquainted with the facts as witnesses rather than 
jurors.29 In any event, courts that had previously been hostile to the 
use of independent witnesses were beginning to welcome their testi-
mony.=m Jurors who had acted as both witnesses and triers of fact 
were beginning to act solely as the triers of evidence produced by 
others?1 
2. The Nature of an Inquisitional Process (1450-1600) 
The most distinctive feature of the emergent criminal trial in 
Tudor England (1485-1603) was the imbalance of advantage between 
the state and the accused. The prosecution had a marked advantage 
both in preparing its case and in presenting its case at trial.32 It could 
interrogate the accused-sometimes with torture-question and take 
29. Id. at 260-61. See also J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 122-36. 
30. 1 ,v. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 335-36. For a history of the modern use 
of witnesses see 9 ,v. HOLDSWORTH, sup,·a note 22, at 177-85. The new role for wit-
nesses is reflected in various statutes of the time (1500-1700). Statutes were passed 
to require two witnesses in some cases, and at least one witness in others, to support 
a criminal conviction. J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 179. A statute of 1555 required 
justices of the peace, after examining witnesses, to take recognizances from them and 
bind them over for trial, in order to ensure their presence at trial. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., 
c. 10, disc11Ssed ill J. COCKBURN, HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES 1558-1714, at 102-03 
(1972); J. LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 15-17, 24-25, 35. Statutory incenth·es were e\'en 
given to encourage witnesses to come forward with incriminating evidence. 6 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 406 (2d ed. 1937). 
31. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 304, 319, 335-36; J. LANGBEIN, supra 
note 24, at 118-19, 124. Sir John Fortescue (1395-1479) drew a sharp distinction be-
tween the French trial by "witnesses," which he condemned, and the English trial 
by "jury," which he praised. J. FORTESCUE, supra note 23, at 43-47, 59-73. Fortescue, 
however, was not criticizing the use of witnesses in criminal trials. Rather, he was 
criticizing the practice of trying cases by counting the number of witnesses on each 
side and applying rigid rules of credibility to their testimony, instead of leaving the 
ultimate decision to a jury of twelve men from the neighborhood. For a description 
of the medieval "trial by witnesses" in England, which was similar to trial by oath 
or compurgation, sec J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 17-24. 
32. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 223-29; 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 
324-26. According to Sir James Stephen, the imbalance of advantage between the state 
and the accused continued well into the seventeenth century: 
In •.• all the trials [between 1678 and 1688], the sentiment continually displays 
itself, that the prisoner is half . . • proved to be an enemy to the King, and 
that, in the struggle between the King and the suspected man, all advantages 
arc to be secured to the King .••. A criminal trial in those days was not un-
like a race between the King and the prisoner, in which the King had a long 
start and the prisoner was heavily weighted. 
Id. at 397. 
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statements from other witnesses, and bind witnesses over for triai.=13 
At trial the prosecution could present its case through counsel, sum-
mon witnesses to testify, and place its witnesses under oath.34 
The defendant, on the other hand, had very few of the rights 
later protected by the American Bill of Rights. While he could be 
released before trial on bail, hear the charges against him, and receive 
a public trial by a jury drawn from the neighborhood, he had no 
guarantees against excessive bail, inordinate delay, self-incrimination, 
or cruel and unusual punishments.36 He was particularly hampered 
in preparing his defense. He was not informed of the charges against 
him until the day of his trial; he was denied the assistance of counsel 
at all stages of the proceeding, which seriously handicapped the 
gathering of evidence by incarcerated defendants; he was prohibited 
(if incarcerated) from interviewing persons with knowledge of the 
events.36 He was also hampered in presenting his defense. He had no 
right to confront the witnesses against him in person; he had no right 
to summon witnesses in his favor, or, indeed, to present witnesses 
who were willing to testify voluntarily.:11 He was permitted to make 
an unsworn statement in his defense, but it lacked weight because it 
was not made under oath.=18 In short, while changes were under way 
that would soon transform the criminal trial into a truly adversary 
proceeding, criminal trials in the sixteenth century were primarily 
one-sided inquests into the truth of the prosecution's charges.:m 
33. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 23; I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 325. 
34. See The King,·. Thomas, 80 Eng. Rep. 1022 (K.B. 1613). See also J. LANGBEIN, 
supra note 24, at 25. 
35. The right to be free from excessive bail and from cruel and unusual punish-
ments was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of 1689. I W. & M. scss. 2, c. 2. The 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge pretrial detention and denials of a speedy trial 
was made available by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 31 Car. 2, c. 2. The privilege 
of the accused to refuse to answer incriminating questions at trial was created by 
the common law courts during the period 1640-1699. 9 ,v. HOLDSWORTH, mpra note 22, 
at 199-201. 
36. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 229, 232-33; I J. STEPHEN, mpra note 19, 
at 350. It has been persuasively argued that the defendant did have the benefit of 
legal advice, or "counsel" as we presently understand it, during the medieval period, 
See Comment, An Histo1-ical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Inter-
rogation, 73 YALE I.;.J. 1000, 1018-22 (1964). 
37. 5 w. HOLDSWORTH, mpra note 30, at 192-93, 195. 
38. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 25; D. VEALL, mpra note 25, at 20. 
39. See J. COCKBURN, supra note 30, at 122; D. VEALL, mpm note 25, at 20. At his 
trial for treason in 1603, for which he was eventually executed, Sir Walter Raleigh 
asked the court to confront him personally with the witness whose pretrial deposi-
tion was being used against him, arguing that "the Common Trial of England is 
by Jury and Witnesses," to which the Chief Justice replied "No, by Examination.'' 
Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1 (T. Howell 
ed. 1816) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS]. 
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The major obstacle to presenting a defense was that the defendant 
was prohibited from calling witnesses, even if they were present in 
court and willing to testify. While the rule against defense witnesses 
was applied even in celebrated cases,40 its rationale remains a mystery. 
The rule may have rested on the belief that it would be inappropriate 
for witnesses to give sworn testimony against the Crown, and useless 
for them to give unsworn testimony.41 It may have rested on the 
assumption that as long as the defendant could speak for himself he 
had no need for independent witnesses.42 Some argued that defense 
The famous description of the sixteenth century trial as an "altercation" be-
tween prosecution and accused comes from the contemporary account by Sir Thomas 
Smith. 2 T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 94-104 (L. Alston ed. 1906). See also 
I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 325-26, 332, 336. 
40. See, e.g., T1ial of Nicholas Thrnckmorton, l STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, at 
869 (Guildhall 1554). Sir Throckmorton was indicted for compassing the death of 
Queen Mary by aiding in the rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyat. During his trial he 
tried to call a witness named Fitzwilliams to testify to his innocence. Fitzwilliams 
was present in the courtroom and ready to testify. There was no question about 
the relevance or materiality of the testimony. Yet he was turned away and told to 
"go your ways, Fitzwilliams, the court hath nothing to do with you." Id. at 885. 
Throckmorton could not understand why the court was willing to hear false testimony 
against him but unwilling to hear true words in his favor. Id. at 884-85 ("Why 
should he [.Fitzwilliams] not be suffered to tell [the] truth? And why be ye not so 
well contented to hear truth for me, as untruth against me?"). The prosecution of 
Throckmorton was so vigorous that the jury itself was imprisoned and fined for 
eventually acquitting him. 1 J. STEPHEN, mpra note 19, at 329. Cf. Trial of John 
Udall, l STATE TRIALS, supra, at 1271 (Croydon assizes 1590). Udall was tried for 
the felony of authorizing a book that disparaged the Queen. The evidence against 
him consisted of a written statement by Nicholas Thompkins that Udall had ad-
mitted being the author. Udall produced witnesses who were ready to impeach 
Thompkins' statement, but they were barred from giving testimony against the 
Queen. Id. at 1281. At a later stage of the proceedings Udall protested that, if 
permitted, he could have established his innocence: "I ... offered to produce suf-
ficient Proof for it; but your lordships answered, that no Witnesses might be heard 
in my behalf, sGeing it was against the queen: which seemeth strange to me; for 
methinks it should be for the queen to hear all things on both sides, especially 
when the life of any of her subjects is in question." Id. at 1304. It is said that on 
appointing a new chief justice, Queen Mary (1553-1558) specifically instructed him 
"that notwithstanding the old error, which did not admit any witness to speak, 
or any other matter to be heard, in favour of the adversary, her majesty being 
party; her highness's pleasure was, that whatsoever could be brought in favour of 
the subject should be admilted to be heard." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
•352-53. Her instructions were evidently ignored. See Trial of Sir Nicholas Throck-
111orto11, I STATE TRIALS, supra, at 869, 884-85, 887-88 (Guildhall 1554). Although the 
great treason trials may have been atypical of procedure in less notorious cases, 
this article is concerned with English legal history as understood by the framers 
of the American Bill of Rights, who relied for their information almost entirely on 
the Stale T1·ials reports. See note 92 infra. 
41. Witnesses were generally assumed incompetent to give lawful testimony unless 
they were sworn to tell the truth. Witnesses against the Crown were not sworn 
until much later. See notes 52-73 infra. Cf. text at notes 45-46 infra. 
42. See Trial of Sir Henry T'ane, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, at 119, 152 (K.B. 
1662); 1·1·ial of Sir Nicholas Thrnckmorton, I id. at 869, 888 (Guildhall 1554). 
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witnesses were superfluous in a system that placed the burden of 
proof on the prosecution: There was no need for defense testimony 
until the prosecution sustained its burden of proof, and at that point 
contrary testimony was immaterial.43 One commentator suggests that 
the rule had no purpose other than to give the government an added 
advantage in prosecuting its enemies at a time when its powers were 
relatively weak.44 More likely, the rule arose at a time when the 
jurors themselves were considered the sole "witnesses" to the facts, 
and simply failed to adjust to reflect the new role of the jury as a 
trier of evidence presented by others. 
Whatever its rationale, the rule began to change. Parliament 
enacted statutes in 1589 and 1606 that gave the accused the right, 
in limited cases, to present witnesses in his favor.45 By the middle of 
the seventeenth century-without discussion-witnesses for the ac-
cused were routinely permitted to given unsworn testimony in his 
favor.46 
The accused, however, still lacked two advantages possessed by 
the Crowq.: the right to compel his witnesses to appear and testify 
and the right to have his witnesses sworn. The common law courts 
themselves originally lacked the subpoena power to compel atten-
dance. They relied instead on the power to arrest witnesses and bind 
them over for trial and on the discretion of the Chancellor to issue 
subpoenas on the parties' behalf.47 In 1562 a statute was passed re-
quiring witnesses to appear and testify after being served with 
"process" by "courts of record."48 The common law courts, which 
43. Cf. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 351-53. 
44. Id. at 354-55. 
45. The statute of 1589 gave persons accused of embezzling the Queen's "armour, 
ordinance ... or any victuals" the right "to make any lawful proof that he can, 
by lawful witness or otherwise, for his discharge and defense in that behalf ..• ," 
31 Eliz, c. 4, § 2. The statute of 1606-1607 permitted Englishmen who committed 
offenses in Scotland to be tried in England, and to be given the right to call wit• 
nesses in their favor. 4 Jae. I, c. I. 
46 •. See Trial of Thomas White, alias Thomas Whitebread, 1 STATE TRIALS, supra 
note 39, at 3II, 359-60 (Old Bailey 1679); Trial of Colonel James Turner & Others, 
6 id. at 565, 605, 613 (Old Bailey 1664); Trial of Henry Vane, id. at 119, 152 (K,B. 
1662); T1·ial of William Hulet, 5 id. at 1185, II9I-92 (Old Bailey 1660); Trial of 
Connor Lord Macguire, 4 id. at 653, 666-67 (K.B. 1645). 
47. J. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688, at 90 (1966). 
48. Provided also, and be it further enacted by authority aforesaid, That if 
any person or persons, upon whom any process out of any of the courts of 
record within this realm or Wales shall be served to testify or depose concern• 
ing any cause or matter depending in any of the same courts, and having 
tendered unto him or them, according to his or their countenance or calling, 
such reasonable sum of money for his or their costs and charges, as having 
regard to the _distance of the places is necessary to be allowed in that behalf, 
do not appear according to the tenor of the said process, having not a lawful 
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had no compulsory "process" of their own, implemented the act by 
adopting the process of "subpoena" used in chancery.49 They did 
not, however, use their new subpoena power to compel the appear-
ance of the defendant's witnesses, despite the resulting disparity 
between defendants with volunteer witnesses and those with recal-
citrant witnesses. 50 As a result, innocent defendants went to their 
deaths because they were denied coercive means for securing the 
presence of witnesses in their favor.51 
The same prosecutorial advantage existed with respect to the 
use of sworn testimony. The courts routinely placed prosecution wit-
nesses under oath; except in misdemeanor cases, however, courts re-
fused to swear defense witnesses. 5:! Indeed, a defense witness in one 
case was restricted to giving unsworn testimony until he happened 
to say something that favored the Crown, whereupon at the prose-
cutor's request he was immediately placed under oath.53 The great 
advantage of testimony under oath---clearly understood at the 
and reasonable let or impediment to the contrary; that then the party making 
default, to lose and forfeit for every such offense ten pounds, and to yield such 
further recompense to the party grieved, as by discretion of the judge of the 
court, ... by reason of the non-appearance of the said witness or witnesses .•.. 
5 Eliz., c. 9 (1562). 
49. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 131, 185. 
50. No distinction was drawn between compelling a witness to attend trial and 
compelling him to testify, because (with the possible exception of the lawyer/client 
privilege) testimonial privileges did not come into existence until much later. Id. 
at 201-02. Persons with knowledge of the facts, if present, could be ordered to testify. 
Accordingly, witnesses were simply ordered to testify at a certain time and place. 
See note 48 supra. 
51. See, e.g., Trial of William freland, Thomas Pickering rb- John Grove, 7 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 39, at 79, 120-21 (Old Bailey 1678); I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, 
at 388 n.3. Ireland, who was tried for the "Popish Plot" to assassinate Charles II, 
contended at trial that he knew witnesses who would establish his alibi, but that 
he had been unable to contact them from prison. When they did not appear vol-
untarily, and the court did not subpoena them, Ireland was found guilty and 
executed, although it was later discovered that he had been telling the truth. 
James Turner, who was eventually executed for burglary, argued at trial that 
he could exculpate himself if he had the means for compelling the attendance of 
certain witnesses who were reluctant to appear on his behalf voluntarily, but who 
would testify if officially compelled. The court denied his request on the ground 
that it had no power to subpoena witnesses to testify against the Crown. See Trial 
of Colonel James Turner 6- Others, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra, at 565, 570 (Old Bailey 
1664). See also Tt-ial of Edwa1·d Fitzhan·is, 8 id. at 223, 373 (House of Lords 1681); 
T1·ial of Henry Vane, 6 id. at ll9, 152 (K.B. 1662). 
52. See, e.g., Trial of Thomas White, alias Thomas Whitebread, 7 STATE TRIALS, 
mpra note 39, at 3ll, 359 (Old Bailey 1679); T1·ial of William Hulet, 5 id. at ll85, 
1191-92 (Old Bailey 1660). For reasons that are not apparent, witnesses for the defense 
were presumably sworn in misdemeanor cases. See 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
283 (1778); Trial of Thomas Rosewell, IO STATE TRIALS, supra, at 147, 267 (K.B. 
1684). 
53. T1·ial of Hopestill Tyndal, 79 Eng. Rep. 855, 856 (K.B. 1633). 
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time54-was its credibility. Sworn testimony was given under an oath 
to God and carried penalties of perjury, while unsworn testimony 
was gratuitous. By permitting only prosecution witnesses to testify 
under oath, and by instructing the jury to attach greater weight to 
sworn testimony, the courts were tipping the balance against the 
accused.55 
The rationale for the rule against sworn testimony is also dis-
puted.56 Its proponents believed that placing two contradictory wit-
nesses under oath would necessarily produce perjury by one of 
them;57 that the defendant had no need for sworn witnesses, because 
the prosecution had a duty to present a case so compelling that no 
witnesses could refute it;58 and that the defendant could rely on the 
mercy of the court to safeguard his interests.5° Critics of the rule-
including Coke, Hale, and Jeffreys (all Chief Justices)-considered 
the arguments without merit and the rule unwise.00 Whatever its 
54. Consider the desperate but futile effort by Thomas White (who eventually 
was convicted and executed) to persuade the court to permit his witnesses to be 
sworn. Trial of Thomas White, alias Thomas Whitebread, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra 
note 39, at 359-60 (Old Bailey 1679). 
55. J. COCKBURN, supra note 30, at 121. "[A] practice was gradually introduced 
of examining witnesses for the prisoner, but not upon oath: the consequence of 
which still was, that the jury gave less credit to the prisoner's evidence, than to that 
produced by the crown." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at •353 (footnote omitted). 
See also I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 398. 
56. Wigmore suggests that perhaps trial by sworn witnesses was considered an• 
tagbnistic to the emerging trial by "jury," where it is the jurors, rather than the 
"witnesses" or "oath-helpers," who take the oath: "[U]nless the jurors think that 
they need it, or the court calls for it, any other man's oath is merely a meddlesome 
intrusion upon the carefully selected body of triers." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, 
at 677 (3d ed. 1940). However, that would not explain the practice of permitting 
prosecution witnesses but not defense witnesses to be sworn. See text at note 34 supra. 
57. l J. STEPHEN, mpra note 19, at 351-53, quoting 2 D. HUMES, COMMENTARIES 
ON LAW OF SCOTLAND 70 (1800). 
58. At the trial of Sir Thomas White, Chief Justice Scroggs refused to administer 
an oath to witnesses for the defense by quoting Edward Coke for the proposition 
that "evidence should be so plain that nothing could be answered to it; and therefore 
no e\'idence should be sworn against the king." T1·ial of Thomas White, alias Thomas 
Whiteb1·ead, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, at 311, 359-60 (Old Bailey 1679). Actually, 
however, Coke made that argument ("quod in criminalibus, probationes debent esse 
luce clariores') to justify the denial of sworn testimony. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 
137, 210 (6th ed. 1680). 
59. Coke in 1613 defended the English practice of denying sworn testimony to 
the accused against criticism from Jesuit jurists by arguing that "the law of England, 
is a law of mercy; . . . and it is far better for a prisoner to have a Judges [sic] 
opinion for him, than many counsellors at the Bar; the Judges to have a special 
care • . . to see . . . that justice be done to the party." The King v. Thomas, 80 
Eng. Rep. 1022 (K.B. 1613). But see note 60 infra. 
60. Coke, despite his earlier defense of the rule, see note 59 supm, wrote later 
that he could not find "scintilla juris" to support the rule, and that permitting 
sworn testimony on each side would lead to a better discovery of the truth ("truth 
cannot appear without witness'). E. CoKE, supra note 58, at 79. Hale could find no 
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origins, the rule was probably retained simply to give one more ad-
vantage to the prosecution.61 
3. The Development of an Adversary Process (1600-1700) 
The defendant's right to obtain subpoenas for his witnesses, and 
to introduce their testimony under oath, finally emerged in the 
seventeenth century. The first significant development was a stat-
ute to settle hostilities between England and Scotland-enacted 
against the opposition of both the Crown and the House of Lords-
that provided that Englishmen committing crimes in Scotland be 
tried in the northern counties of England, and permitted the defen-
dants to subpoena witnesses and place them under oath.62 By 1702 
that limited exception would finally be the rule in England in all 
criminal cases. 63 
It was no accident that the movement to strengthen the proce-
explanation for the rule ("the reason thereof is not manifest"), and considered it 
ironic that sworn testimony coul<l be given for the accused if it happened to come 
by accident from the mouth of a government witness, but not if it came directly 
from a <lefense witness. 2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 283 (1800). 
Jeffreys thought it a "hard case" that misdemeanor defendants, but not felony de• 
fcndants, shoul<l have the benefit of sworn witnesses. "But yet you know as well as 
I, that the practice of the law is so; and the practice is the law." Trial of Thomas 
Rosewell, 10 STATE TRIALS, supm note 39, at 147, 267 (K.B. 1684). 
61. See I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 354; 3 J. STORY, supra note 13, at 664. Cf. 
text at note 44 supra. 
62. Be it therefore enacted ... that all offense ... committed ... by any of 
His Majesty's natural born subjects of this Realm of England ... within the 
Realm of Scotland . . . shall be from henceforth inquired thereof . . . before 
His Majesty's Justice .... At which trials, for the better discovery of the truth, 
and for the better information of the conscience of the jury and justice, there 
shall be allowed unto the party so arraigned the benefit of such witne~ses only 
to be examined upon oath that can be produced for his better clearing and 
justification .... 
4 Jae. I., c. I, § b (1606-1607). The statute, howe\'er, gaYe the jury 
th'e power and election ... to receive and admit only such sufficient good and 
lawful witnesses upon their oaths, either for or against the party arraigned, as 
shall not appear to them (the jurors] ... to be unfit and unworthy to be wit-
nesses in that case, either m regard to their hatred and malice, or their favour 
and affection, either to the party prosecuting or to the party arraigned, or of 
their former evil life and conversation. 
4 Jae. I., c. I, § 16 (1606-1607). It has been argued that the earlier statute, 31 Eliz., c. 4, 
§ 2 (1589), see note 45 supra, which permitted the accused in limited cases "to make 
any lawful proof that he can, by lawful witnesses," was also intended to include 
sworn testimony. See 2 M. HALE, supra note 52, at 283. 
The provision for defense witnesses was opposed by both the Crown and the 
House of Lords because it conflicted with the prevailing rules in England and 
Scotland. See I H.C. JoUR. 378-79, 382-83, 388 (1607). 
63. See notes 74-75 in/m and accompanying text. By 1702 the only remaining 
major imbalance between the prosecution and the accused with respect to witnesses 
was the refusal to allow the defendant himself to testify under oath, a disability 
that was finally abolished in the nineteenth century. Criminal Evidence Act, 61 &: 62 
Viet., c. 36 (1898). See J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 579. 
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dural rights of the accused culminated when it did. The seventeenth 
century had witnessed a succession of celebrated treason trials, as 
one faction after another seized power: first the Royalists under 
Charles I, then the Puritans under Cromwell, then the restored 
Stuarts, and finally the Protestant revolutionaries of 1688. By the 
end of the century Englishmen of every class and belief had experi-
enced injustice in the criminal courts. They were thus eager to 
reform a system that permitted the state to bring its entire weight 
to bear on the man in the defendant's dock while denying him a 
proper opportunity to defend.64 
The major reform movement came during the Puritan rebellion 
and commonwealth (1640-60), when memories of Star Chamber pro-
cedure were still fresh. 6;; The Levellers and Diggers published tracts 
calling for, inter alia, an end to the rules that denied the accused 
"the benefit of witnesses."66 A reform commission appointed by 
Parliament and led by Matthew Hale recommended that defense wit-
nesses be permitted to testify under oath in all criminal cases.07 
Parliament passed at least one act that permitted the accused to 
subpoena witnesses in his favor and place them under oath.68 The 
criminal courts in some cases gave the accused the benefit of com-
pulsory process. 69 
64. See I. BRANT, supra note 12, at 26; I J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 369, 415-16, 
419. 
65. 9 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 230-31. Cf. I J. STEPHEN, mpra note 19, 
at 337-38, 341. The Star Chamber gained a bad reputation because of the "astonish-
ing[Iy]" severe sentences it imposed, id. at 338, and because of its "inquisitional" 
methods, namely the secret interrogation of the accused before trial, the use of 
torture, the presumption of guilt, the use of written depositions against the accused, 
and the compulsion to answer incriminating questions under ex officio oath. In some 
ways, however, its procedure was even fairer to the accused than common law pro-
cedure, because it gave the defendant notice of the charges against him, permitted 
him to testify in his favor under oath, and granted him the assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 338, 341; D. VEALL, supra note 25, at 22-24. 
66. See Foundations of Freedom 01· An Agreement of the People (1648), in LEVELLER 
MANIFEST0ES OF THE PURITAN R.EvoLUTI0N 294, 302 (D. Wolfe ed. 1944); An Agreement 
of the Free People of England (1649), in THE LEVELLER TRACTS 1647-1653, at 318, 326 
(W. Haller & G. Davies ed. 1964). See also D. VEALL, supra note 25, at 154. 
67. The recommendations of the Hale Commission arc reprinted in 6 L. SOMERS, 
A CoLLECI10N OF SCARCE AND VALUABLE TRACTS 234-35 (:N. Scott ed. 1811). 
68. Provided also, That it shall be lawful for any person or persons who shall 
be indicted for any of the offences aforesaid, to produce at their respective 
Tryals any witness or witnesses, for the clearing of themselves from the said 
offences whereof they shall be so indicted: And the Justices before whom such 
Tryal shall be so had, shall have power, and are hereby Authorized to Examine 
the said Witnesses upon Oath. 
An Act for suppressing the detestable sins of Incest, Adultery and Fornication (10 
May 1650), in 2 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 387, 389 (C. 
Firth & R. Rait ed. 19II). See also D. VEALL, supra note 25, at 160-62. 
69. See, e.g., Trial of Nathanael Reading, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, at 259, 
278 (K.B. 1679); Trials of John Twyn, 6 id. at 514, 516 (Old Bailey 1663) ("If you 
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The return of the Stuarts and the celebrated, often virulent 
treason trials accompanying the Restoration (1660-88) briefly inter-
rupted the reform.rn But perhaps because of those new abuses, reform 
reasserted itself in bolder form in the Revolution that produced the 
Bill of Rights of 1689 and other procedural guarantees since incorpo-
rated in the American Bill of Rights.71 The achievement was perhaps 
best reflected in a celebrated address by John Hawles, Solicitor-
General to William III, in 1695, in which he likened the abuses of 
the previous era in English procedure to the Inquisition, and specif-
ically condemned the practice of denying the accused equal access 
with the prosecution to witnesses and counsel.72 In the same year 
Parliament passed a statute giving defendants in treason cases the 
same subpoena power for their witnesses "as is usually granted to 
compel witnesses to appear against them," and also the right to place 
have any witnesses on your part, let's know their names, we will take care they shall 
come in."); T1·ial of Ma1or Richard Faulconer, 5 id. at 323, 357 (Westminster Hall 
1653). 
70. For a detailed desa·iption of the Restoration trials see 1 J. STEPHEN, supra 
note 19, at 369-416. 
71. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, s1tpm note 22, at 230-31, 234-35; 1 J. -STEl'HEN, mprn 
note 19, at 415-16. By the close of the seventeenth century criminal defendants had 
largely obtained the rights to be free from excessive bail, to ha,·e re,·iew of pretrial 
detention by habeas corpus, to be informed of the charges against them, to be as-
sisted by counsel, to refuse to answer incriminating questions, to be confronted with 
the adverse witnesses, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. The right 
to confront and cross-examine, so flagrantly denied Sir Walter Raleigh at his trial 
in 1603, see note 39 supra, began to emerge by ·1650 and triumphed by the end of 
the century. D. VEALL, suprn note 25, at 160; 9 ,v. HOLDSWORTH, supm note 22, at 
228-29. The right to counsel came more sporadically. By the middle of the seventeenth 
century the defendant was permitted assistance of counsel in misdemeanor cases and 
the advice of counsel on legal issues in more serious cases. By the end of the century 
he enjoyed the full right of counsel in treason cases and the assistance of counsel in 
felony cases on all matters except the actual addressing of the jury. He was finally 
afforded the full right of counsel in felony cases in 1836. J. CocKBURN, supra note 30, 
at 121-22; 9 w. HOLDSWORTH, S!tpm note 22, at 235; J. KENYON, supra note 47, at 426. 
72. The truth is, when I consider the practice of late times, and the manner 
of usage of the prisoners, it is so very much like, or rather worse than the 
practice of the inquisition, as I have read it ... I will therefore recount some 
undeniable circumstances of the late practice .... [T]here is a proclamation to 
call in all persons to swear against him [the accused], none is permitted to swear 
for him; all the impertinent evidence that can be given is permitted against 
him, none for him; as many counsel as can be hired are allowed to be against 
him, none for him. Let any person consider truly these circumstances, and it is 
a noncler how any person escapes: it is downright tying a man's hands behind 
him, and baiting him to death, as in truth was practiced in all these cases. 
. . . There is an unreasonable disadvantage put on the prisoner, that a 
witness produced on his part, of equal credit with the witness against him, shall 
not have equal credit given him, because he is not on his oath: whereas he is 
ready to deliver the same things on his oath, if the court would administer it 
to him .... 
Remarks on Col_ledge's Ti·ial, 8 STATE TRIALS, mpra note 39, at 723, 733-34, 736. 
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their witnesses under oath.73 In 1702 Parliament extended the act by 
permitting defense witnesses to be sworn in all felony cases.74 Al-
though the felony statute made no similar mention of the subpoena 
power, the courts commonly construed it to include compulsory 
process.75 
Thus, by the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England shortly before the American Revolution, he was 
able to state as a matter of principle that "in all cases of treason 
and felony, all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon 
oath, in like manner as the witnesses against him,"76 and further "that 
he shall have the same compulsive process to bring in his witnesses 
for him, as was usual to compel their appearance against him."77 It 
was this cumulative English experience that crossed the ocean to 
the American colonies. 
B. The History of Compulsory Process in America 
The right of the accused to present his defense developed in the 
American colonies much as it had in England. As part of the common 
73. [E]very such person so accused [of treason] . . . shall be received and ad• 
mitted to make his and their full defence, by counsel learned in the law, and 
to make any proof that he or they can produce by lawful witness or witnesses, 
who shall then be upon oath, for his or their just defence in that behalf ...• 
. . . [A]ll persons so accused [of treason] ... shall have the like process of 
the court where they shall be tried, to compel their witnesses to appear for 
them at any such trial or trials, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to 
appear against them. 
7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, §§ 1, 7 (1695). 
74. [E]very person ... who shall be produced or appear as a witness or wit-
nesses on behalf of the prisoner, upon any trial for treason or felony, before 
he or she be admitted to depose, or give any manner of evidence, shall first take 
an oath to depose the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in 
such manner, as the witnesses for the Queen are by law obliged to do •..• 
I Anne 2, c. 9, § 3 (1701). Cf. text at note 46 supra (unsworn testimony). 
75. As to ... Whether a Defendant in criminal Cases have the Right to Process 
to bring in his Witnesses: I take it that in Prosecutions for Misdemeanors the 
Defendant may take out S1tbpoena's [sic] of Course, but that in Capital cases he 
hath no right by the Common Jaw to any process against his witnesses with-
out a special order of the court. But [after discussing 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 7 
(1695)] it seems that since the Statute of 1 Annae 9 ••. which ordains, That 
the witnesses for the prisoner shall be sworn, process may be taken out against 
them of course in any case whatsoever. 
2 w. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 46, § 30, at 435 (4th ed. 
1762) (footnotes omitted). Cf. 2 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 296 (1736). 
Parliament implicitly accepted this construction of the I 702 statute; it did not act 
again in the area until 1867, when it extended the subpoena power to indigents who 
could not afford to pay witness fees. In doing so it implicitly recognized that except for 
indigence there was no barrier to the subpoenaing of defense witnesses in criminal cases. 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 35, § 3 (1867), repealed by The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, § 49(4)(5) (1925). 
76. 4 W. BLAcKsroNE, supra note 40, at •354 (emphasis original). 
77. Id. at •345 (emphasis original). 
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law brought from England by the colonists, the right was deemed so 
essential that most of the new states included it among the liberties 
protected by their constitutions. When the framers failed to include 
it in the federal Constitution, several ratifying states insisted that 
a bill of rights be adopted to include it in some form. James Madison's 
original formulation of the compulsory process clause was promptly 
adopted without change. Within a few years, in the trial of Aaron 
Burr, John Marshall gave it the most sweeping construction it would 
receive for the next 160 years. 
1. The Colonial Period 
The principles that eventually merged into the compulsory pro-
cess clause had taken root in America long before independence. The 
colonists, after all, were British citizens first and Americans second. 
The royal charters that authorized the original settlements in Amer-
ica guaranteed the colonists all of the rights and liberties of English-
men.78 Laws enacted by Parliament for Great Britain were to have 
the same effect in the colonies. The common law, while permitting 
some local variation and adaptation, was as much the law of America 
as that of England.79 The unfairness of criminal procedure under 
the Stuarts was experienced on both sides of the Atlantic, as was the 
countervailing movement for reform.80 
The experience of the Pennsylvania colony and its founder is 
illustrative. While still in England, William Penn experienced some-
thing of the administration of criminal justice under Charles II at 
his own celebrated trial. He was arrested in 1670 and tried at the 
Old Bailey for delivering a sermon on London's streets to an unlaw-
ful assembly of Quakers. Trying to defend himself against the charges 
without the assistance of counsel, he was interrupted by the court 
78. The 1606 Virginia Charter granted by James I, for example, declared that 
"all • • . Persons . • . which shall dwell and inhabit within . • • any of the said 
several Colonies . . . and every of their children . . . shall have and enjoy all 
Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities . . . as if they had been abiding and born, 
within this our Realm of England .•.. " I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 59-60. 
The same guarantee can be found in various forms in the charters of New England 
(1620), the Massachusetts Bay (1629), Maryland (1632), Connecticut (1662), Rhode 
Island (1663), Carolina (1663), and Georgia (1732). Id. at 53. 
79. See generally Chafee, Colonial Cottrts and the Common Law, in ESSAYS IN 
THE HISTORY oF EARLY AMERICAN LAw 53 (D. Flaherty ed. 1968); Goebel, King's Law 
aml Local C11Stom in Seventeenth Centttry New England, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 416 
(1931); Nelson, E111e1·ging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: 
An Histo1·ical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 468-69 (1967). 
80. See I. BRANT, supra note 12, at 17-18, 163; R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE 
BILL o~· RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 3, 8-10 (1955); 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 3 ("All 
too few people in this country realize the extent to which our modern liberties are 
based upon the crucial battles waged against seventeenth-century Stuart tyranny."). 
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and forcibly removed to a walled-off comer of the courtroom where 
he remained while the trial proceeded in his absence.81 Although he 
was eventually acquitted by a jury that ignored the judge's instruc-
tion to convict,82 Penn remembered his experiences, and later set 
about to organize the laws of Pennsylvania to prevent such abuses. 
. The royal charter Penn received in 1681 for his proprietary 
colony authorized him to issue governing laws, provided they "be 
consonant to reason, and not repugnant or contrary, but (as near as 
conveniently may be) agreeable to the Laws, Statutes and Rights of 
this our Kingdom of England."83 He promulgated two of the most 
influential organic acts in American history-the Frame of Govern-
ment in 1682 and its successor, the Charter of Liberties, in 1701. 
Both are particularly important for present purposes, because they 
included procedures aimed at protecting the accused from the kind 
of abuse Penn himself had suffered. They guaranteed the defendant 
the right to be informed of the charges, to be released on bail, to be 
tried in public, to be present at trial, to plead his cause, to be assisted 
by counsel, to be tried by a jury of twelve, and to be free from un-
reasonable fines.84 
Penn's two charters also made specific provision for the right of 
the accused to put on a defense. Indeed, in that respect Penn not 
only kept pace with English developments, but anticipated them. 
In 1677, as an adviser to the proprietary Quakers of West New Jersey, 
and later in his own Frame of Government, he provided for sworn 
testimony by defense witnesses in all cases, something that did not 
come in England until 1702.85 Similarly, the Charter of Liberties 
81. Trial of William Penn & William Mead, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, at 
959-60 (Old Bailey 1670). See also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351, 355 n.3 (1970): 
W. DIXON, WILLIAM PENN: AN HISIORICAL BIOGRAPHY 74-98 (1851). 
82. The case is more important for what subsequently happened to the jury than 
for what happened to Penn, for it led to a landmark decision on the scope of habeas 
corpus and the right to a jury trial. When the jury refused to return a guilty verdict 
as directed, the court ordered the jurors fined and imprisoned. One of the jurors, 
Edward Bushell, sought release in the Kings Bench on a writ of habeas corpus, The 
court, through Chief Justice Vaughn, released Bushell, on the ground that the trial 
court had no power to direct the jury to return a verdict against the defendant, 
and that the jury could not be punished for reaching a verdict with which the court 
disagreed. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward B!lShell, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 39, 
at 999 (K.B. 1670). 
83. Charter of King Charles II of England and William Penn's Frames of Govern-
ment for Pennsylvania, in B. FRANKLIN, A COLLECTION OF CHARTERS AND OTHER 
PUBLICK Acrs RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 3 (1740). 
84. I B. ScHWAR1Z, supra note 12, at 132, 140-42, 173. So heralded was the Charter 
that the bell now referred to as the "Liberty Bell" was originally cast for the 
fiftieth anniversary celebration of its adoption. Id. at 170. 
85. Concessions and. Agre~ments of West New Jersey, ch. XX (1677), in id, at 
128-29; Frame of Government, "Laws Agreed upon in England," art. XXVI (1682), 
in id. at 142. There is sme confusion about the date of enactment of the English 
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extended to all criminal cases a principle that in England applied 
only in treason cases, namely, that "all criminals shall have the same 
Privileges of Witnesses and Counsel as their prosecutors."86 The 
Pennsylvania assembly, in turn, made explicit in 1718 what was 
still implicit in England-that the defendant in felony cases is en-
titled to "process" to compel the attendance of his witnesses at trial.87 
Pennsylvania was not unique. Although colonial records for the 
seventeenth century are not as detailed as one would wish, 88 they 
indicate that criminal proceedings in America were similar to con-
temporary proceedings in England and followed a corresponding 
development. Thus, while it appears that the defendant in colonial 
New York had no right before 1690 to place his witnesses under 
oath except in misdemeanor cases, by 1700 he was permitted to 
subpoena and swear his ·witnesses in all criminal cases.89 Similarly, 
by 1750 the defendant had the right to subpoena witnesses in his 
favor, call them to the stand, and place them under oath, in Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.90 
2. The Revolutionary Period 
The authors of the early state constitutions may not have experi-
enced abuses under the Tudors and Stuarts, but they were familiar 
statute, 1 Anne 2, c. 9, § 3, which extended to all felony defendants the right to 
present sworn testimony. The Statutes of the Realm record the date as 1702, 8 
Statutes of the Realm 168-69, while the Statutes at Large record it as 1701. 10 
Statutes at Large 488. In either event, its effective date was clearly 1702. 
86. Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges art. V (1701), in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 12, at 173 (presumably including the "privilege" of the subpoena power). For 
the English treason statute of 1695 see note 73 supra. 
87. And that upon all trials of the said capital crimes, lawful challenges shall 
be allowed, and learned counsel assigned to the prisoners, and [defendants] shall 
have process to compel witnesses to appear for them upon any of the said trials, 
But before such witnesses shall be admitted to ••• give any manner of evidence, 
they shall fi.-st take an oath or affirmation, To say the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth •••• " 
Act of May 31, 1718, 1 Laws of Pennsylvania, ch. 236, § 4 (Bioren ed. 1810). The 
subpoena power, which had been granted by statute to defendants in treason cases 
in England (1695), see text at note 73 supra, was thereafter granted by the courts 
to all defendants. See note 75 supra. 
88. For a bibliography of primary sources for the period see Flaherty, An In-
troduction to Early American Legal History, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN LAW 3, 20-32 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). 
89. See J. GoEBEL 8: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 8, at 476-84, 562, 572, 627-28, 633. 
90. Maryland: COURT REconns, supra note 8, at l; Massachusetts: COLONIAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 8, at 146, 149; Pennsylvania: Act of May 31, 1718, 1 Laws of Pennsylvania, 
ch. 136, § 4 (Bioren ed. 1810); Virginia: H. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 99 (1965); A. Scorr, supra note 8, at 50-130. 
Thomas Jefferson, in his monumental draft penal code for Virginia, provided that 
defendants be given subpoena power for their witnesses and the right to question them 
under oath. Bill No. 103, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 612, 615 a. Boyd ed. 
1950). His draft was adopted by Virginia without change in 1785. Id. at 616, 
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with the histories of those who had. The great treason trials of 
Throckmorton and Raleigh, the Star Chamber proceedings against 
the Puritans, the abusive persecution of the "Popish Plotters,'' and 
the proceedings against William Penn, were well knmvn to Ameri-
can lawyers and nonlawyers alike.91 Published histories and inex-
pensive pamphlets conveyed the English experience to this continent. 
The most celebrated trials were contained in a ten volume, 1765 
edition of Salmon's State Trials, which was owned by many individ-
uals and libraries in America, including the City Library of Phila-
delphia, which was used by the framers in drafting the Constitution.02 
The new states expressed the importance of allowing the defen-
dant to present witnesses both in their mvn bills of rights and in 
their later pressure for a federal bill of rights.93 Each of the original 
thirteen colonies and Vermont (admitted as a state in 1791) declared 
its independence from England and set up a separate government 
benveen 1776 and 1783. All but Rhode Island specifically provided 
for civil liberties, nine in separate bills of rights and four-Georgia, 
New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina-directly in the body 
of their constitutions. Nine states-all but Connecticut, Georgia, 
New York, and South Carolina-specifically provided for the defen-
dant's right to produce witnesses in his favor.94 
Particulars varied from state to state, but the provisions reflected 
a common principle. Three states emphasized the right to present 
evidence, guaranteeing the accused the right "to call for evidence in 
his favour."95 Two emphasized the subpoena power, giving the defen-
91. I. BRANT, supra note 12, at 22, 32-35, 56, 104-05, 124, 152, 163. 
92. Id. at 34, 152. It is said that State Trials (see note 39 supra) presents a distorted 
view of English procedure in routine cases, because the causes celebres it reports were 
atypical. See J. COCKBURN, supra note 30, at 124-25. It is also persuasively argued 
that the State Trials reports, which are presented as eye-witness accounts, may be 
embcllished and even fictional accounts written long after the fact. See G. CLARK, 
THE CRrnCAL HlsToRIAN 89-115 (1967). For present purposes, however, it is irrelevant 
whether the reports are misleading or inaccurate. The important point is that they 
were accepted without question by the American colonists, and formed the basis of 
their views of criminal procedure. 
93. The state representatives to the First Continental Congress drafted a bill of 
rights that included a declaration "[t]hat the respective colonies are entitled to the 
common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege 
of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law," 
Declaration and Resolves of The First Continental Congress, 1774, art. 5, in 1 D, 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 217 (emphasis added). It can be argued that trial ac• 
cording to the common law meant a trial in which the defendant enjoyed the 
privilege of witnesses. See F. HELLER, supra note 12, at 21. The American Declaration 
of Independence complained that George III had "depriv[ed] us, in many cases, of 
the benefits of trial by jury." See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 253. 
94. For a documentary record of the constitutions of the new revolutionary states 
see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 179-379. 
95. VA. DEc. OF RTS. art. 8 (1776), in id. at 235; PA. DEC. OF RTS. art, IX (1776), 
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clant the right to produce "all proofs that may be favorable" to him.96 
North Carolina combined the right to put on a defense with the 
right of confrontation, guaranteeing the right "to confront the 
accusers and witnesses with other testimony."97 Delaware emphasized 
the defendant's interest in sworn testimony, giving him the right "to 
examine evidence on oath in his favour."98 New Jersey opted for a 
principle of equality between the parties: "[A]ll criminals shall be 
admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, as their 
prosecutors are or shall be entitled to. "99 Maryland consolidated 
several interests, guaranteeing the defendant the right "to examine 
[his] witnesses ... on oath," and "to have process for his witnesses."100 
Some of the state provisions originated in English statutes, some 
in colonial enactments, and some were original.1°1 Regardless, they 
all reflected the principle that the defendant must have a meaningful 
opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the prose-
cution, to establish the essential elements of his case. The states 
pressed the principle so vigorously that the framers of the federal 
Bill of Rights included it in the sixth amendment in a distinctive 
formulation of their own. 
3. The Bill of Rights 
The delegates to Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were pri-
marily concerned with organizing a strong national government to 
replace the existing Confederation.102 Although they provided for 
some civil liberties in the body of the proposed Constitution,103 they 
rejected a proposal for a separate bill of rights. They sent the pro-
posed Constitution to the states for ratification over the objection of 
in id. at 265; VT. DEC. OF RTS. art. X (1777), in id. at 323. The Virginia declaration 
was the first in time and served as a model for the others. Id. at 262, 319. 
96. MAss. DEC. oF RTS. art XII (1780), in id. at 342; N.H. BILL OF RTS. art. XV 
(1783), in id. at 377. 
97. N.C. DEC. OF RTS. art. VII (1776), in id. at 287. 
98. DEL. DEC. OF RTS. § 14 (1776), in id. at 278. 
99. N.J. CoNsr. art. XVI (1776), in id. at 260. 
100. :h-fo. DEc. OF RTS. art XIX (1776), in id. at 282. 
101. The New Jersey provision, N.J. CONST. art. XVI (1776), in id. at 260, con-
tained essentially the same wording as the Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges (1701), 
quoted note 86 supra. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire provisions appear to 
have been taken from 31 Eliz., c. 4, § 2 (1589), quoted note 45 supra. See also 7 &: 8 
Will. 3, c. 3, § I (1965), quoted note 73 supra. 
102. For discussions of the adoption of the Bill of Rights see I. BRANT, supra 
note 12; E. DUMBAULD, supra note 6; R. RUTLAND, supra note 80. 
103. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I, §§ 9, 10 (prohibition of bills of attainder and 
ex post facto laws passed by Congress and the states, respectively) III, § 2 (trial by 
jury in the state in which the crime was committed). 
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the anti-federalists, who began to rally their opposition around the 
omission of a bill of rights. 
The Articles of Confederation had contained no bill of rights 
because the Confederation was considered too frail to threaten civil 
liberties, and because the member states were considered strong 
enough to protect their citizens. The new Constitution, on the other 
hand, created a national government of sufficient power to arouse 
concern. Accordingly, while some states ratified without hesitation, 
in others a movement began to ratify the Constitution on the under-
standing that it be immediately amended to include a bill of rights. 
The first such list of proposed amendments was issued by a dissenting 
minority in Pennsylvania, and followed by official recommendations 
from Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and 
New York, and another dissenting list from Maryland. North Carolina 
felt so strongly about its proposed bill of rights that it refused to 
ratify the Constitution until the Bill of Rights was approved by 
Congress in 1789 and sent to the states.104 
Four of the recommending states proposed specific provisions for 
the right of the accused to present witnesses in his favor. The formu-
lations differed from state to state, and sometimes departed from the 
formulation contained in the states' constitutions. Virginia and the 
dissenting minority in Pennsylvania, copying their state versions, 
recommended that the defendant be guaranteed the right "to call for 
evidence in his favor.''105 North Carolina, which had a different ver-
sion in its constitution, 106 also proposed that the defendant be able 
"to call for evidence .•. in his favor."107 New York, which had no 
comparable provision, recommended that the defendant be guaran-
teed "the means of producing his Witnesses.''108 The importance of 
the recommendations was not their particular wording, but the 
pressure they brought to bear on the first Congress to include a pro-
vision for defense witnesses in the Bill of Rights. 
James Madison, who drafted much of the Bill of Rights, must 
have been aware of the states' pressure to amend the Constitution. 
Although he originally urged ratification without a bill of rights, he 
had changed his position by the time the first Congress convened in 
1789. In fact, he had campaigned for his seat in the House of Repre-
104. For a documentary history of the ratification of the Constitution see 2 B. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 627-980. 
105. Id. at 664-65, 841. 
106. See text at note 97 supra. 
107. 2 B, SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 967. 
108. Id. at 912-13. 
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sentatives by promising his Virginia constituents that he would push 
for amendments.109 He must have been aware, too, of the specific 
need to provide for defense witnesses. Presumably he realized that 
the new government could not survive without the continued support 
of the two most important states-Virginia and New York-and that 
both had included a provision for defense witnesses in their ratifica-
tion amendments. He had been a member of the Virginia ratifying 
convention that in 1788 had recommended the Virginia provision.110 
He knew that New York had nearly rejected the Constitution and 
that it was already calling for a second convention to adopt a satis-
factory bill of rights.111 He knew also that North Carolina was re-
fusing to ratify the Constitution until a proper bill of rights was 
adopted.112 
Records do not indicate why Madison formulated the compulsory 
process clause precisely as he did. The remainder of his draft sixth 
amendment was almost identical to an amendment recommended by 
Virginia in ratifying the Constitution.113 The provision for the defen-
dant's right to produce witnesses, however, differed from the Virginia 
version. Instead of guaranteeing the accused the right "to call for 
evidence," Madison substituted the present "right ... to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Only a statement 
in .Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England and a pro-
vision in the Maryland Constitution were even arguably compa-
rable.114 Madison's unique phrasing suggests that he wished to fashion 
109. R. RUTLAND, supra note 80, at 195-96. 
110. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 764-65. The Virginia recommendations for 
witnesses, and for criminal procedure generally, were taken from an existing provision 
in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. Madison, then twenty-six, had also been 
a member of the committee of the state constitutional convention that had drafted 
the earlier provision. I id. at 231-34. 
Ill. 2 id. at 854-55. The Constitution technically went into effect when New 
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify, but it was generally recognized that 
as a political matter the Union would not survive unless Virginia and New York 
also ratified. R. RUTLAND, supra note 80, at 162. 
112, Madison received a copy of the North Carolina amendments before the House 
of Representatives began to debate his proposed bill of rights. R. RUTLAND, supra 
note 80, at 204-05. 
113. "[I]n all criminal and capital prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand 
the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and wit-
nesses, to call for evidence, and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair trial 
by an impartial jury of his vicinage ••• .'' Virginia Recommendation No. 8 (1788), 
in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 841 (emphasis added). The Virginia Recommenda-
tion, in tum, was taken almost verbatim from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
which George Mason had drafted in 1776. The right of the accused "to call for 
evidence," which appears in other state constitutions and recommendations, pre-
sumably originated with Mason. See 1 K. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MAsoN 
433-36 (1892). 
114, See text at notes 76, 100 supra. Madison may well have referred to Black-
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a neutral version that would satisfy the various states without adopt• 
ing the language of any existing statute or recommendation. 
Significantly, the compulsory process clause, despite its peculiar 
and narrow wording, was adopted by Congress and accepted by the 
states without substantive change.115 The clause was mentioned only 
once in the record: Representative Burke of South Carolina moved 
that it be amended to guarantee the accused the right to a continu• 
ance of his trial if his subpoenas for material witnesses were not 
served. The proposal was rejected as superfluous on the ground that 
the courts could be trusted to construe the clause to achieve its 
intended (but unarticulated) purposes.116 
An important question, given the paucity of debate regarding the 
substance of the right of compulsory process, is what weight, if any, 
stone in drafting his amendments. Blackstone had a profound influence on the 
framers, perhaps even surpassing his influence in England. D. LocKMILLER, Sm 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, ch. X (1938) ("Blackstone in America'1, When Madison was 
authorized by the Continental Congress in 1783 to draw up a list of recommended 
books for its library, he specifically included the works of Blackstone, I. BRANT, supra 
note 12, at 31, 33. 
115. Madison assumed that his amendments would be incorporated directly into 
the body of the Constitution, rather than added as a supplement. Accordingly, he 
drafted his criminal procedure amendments in two parts: the first (concerning every• 
thing but jury trial) as an amendment to article I, section 9, and the second (the 
jury provisions) as an amendment to the jury provisions of article III, section 2, 
The first part provided: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the 
accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to 
have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense," 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 1026•27. 
The proposed bill of rights, introduced in the House on June 8, 1789, was re• 
ferred to a committee of eleven, consisting of one member from each state, and 
then to the floor of the House, where it was debated first in the committee of the 
whole and then in the chamber. The House passed the bill on August 24; the Senate 
passed it with some changes on September 9; the joint conference accepted the final 
version on September 25; Virginia's ratification on December 15, 1791, was the last 
necessary for adoption. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 456. During the entire two• 
and-a-half year debate the compulsory process clause was mentioned only once, 
during a discussion in the House sitting as a committee of the wl1olc. See text at 
note 116 infra. The only difference between Madison's original draft of the com• 
pulsory process clause and the final version was that Madison would have allowed 
the defendant to have a compulsory process • • • ," while the final version omitted 
the article "a." Compare 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1027 with id. at 1165, For a 
documentary history of the adoption of the Bill of Rights see id. at 1006-24, 
116. Mr. Burke moved to amend this proposition in such a manner as to leave 
it in the power of the accused to put off the trial to the ne.xt session, provided 
he made it appear to the court that the evidence of the witnesses, for whom 
process was granted but not served, was material to his defence. Mr. Hartly said 
that in securing him the right of compulsory process, the Government did aii 
it could; the remainder must lie in the discretion of the court. Mr. Smith, of 
~ou~ Carolina, thought the regulation would come properly in, as part of the 
JUd1oal system. 
2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 1114. 
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to attribute to the precise wording of the compulsory process clause. 
Is it significant that Madison chose words that, while guaranteeing 
the accused the right to subpoena witnesses, do not specifically guar-
antee him the right to place them under oath, or call them to the 
stand, or compel them to testify, and that do not necessarily ensure 
him parity with the prosecution? Did Madison, his fellow congress-
men, and the ratifying states intend to guarantee only one aspect of 
the historic right to call witnesses, and leave the others unprotected? 
Or did they give explicit protection to the subpoena power with the 
understanding that it implicitly included the other features of the 
right to present a defense? 
Madison may have departed from the Virginia recommendation 
("the right •.. to call for evidence") in order to gain the support of 
New York, which had emphasized the subpoena power in its recom-
mendation ("the accused ought ... to have -the means of producing 
his witnesses"). The essential question, however, is whether he in-
tended by so doing to limit the scope of the clause. Although it can 
be argued that he intended to confine the defendant to the right to 
compel his witnesses to attend trial, this narrow construction is incon-
sistent ·with Madison's goal of achieving consensus.111 While he may 
have felt strongly about specific amendments (e.g., the religion 
clauses), Madison did not draft the Bill of Rights as a statement of 
his personal views. Rather, he drafted it to obtain a consensus by 
the almost mechanical process of choosing central and recurring 
themes from among the various recommendations. In that light it is 
unlikely that he intended to confine the defendant to the subpoena 
power. Only two of the state provisions and recommendations empha-
sized the subpoena power; most referred generally to the defendant's 
right to present evidence on an equal basis with the prosecution. 118 
117. Madison proposed only amendments to which "no serious objection ha[d] been 
made by any class of our constituents: such as would be likely to meet with the 
concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of 
the State Legislatures." 2 B. ScmVARTZ, supra note 12, at 1025 (address by Rep. 
Madison, June 8, 1789). Cf. F. HELLER, supra note 12, at 29; R. RUTLAND, supra note 
80, at 206. He formulated his bill by studying the various state recommendations, 
state provisions, and newspaper accounts, J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 427-28, 436; R. 
RUTLAND, supra, at 202; 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1008; and by selecting the provisions 
he considered important. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 
Aug. 21, 1789, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HisrORY OF nm CoNsrrrtJTION OF nm UNITED STATES 
OF .AMERICA 191-92 (1905), When George Mason, Madison's colleague from Virginia 
and author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, proposed to the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia (1787) that it add a bill of rights to the draft Constitu-
tion, he said that such a bill could be put together without any effort; indeed, 
"with the aid of the State declarations [of rights]," he said, "a bill might be prepared 
in a few hours." I B. ScmVARTZ, supra, at 438. 
118. See text at notes 95-100, 105-08 supra. 
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More likely, therefore, Madison adopted his formulation not to ex-
clude the general views of Virginia and the other states but to ensure 
that the clause also included New York's minority view. Accordingly, 
while he may have emphasized the subpoena power to prevent it from 
being overlooked, he probably assumed that it would implicitly pro-
tect the more conspicuous and common aspects of the defendant's 
right to present witnesses in his favor. 
Furthermore, Madison's contemporaries do not appear to have 
attached any significance to the narrow wording of the compulsory 
process clause. Madison's proposed amendments were widely publi-
cized throughout the states.119 During the House and Senate debates, 
and presumably in committee,120 the bill was continually juxtaposed 
with various state formulations, some of which were adopted in place 
of Madison's formulations.121 And, although the same process of com-
paring presumably occurred in the states when the bill was submitted 
for ratification, no one suggested that Madison's provision was nar-
rowly limited to the subpoena power. The state representatives must 
have assumed that his formulation was implicitly as broad as their 
comparable state provisions. The use of sworn testimony provides a 
good illustration of the clause's implicit meaning. In contrast to sev-
eral state provisions, the compulsory process clause says nothing about 
· permitting defense witnesses to testify under oath, yet it has always 
been deemed implicitly to include sworn testimony "as a matter of 
constitutional right."122 
Finally, when the original Congress implemented the compulsory 
process clause it gave it broad meaning beyond the subpoena power. 
In 1790 Congress enacted a statute that, while guaranteeing that the 
accused in a capital case "shall have the like process of the court to 
compel his witnesses to appear at his trial, as is usually granted to 
119. R. RUTLAND, supra note 80, at 205. 
120. See note 115 supra. 
121. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 1114-16, 1127-37, 1150-53. 
122. Joseph Story, in bis authoritative Commentaries on the Constitution, re-
viewed the history and adoption of the compulsory process clause, and concluded 
that one of its accomplishments was to guarantee the defendant the right to in-
troduce sworn testimony: 
The wisdom of these provisions [compulsory process and right to counsel] is, 
therefore, manifest, since they make matter of constitutional right, what the 
common law had left in a most imperfect and questionable state, The right to 
have witnesses sworn, and counsel employed for the prisoner, are scarcely less 
important privileges, than the right of a trial by jury. The omission of them 
in the constitution [of 1789] is a matter of surprise; and their present incorpora-
tion (in the sixth amendment] is a matter of honest congratulation among all 
the friends of rational liberty. 
3 J. SToRY, supra note 13, § 1786, at 665·66. See United States v. Reid, 58 U.S. (12 
How.) 361, 368-64 (1851); 4 ST. G. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 860 n.24 
(1803). 
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compel witnesses to appear on behalf of the prosecution against him," 
specifically added that he "shall be allowed, in his ... defence to make 
any proof that he can produce, by lawful witnesses."123 Congress said 
nothing to indicate that the constitutional provision was any nar-
rower than the statute;. indeed, the courts have treated the two 
alike.124 A parallel development is evident in state courts. Although 
respective provisions still vary from one state to another, and from 
the precise wording of the sixth amendment, they have been con-
strued in substantially identical fashion.125 The courts have evidently 
recognized that the meaning of the compulsory process clause is not 
limited to its H.teral terms, but must be derived from the context in 
which it was adopted.126 As Chief Justice Taney observed, the princi-
ples of compulsory process were early understood to be "substantially 
the same with those which had been previously adopted in the 
several States."127 
4. The Trial of Aaron Burr 
Within a few years of its adoption, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
presiding as circuit judge, gave a sweeping construction to the com-
pulsory process clause in the treason and misdemeanor trials of 
Aaron Burr.128 His two opinions in the case deserve attention because 
123. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29. 1 Stat. 119, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3005 
(1970). This act had been introduced in the House in June 1789 and in the Senate 
in July 1789, the same summer in which Congress was debating the Bill of Rights. 
124. See, e.g., Wallace v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 59, 60-61 (10th Cir. 1945); Casebeer v. 
Hudspeth, 121 F.2d 914, 916 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 683 (1942). 
125. For a list of the various state provisions see note 1 supra. The Maryland 
provision, see text at note 100 supra, despite its distinctive wording, has been read 
to have the same meaning as the federal provision, Iµllllely, to "declare and secure 
the pre-existing rights of the people as those rights had been established by usage 
and the settled course of law." Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 610, 71 A. 1058, 1061 
(1909). Cf. State v. Prouty, 94 Vt. 359, 370, 111 A. 559, 564 (1920). 
126. "[T]he provisions of the [sixth amendment] are not mathematical formulas 
having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted 
from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not 
simply by taldng the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and 
the line of their growth." Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). Cf. 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 370-71 n.6 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 
(1926). But see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, _198-200 n.2 (1968). 
127. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363-64 (1851). 
128. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Beveridge called the 
proceedings "the greatest criminal trial in American history." 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE 
LIFE OF JoHN MARsHALL 275 (1919). For an account of Burr's alleged conspiracy and 
his trial see L. BAKER, JOHN MARsHALL 447-518 (1974); 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra, at 
274-545; 1 C. W~, THE StlPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HlsroRY 301-15 (1922); 
Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111-22 (1974); 
Freund, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARv. 
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they represent a contemporary construction of the clause by the pre-
eminent constitutional jurist of the time.129 Marshall was an active 
lawyer in Virginia at the time of the Constitutional Convention and 
a member of the Virginia convention that ratified the Constitution 
with a recommendation that it be amended to give the accused the 
right "to call for evidence in his favor." He understood compulsory 
process to reflect a purpose broad enough to bring the President of 
the United States to bar on behalf of the most notorious of defendants. 
It was not a propitious moment for reasoned adjudication. Aaron 
Burr, a former Senator and Vice-President of the United States, was 
accused of planning to precipitate war with Spain and set up a 
separate government in the western states by force. His archenemy, 
President Thomas Jefferson, was so successful in poisoning public 
opinion that the Senate approved a bill suspending habeas corpus to 
prevent the courts from releasing Burr and his alleged co-conspirators. 
Yet, despite the popular pressure, and despite the likelihood that 
Jefferson would exploit the trial to remove him from office, Marshall 
resolved all doubts in favor of Burr's right of compulsory process: 
"[T]he right given by this article must be deemed sacred by courts, 
and the article should be so construed as to be something more than 
a dead letter."130 
The case began with a message from Jefferson to the Congress in 
1807,131 charging on the basis of certain letters from General James 
Wilkinson in New Orleans that Burr was planning to dismember the 
states west of the Alleghenies, invade Mexico, and set up a separate 
government under his control. The message concluded with Jeffer-
son's statement that Burr's guilt was established "beyond question." 
L. R.Ev. 1, 23-31 (1974-); Wills, Book Review, N.Y. Review of Books, May 2, 1974, at 
15; Letter from Garry Wills, N.Y. Review of Books, July 18, 1974-, at 36. 
129. "[Marshall] had better opportunities than any student of history or law 
today to discover the intention of the framers of the federal Constitution." C. Bunn, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTlTU110N 113 (1912). The opinion of judges in the 
founding era is entitled to special weight in construing the Constitution. Cf. Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (interpretation 
given the fourteenth amendment by contemporaries of its authors). 
130. 25 F. Cas, at 33. The Senate bill to suspend habeas corpus for a period of 
three months in treason cases was passed with only one dissenting vote, and then 
referred to the House where it was rejected. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 128, at 346-48. 
Marshall was aware of the temper of the times, saying at the start of the trial that 
"it would be difficult or dangerous for a jury to venture to acquit Burr, however 
innocent they might think him." Id. at 401. 
131. Special Message to Congress, Annals of the Congress of the United States, 
9th Cong., 2d Sess., at 39 Gan. 22, 1807). The message was in response to a request 
by the House that Jefferson give fuller details of the conspiracy that Jefferson had 
mentioned cryptically in his State of the Union Address on December 2, 1806. See 
3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 128, at 337-42. 
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Burr was promptly arrested in Louisiana, transported to the circuit 
court in Richmond, Virginia, and bound over to the grand jury.132 
In the course of the proceedings Burr made two motions for the 
Wilkinson letters, directing that Jefferson himself be subpoenaed to 
produce a letter of October 21, 1806, and that the United States 
attorney be subpoenaed to produce a letter of November 12, includ-
ing portions the government deemed privileged.133 The motions 
resulted in nv-o opinions by Marshall: one of June 13 on whether 
the President could be subpoenaed at all, and one of September 4 on 
whether the case should be discontinued until the United Sta_tes 
attorney produced correspondence he considered privileged.184 
The government raised several objections t6 the motion to 
subpoena Jefferson: (1) The motion for a subpoena duces tecum was 
too broad, because "process" under the sixth amendment extends 
only to "witnesses" for the defense, and not to their papers. (2) The 
motion was inadequate because, instead of showing precisely how 
he intended to use the Wilkinson letters, Burr simply alleged that 
the letters "[m]ay be material to his defence."135 (3) The motion was 
premature, because Burr had not yet been indicted by the grand jury, 
and because the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment are trial 
rights, which do not come into play until "criminal prosecutions" 
commence on the return of a true bill.136 (4) The motion, even if 
othenvise proper, was invalid in so far as it ran against the President 
of the United States.137 -
132. The proceedings consisted of four stages: the proceedings before trial 
(March 30-August 3, 1807); the treason trial on charges that Burr plotted to wage 
war against the United States, which ended in Burr's acquittal {August 3-September 
1); the misdemeanor trial on charges that Burr plotted to attack Spain in Mexico, 
which also ended in Burr's acquittal {September 2-September 15); and Burr's com-
mitment to a federal district court in Ohio on misdemeanor charges (September 15-
October 20). For a verbatim record of the proceedings see T. CARPENTER, THE TRIAL 
OF COL, MRON BURR (1807); D. ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL 
.AARON BURR (1808) (excluding Burr's commitment to Ohio). 
133. The pretrial subpoena for Jefferson to produce the October 21 letter was 
requested on June 9 and issued on June 13. See 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 
113-14, 177-89. The subpoena for the United States attorney to produce the Novem-
ber 12 letter was requested and issued on September 4, during Burr's misdemeanor 
trial. See 2 id. at 507-13. There has been some suggestion, based on a remark by 
one of Jefferson's lawyers, that still a third subpoena was issued, going to Jefferson 
to produce the letter of November 12. See 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 132, at 38. 
But the better view is that only two subpoenas were issued, only one of which went 
to Jefferson. See Wills, Book Review, supra note 128, at 15-19. The lawyers agreed 
to dispense with Jefferson's personal appearance, so long as the letter itself was 
produced. See 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra, at 116, 121, 124. 
134. See note 128 supra. 
135. 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 132, 136-43, 149-50 {emphasis added). 
136. Id. at 121-24, 154-55. 
137. One of Jefferson's lawyers seemed to concede that the President could be 
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Marshall resolved the issues on June 13, drawing authority from 
the compulsory process clause, "general principles," "general prac-
tice," and the federal statute governing the trial of capital cases.188 
He understood the various sources of authority to be internally 
consistent with one another: He construed the constitutional com-
mand as consistent with prior practice, and the federal statute as 
"declaratory of the common law in cases where this constitutional 
right exists.''139 Because he did not distinguish among the various 
sources his opinion can be assumed to rest on constitutional grounds. 
Marshall disposed of some of the issues summarily. Although the 
sixth amendment speaks of process for witnesses rather than papers, 
he rejected the "literal distinction" as "too much attenuated to be 
countenanced by in the tribunals of a just and humane nation."140 
He construed the clause in light of its purpose-to enable the defen-
dant to present evidence-and concluded that it must include papers. 
Concerning materiality, he considered sufficient a showing that "there 
exist[s] any reason for supposing that the [subpoenaed] testimony may 
be material .... "141 That Wilkinson was expected to testify against 
Burr at trial and that Wilkinson's prior correspondence might prove 
useful in impeaching his credibility were sufficient to justify a sub-
poena for the Wilkinson letters.142 A requirement that the accused 
make a greater showing before he knows what the letters contain and 
"before he knows positively what the witness will say ... " at trial 
would, Marshall thought, be unreasonable.143 
Marshall took greater care in disposing of the remaining argu-
ments. He held that Burr had a constitutional right to obtain sub-
poenas before as well as after indictment.144 Because compulsory 
subpoenaed, id. at 130-31, but the United States attorney later withdrew the con-
cession, and Marshall did not rely on it. Berger, supra note 128, at lll3. 
138. See text at note 128 supra. 
139. 25 F. Cas. at 33. 
140. 25 F. Cas. at 35. 
141. 25 F. Cas. at 38 (emphasis added). 
142. 25 F. Cas. at 36. Marshall ordered the disclosure be made before trial. In so 
far as his reasoning rests on constitutional grounds, as it appears to do, it casts 
doubt on the constitutionality of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970), which 
prohibits the pretrial statements of government witnesses from being disclosed be-
fore trial. Cf. United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
143. 25 F. Cas. at 36. Marshall returned to the issue in his second opinion: "Now, 
if a pap·er be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or 
applicability can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not 
precisely knowing its contents?" 25 F. Cas. at 191. 
144. "Upon immemorial usage, then, and upon what is deemed a sound construc-
tion of the constitution and law of the land, the court is of opinion that any person 
charged with a crime in the courts of the United States has a right, before as well as 
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process is designed to enable the accused to present a defense, he 
must have time to prepare that defense. To achieve its purpose at 
trial, it must be available before trial. In short, the right attaches 
as soon as the defendant has an interest in preparing his defense, 
which in Burr's case occurred upon his arrest.145 With respect to the 
President, Marshall found nothing in the Constitution to justify 
immunity from subpoena: "In the provisions of the constitution, 
and of the statute, which give to the accused a right to the compulsory 
process of the court, there is no ·exception whatever."146 The Pres-
ident, unlike the King of England, is governed by law and answerable 
to the courts. If Jefferson wished to assert a privilege against dis-
closing the letters, the appropriate time would be when the subpoena 
was returned. In the meantime Marshall saw no choice but to issue 
subpoenas "for papers to which the accused may be entitled, and 
which may be material in his defence."147 
Jefferson complied with the subpoena by producing the letter of 
October 21.148 He also delivered a bundle of material, presumably 
including the letter of November 12, to United States attorney 
George Hay, ·with instructions that Hay withhold any portions he 
after indictment, to the process of the court to compel the attendance of bis wit-
nesses." 25 F. Cas. at 33. 
145. "General principles, then, and general practice are in favor of the right of 
every accused person, so soon as his case is in court, to prepare for his defence, and 
to receive the aid of the process of the court to compel the attendance of his wit-
nesses." 25 F. Cas. at 33. 
146. 25 F. Cas. at 34. Burr was not the first defendant to succeed in subpoenaing 
elected officials on his behalf. The defendant in United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) 341, 25 F. Cas. 626 (No. 14,861) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800), on trial for seditious libel, 
asked that a letter be sent to various members of Congress requesting their at-
tendance at trial. The court, speaking through Justice Chase, ruled that he was 
entitled to an official subpoena compelling their attendance, and to a continuance 
of the trial until they appeared: "The constitution gives every man, charged with 
an offence, the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his wit-
nesses. I do not know of any privilege to exempt members of congress from the 
service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 341, 25 F. 
Cas. at 626. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Weinfeld, 
J.) (right of compulsory process to subpoena congressman). However, the court re-
jected a request that the President also be subpoenaed. United States v. Cooper, 
25 F. Cas. 631, 632-33 (No. 14,865) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800). It is unclear why the second 
request was rejected. See 1 ST. G. TUCKER, supra note 122, at 358 n. •. In any event, 
the parties to Burr agreed that Cooper had no precedential value on the presidential 
issue, perhaps because of Chase's scandalous reputation in seditious libel cases, for 
which he had since been impeached. See 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 132-33, 
135-36. , 
147. 25 F. Cas. at 35. 
148. There was some delay because the original had apparently been Jost. See 2 
D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 484-85. Burr at first refused to be satisfied with a 
copy, but eventually agreed, and it was produced. See id. at 504. See generally Berger, 
supra note 128, at 1115 n,25. 
106 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:'ll 
considered privileged and "not directly material for the purposes of 
justice."149 When Burr learned of the letter of November 12 he sub-
poenaed Hay to produce it. Hay delivered an edited version, arguing 
that the deleted portions had been written to the President in the 
strictest confidence, and had no bearing on the issues at trial; Hay 
offered, moreover, to deliver the unedited original to the court and 
to defense counsel for their private inspection, and promised to 
abide by the court's ruling on the propriety of the deletions.100 The 
defense, however, was not satisfied with limited disclosure, and 
moved to postpone the case indefinitely until the letter was disclosed 
not only to the lawyers, but to Burr himself and to the public.m 
Burr's motion for a continuance prompted the second Marshall 
opinion. Marshall gave Burr what he wanted by ordering that "the 
paper be produced, or the cause be continued, "102 but avoided a 
direct confrontation with the President. While he agreed that the 
President possessed a qualified privilege to withhold information 
that "the public interest required ... to be kept secret ... ;•1ua he 
ruled that Jefferson had failed properly to assert the privilege: The 
privilege was personal to the President and had to be asserted by 
the President himself, rather than through his attorney Hay.1114 
Accordingly, Marshall ruled that while he would consider entering 
a protective order to prohibit unnecessary public disclosure of the 
letter, he had no choice but to halt the proceedings until the letter 
was produced for Burr's personal inspection.100 
Marshall also used the occasion to define the standard that would 
govern disputes between the President and Burr if the President 
properly invoked his personal privilege. The courts, he said, must 
balance the President's need for secrecy against the defendant's need 
for disclosure. A strong claim on one side might outweigh a weak 
149. 25 F. Cas. at 190; 1 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 210; 2 id, at 502, 
150. 2 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 501, 509-11, 513-14, 523. 
151. Id. at 507-11, 514-19, 532. Burr, in other words, insisted on making tl1e 
determination himself whether the Wilkinson letters were relevant to his defense, 
Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180-85 (1969). 
152. 25 F. Cas. at 192. 
153. 25 F. Cas. at 192. 
154. 25 F. Cas. at 192. 
155. The only ground laid for the court to act upon is the affidavit of the ac-
cused; and from that the court is induced to order that the paper be produced, 
or the cause be continued. In regard to the secrecy of these parts which it is 
stated are improper to give out to the world, the court will take any order that 
may be necessary. I do not think that the accused ought to be prohibited from 
seemg the letter; but, if it shonld be thought proper, I will order that no copy 
of it be taken for public exhibition •••. 
25 F. Cas. at 192. 
November 1974] Compulsory Process 107 
claim on the other. The scales, however, are weighted in favor of 
the accused, for it would be "a very serious thing, if such letter 
should contain any information material to the defence, to withhold 
from the accused the power of making use of it."156 No matter how 
strong the President's interest in secrecy, the defendant is entitled 
to any information "absolutely necessary in the defence" or "essential 
to the justice of the case,"157 and it is for the courts to make the 
necessary determination.158 If the President refuses to disclose such 
information, the courts have no choice but to halt the prosecution.159 
Although J e:fferson responded to the opinion by personally invoking 
privilege with respect to certain portions of the letter, and by di-
recting Hay to withhold them from the court,160 the controversy was 
never finally resolved. By the time Jefferson's response arrived Burr 
had decided to drop his request and proceed with the trial.161 The 
jury acquitted him a few days later. 
The Burr opinions are important both for what Marshall did 
156. 25 F. Cas. at 192. 
157. Perhaps the court ought to consider the reasons which would induce the 
president to refuse to e.'Chibit such a letter as conclusive on [the privilege], un-
less such letter could be shown to be absolutely necessary in the defense. • • • 
But on objections being made by the president to the production of a paper, 
the court would not proceed further in the case without such an affidavit as 
would clearly shew the paper to be essential to the justice of the case. 
25 F. Cas. at 192. 
158. Marshall justified judicial review of presidential action in much the same 
terms he used in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). He said 
that it would "be a blot in the page which records the judicial proceedings of this 
country ••• " to withhold exculpatory evidence from the accused, 25 F. Cas. at 35, 
and would "tarnish the reputation of the court which had given its sanction to its 
being withheld." 25 F. Cas. at 37. He added that he would personally "deplore, most 
earnestly, the occasion which should compel me to look back on any part of my 
official conduct with so much self-reproach as I should feel, could I declare, on 
the information now possessed, that the accused is not entitled to the letter in 
question, if it should be really important to him." 25 F. Cas. at 37. 
Marshall did not specify whether the courts should make the necessary determi-
nation by inspecting the disputed information in camera or by considering circum-
stantial evidence of the privilege in the form of affidavits; however, he made it clear 
that courts would not automatically accept the President's assertion of privilege. See 
Freund, supra note 128, at 29. 
159. Marshall stated his conclusion in the negative. He referred to the practice 
in civil cases of ordering a nonsuit against a plaintiff who fails to produce material 
evidence, and observed that he would not "take any definite and decisive step with 
respect to the prosecution, founded on the refusal of the president to exhibit a 
paper • • • ," unless the defendant made a showing that the paper was material to 
his defense. 25 F. Cas. at 191-92. 
160. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 132, at 46. 
161. It is unclear why Burr dropped the request. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 128, 
at 522 n.4. His lawyers may have concluded that the letter was not really helpful 
to his defense, for it does appear that they (along with Marshall) were shown the 
letter in confidence. See 2 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 504-05, 511. But see note 
162 infra. 
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and did not say. The question of enforcing the first subpoena by 
contempt or othenvise did not arise, because Jefferson produced the 
first letter voluntarily. Marshall did not have to subpoena Jefferson 
to produce the second letter because it was in Hay's possession by 
then. He did not have to find Hay in contempt for continuing to 
withhold portions of the second letter because Burr decided to drop 
the matter. On the other hand, Marshall did decide that when the 
President uses the courts to bring a prosecution he must comply with 
measures taken by the courts to preserve the integrity of their pro-
cesses. And he declared that if the President denies the court access 
to evidence that may bear on the defendant's innocence, the court 
has an independent responsibility-not to find him in contempt 
(which can help the accused very little)-but to suspend prose-
cution until material evidence is made personally available to the 
accused.162 
II. THE EMERGING DOCTRINE: WASHINGTON V, TEXAS 
The compulsory process clause, despite John Marshall's warn-
ing,163 seemed destined to become a "dead letter." Until 1967 the 
Supreme Court addressed it only five times, twice in dictum and 
three times while declining to construe it.164 The lacuna was so acute 
that two noted commentators observed as late as 1960 that "[t]he 
question of compulsory process seems not to have been the subject 
of constitutional adjudication, either under the sixth or fourteenth 
amendments, at least not in the federal courts."165 In part because 
litigants failed to brief the issue, courts reached for other grounds 
on which to decide cases that warranted compulsory process analysis. 
The defendant's right to obtain a continuance of his trial in order 
to subpoena witnesses provides a good example. The framers specifi-
162, Marshall addressed this issue again during proceedings to commit Burr to 
an Ohio court on misdemeanor charges. See note 132 supra. When Burr once more 
demanded the letter in order to impeach Wilkinson, Marshall concluded that Burr 
had not shown that the letter was material to the probable cause hearing. But he 
did permit Burr to draw a favorable inference from the suppression, and added that 
if it were a trial (rather than a probable cause hearing) he might have to discontinue 
the case. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 132, at 284. 
163. See text at note 130 supra. 
164. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.l (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932); United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (dictum 
that compulsory process does not require defense subpoenas to issue at government 
expense); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 361, 363-65 (1851) (dictum), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 
(1918) [see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1967)]. 
165. Snee 8: Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure: A Comparison of Two 
Systems, 21 Omo Sr. L.J. 467, 491 (1960). 
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cally considered amending the compulsory process clause to guaran-
tee the defendant enough time to serve his subpoenas, but concluded 
that such an amendment would be superfluous and that the courts 
could be trusted to construe the clause accordingly.166 The same 
conclusion follows from the nature of the right itself, for if trying 
the defendant before he can retain counsel violates the right to 
counsel, 167 trying him before he can call witnesses violates the right 
of compulsory process.168 Instead of recognizing the relevance of the 
sixth amendment, however, courts have relied upon the due process 
clause.169 In one case a court agreed that the defendant had been 
denied adequate time to call his witnesses, and apologized for the 
"necessity" of basing its decision on a standard so vague and uncer-
tain as the "fundamental fairness" requirement of due process.170 
Another example is FeTguson v. GeoTgia,171 in which the defen-
dant challenged a statute that prohibited him from making a sworn 
statement in his defense.172 The provision was part of a larger statu-
tory scheme that declared the defendant incompetent to testify as a 
regular witness but permitted him to make unswom statements. The 
Court was troubled by the statutes, but divided in its approach. The 
166. See note 116 supra and accompanying text. 
167. Averyv. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940). 
168. The better view is that it violates the specific proV1S10n for compulsory 
process-rather than the more general provision for due process-to deny the defen• 
dant sufficient time to issue subpoenas for his witnesses, see Paoni v. United States, 
281 F. 801, 803-04 (3d Cir. 1922); to have his subpoenas executed, see Keener v. 
Tennessee, 281 F. Supp. 964, 969-70 (E.D. Tenn. 1968): and to permit his witnesses 
to travel to the trial. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. llll, 1118-19, 156 S.E. 
577, 579-80 (1931) (state provision). 
169. See, e.g., Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 n.9 (1963); United States ex rel. 
Snyder v. Mack, 372 F. Supp. 1077, 1080-82 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Shepherd v. State, 
108 S.2d 494, 496-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Hainesworth v. State, 9 Md. App. 31, 
33-34, 262 A.2d 328, 330 (1970); People v. Sweeney, 43 App. Div. 2d 564, 349 
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1973) (Benjamin, J., dissenting). 
170. "We deplore the vagueness, the uncertainty, the necessity of reliance on 
individual notions-inherent in applying as a standard of due process a concept 
such as 'fairness' or 'fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice' 
or 'a sense of justice' •••• But ••• [o]n the record as we read it, MacKenna [the 
defendant] did not have his day in court to meet the prosecution's case.'' MacKenna 
v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 604 (5th Cir. 1960), modified on rehearing en bane, 289 F.2d 
928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). 
171. 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
172. The statute, No. 21, [1868] Ga. Acts 24, as amended, No. 17, [1874] Ga. Laws 
22-23, provided in pertinent part: "In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the 
right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case as he may deem 
proper in his defense. It shall not be under oath, and shall have such force only 
as the jury may think right to give it." At the time Georgia was "the only State--
indeed, apparently the only jurisdiction in the common-law world-to retain the 
common-law rule that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent to 
testify under oath in his own behalf at his trial.'' 365 U.S. at 570. 
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concurring members argued that the "unsworn statement" statute 
was invalid only as part of the incompetency statute, and that unless 
the Court was willing to decide the validity of the latter it should 
dismiss the ban on sworn statements for absence of a "substantial 
federal question."173 The majority, unwilling to pass upon the va-
lidity of the incompetency statute, which the parties had not drawn 
into question, concluded that the rule against sworn statements was 
invalid "in the context of"174 the incompetency statute because it 
abridged the defendant's right to counsel by precluding his lawyer 
from asking him questions about the unsworn statement in the 
presence of the jury.175 Neither the parties nor the Court raised the 
issue of compulsory process. 
The majority correctly invalidated the rule against sworn state-
ments without reaching the validity of the incompetency statute. Had 
the defendant been fully competent to testify in his own behalf as an 
ordinary witness he would have had no grounds to insist on making 
an additional unexamined "statement" under oath.176 To that extent, 
the ban on sworn statements was invalid only "in the context of" the 
incompetency statute. But it does not follow that, once having de-
clared the defendant incompetent to testify as an ordinary witness, 
the state could also arbitrarily regulate the manner in which he made 
"statements" in his behalf. Nor does it follow that the defendant first 
had to challenge the incompetency statute in order to contest the 
discrimination between sworn and unsworn statements. Regardless 
of the validity of the incompetency statute, 177 the defendant was 
prejudiced by the accompanying rule that permitted him to make 
statements in his defense but arbitrarily prohibited him from making 
the statements under oath. 
The majority's rationale, however, was erroneous. Ferguson was 
"not a right-to-counsel case."178 The defendant was fully assisted by 
counsel in preparing his unsworn statement. His fawyer was free to 
draft every word of the statement, including rhetorical questions if 
he so wished. The defendant could not have said anything more or 
173. 365 U.S. at 600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
1'14. 365 U.S. at 596. 
175. 365 U.S. at 593-96. 
176. See United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362, 365 (1st. Cir. 1970): "[AJ contrary 
rule might be unfair to society. It would permit a defendant to pick and choose, 
determining which portions of his story he will tell on the witness stand, where he 
is subject to cross-examination, and which he will save for the jury, where anything 
he may say cannot be challenged." 
177. Cf. text at notes 207-19 infra. 
178. 365 U.S. at 599 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 1 • • 
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less if orally questioned by his lawyer. The essential defect from the 
defendant's viewpoint, rather, was that the statement was unsworn, 
not that it was unassisted. Indeed, the majority implicitly recognized 
that the problem was not that the defendant would have said some-
thing different if questioned by counsel, but that his statement would 
have carried greater weight with the jury if given under oath.179 The 
Court ignored the most appropriate rationale on which to base its 
result, namely, that having permitted the defendant to make a state-
ment in his defense, the state violated his right of compulsory process 
by prohibiting him from presenting the evidence under oath, on a 
comparable basis with witnesses for the prosecution.180 
The blind spot in Ferguson, however, was soon eliminated. The 
170-year blackout on compulsory process came to an end in Washing-
ton v. Texas.181 Chief Justice Warren's opinion compares· in scope 
with Marshall's sweeping opinions in United States v. Burr.182 Mar-
shall extended compulsory process to the period before trial and made 
it a means for discovery; Warren read it to reach beyond the mere 
production of ·witnesses and made it a means by which to have de-
fense witnesses heard. The opinion is important, beyond its imme-
diate holding, for its use of history, its standard of analysis, and its 
reliance on the specific words of the sixth amendment instead of the 
"fundamental fairness" requirement of due process. 
The facts were simple. The defendant, Jackie Washington, and a 
1 
man named Fuller were tried in a Texas state court for murder. 
Defendant Washington testified that Fuller took the gun from him 
before the shooting, that he tried in vain to persuade Fuller to with-
draw peacefully, and that he ran from the scene of the crime before 
the shooting started. In support he called Fuller as a defense witness. 
Fuller, who had already been tried and convicted, was ready to 
exonerate Washington by testifying that he acted on his own in firing 
the fatal shot. His offer of proof was material because he was the only 
other eye-witness to the incident, and it was reliable because it was 
corroborated in some respects by other testmony.183 Nonetheless, 
Fuller was disqualified from testifying on Washington's behalf be-
cause a Texas statute rendered "accomplices" incompetent to testify 
179. 365 U.S. at 586-89. 
180. See note 122 supra and accompanying text. 
181. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For another recent analysis of Washington see Comment, 
,The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right To Present a 
Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972). 
182. See text at notes 128-62 supra. 
183. Fuller was seen carrying the gun immediately after the shooting. 388 U.S. 
at 16. 
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for one another.184 Denied the opportunity to call Fuller as a witness, 
Washington was convicted and sentenced to fifty years in prison. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion in which all but Justice 
Harlan joined, unanimously reversed the conviction. The Court 
framed the compulsory process question broadly. The defendant was 
denied the benefit of Fuller's exculpatory testimony not because the 
state refused to compel Fuller's attendance at trial, but because under 
the statute his testimony was inadmissible: "We are thus called upon 
to decide whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the 
right under any circumstances to put his witnesses on the stand, as 
well as the right to compel their attendance in court."18i; The Court 
answered the question in the defendant's favor. It declared the accom-
plice statute unconstitutional under the compulsory process clause 
because it denied the defendant "the right to put on the stand a 
witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to 
events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would 
have been relevant and material to the defense."186 
The Court began by deciding that compulsory process is so essen-
tial to a fair trial that it must be deemed applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.187 The 
Court then determined that historically the compulsory process 
clause was designed to secure more than the presence of defense wit-
nesses: The framers intended to repudiate the ancient rule at com-
mon law that barred the defendant from calling witnesses in his 
favor, and, instead, to permit such witnesses to be heard: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as 
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth 
lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's 
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has 
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.188 
The Texas accomplice rule was invalid under the compulsory 
process clause because it "arbitrarily" disqualified an entire class of 
material witnesses from testifying for the defense. The disqualifica-
tion was arbitrary because it was based on "a priori categories that pre-
184. The statute provided in pertinent part: "Persons charged as principals, ac-
complices or accessories ••• can not be introduced as witnesses for one another • , , ," 
388 U.S. at 16 n.4. 
185. 388 U.S. at 19. 
186, 388 U.S. at 23, 
187, 888 U.S. at 18. 
188. 388 U.S. at 19. 
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sume [the witnesses] unworthy of belief ... " without any individual 
showing that they were untrustworthy, or that the jury was incapable 
of properly evaluating their testimony.189 
Washington's importance is greater than its immediate holding. 
First, the Court's use of history was significant, not only in concluding 
that compulsory process governs the testimonial competence of de-
fense witnesses as well as their personal attendance, but also in defin-
ing the constitutional standard for determining the validity of specific 
rules of competence. Justice Harlan, while agreeing that Texas de-
nied the defendant a fair trial by rendering his accomplice incompe-
tent to testify in his behalf, denied that the error had anything to do 
·with "compulsory process." The Court, he said, had "to strain this 
constitutional provision ... " to reach its result.190 As another com-
mentator put it: "The compulsory process clause . . • cannot be 
construed to give the defendant a substantive right to have the 
testimony of his witness entered into evidence. It gives the defendant 
only the right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his 
behalf-to have subpoenas issued for their appearance in court."191 
The Court rejected Harlan's literal construction in favor of a 
historical construction. Without detailing the long history of the 
defendant's right to present witnesses in his favor, the Court con-
cluded that the clause was originally intended to permit witnesses 
to testify for the defense: "The Framers of the Constitution did not 
intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right 
to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no 
right to use."192 The framers assumed they were providing some 
189. 388 U.S. at 22. The Court noted in the margin that it was not passing upon 
the constitutionality of "testimonial privileges" such as the privilege against self-
incrimination and the husband-wife privilege, or upon rules that disqualify individual 
witnesses "who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing 
events or testifying about them." 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
190. 388 U.S. at 24. 
191. Note, Criminal I.Aw-Right of Defendant To Have Testimony of Co-Partici-
pant, 20 BAYLOR L. R.Ev. 467, 472 (1968). Another commentator writes: 
The Court's reliance upon compulsory process • • • obscured the traditional 
distinction between compulsory process to secure witnesses and rules on com-
petency of witnesses to testify •••• 
The reason the Court ignored these traditional distinctions is that although 
freedom from arbitrary rules regarding competency • • • may be an essential fair 
trial procedure, this freedom is not specified in the Bill of Rights. • • • [T]he 
Court stretched the language of the sixth amendment to cover this case. 
Note, The Sixth Amendment Guarantee of Compulsory Process Is Violated by a 
State Statute that Bars a Co-participant in a Crime from Testifying on Behalfi of 
Another Defendant, 46 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 795, 797-98 (1968) (footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added). 
192. 388 U.S. at 23. The Court continued: 
rrJhe right to compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights in reac-
tion to the notorious common-law rule that in cases of treason or felony the 
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real protection for the defendant's case, and would have been sur-
prised at the suggestion that the courts had a duty to subpoena de-
fense witnesses but could arbitrarily bar them from testifying.103 
Their English ancestors had not struggled so long for something 
that could be circumvented so easily. Rather, the explicit right to 
subpoena witnesses carries with it an implicit right to put them on 
the stand to be heard. 
The Court next applied the compulsory process clause to the 
specific rule at issue. Having relied upon historical evidence to 
conclude that compulsory process bears upon general matters of 
competency, the Court rejected the "dead hand of the common-law 
rule of 1789"194 as a standard for measuring the validity of the Texas 
accomplice rule. It refused, in other words, to apply to compulsory 
process the same strictly historical test it apparently applies to the 
seventh amendment and other provisions of the sixth amendment.10G 
Instead of inquiring whether the accomplice rule existed at common 
law in 1789, the Court inquired whether the rule was "arbitrary" 
by present constitutional standards. 
Although the Court did not explain its simultaneous use and 
disregard of history, its approach is neither unprincipled nor un-
sound. The accomplice rule was itself an exception, even in 1789, to 
the prevailing principle that ·witnesses are competent to testify for 
the defen~e. The spirit and trend of the common law already fa-
vored the abolition of the remaining disabilities, including the dis-
qualification of accomplices.196 There is no reason to believe that 
accused was not allowed to introduce witnesses in his defense at all. Although 
the absolute prohibition of witnesses for the defense had been abolished in 
England by statute before 1787, the Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary 
specifically to provide that defendants in criminal cases should be provided the 
means of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the prosecu-
tion's, might be evaluated by the jury. 
The Court relied principally on Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States (1833). 
193. "In light of the common-law history, and in view of the recognition • • • 
that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part to make the testimony of a defen-
dant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court, it could hardly be argued that 
a State would not violate the clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible 
as a matter of procedural law." 388 U.S. at 22. 
194. 388 U.S. at 22, quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). 
195. For a description of the historical test used to define the seventh amendment 
in accord with the common law of 1791 see Wolfram, The Constitutional History of 
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973). The same test has been used 
to define the scope of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. See Salinger v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926). But see note 10 supra. 
196. For the history of the abolition of testimonial disqualifications during the 
nineteenth century see 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, §§ 492, 501, 509, 519, 575-76, 600, 
602. Virginia abolished the accomplice rule as early as 1849. See United States v. 
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the framers intended to freeze the defendant's constitutional rights 
forever in the form of rules already undergoing change. It is perfectly 
sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main 
and evolving principles of the comm.cm law without their accompany-
ing minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those 
principles in specific cases.197 
Second, having rejected the strictly historical standard, Wash-
ington is important for the standard of analysis it ultimately adopted. 
The Court construed the compulsory process clause to embody the 
principle that the government cannot "arbitrarily" disqualify wit-
nesses from testifying for the defense. The controlling factor is the 
standard it used in deciding whether the accomplice rule was "arbi-
trary." The Texas rule-formerly well-accepted at common law and 
routinely applied in the federal cmirts198-was 'not irrational. It as-
sumed that accomplices were unreliable witnesses because "each 
would try to swear the other out of the charge."199 
The Court nevertheless found the rule "arbitrary," not because 
it failed to prevent perjury, but because it employed means that were 
too drastic under the circumstances. Without so stating, the Court 
implied that the state had no "compelling interest" in using dis-
qualification as a means for avoiding perjury. The Court concluded 
that Texas could adequately satisfy its interest iri avoiding perjury 
without excluding the accomplice's testimony, by leaving its weight 
and credibility to the jury.200 It implied, in other words, that, given 
Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 362 (1851). For a review of Supreme Court cases in the 
area see Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). · · 
197. It is likely that the framers intended to guarantee only the fundamental 
principle that the defendant be permitted to call witnesses in his favor. Cf. Colegrove 
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1970); 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943): "The more logical conclusion, 
we think, and the one which both history and the previous decisions here support, 
is that the [Seventh] Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of 
jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural 
forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." 
198. See 2 J. W1c:r.10RE, supra note 56, § 580. In criminal trials the federal courts 
followed the rules of evidence of the states where they presided, as such rules existed 
at the time the states were admitted to the Union. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 361, 366 (1851). 
199. Benson v. United States, 146U.S. 325,335 (1892). 
200. The Court did not use an "alternative-means" analysis in so many words. 
However, it quoted a statement from Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S .. 467 (1918), 
that "'truth is more likely to be arrived at by" hearing the testimony of all persons 
of competent understanding • • • leaving credit and weight of such testimony to be 
determined by the jury or by the court ••• ,• " and then announced that "[a]lthough 
Rosen v. United States rested on nonconstitutional grounds, we believe that its 
reasoning was required by the Sixth Amendment.'' 388 U.S. at 22. The Court must 
have been referring to the above quotation in Rosen, rather than to its holding-, 
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the benefits of cross-examination and cautionary instructions, a jury 
determination of credibility constituted an adequate and constitu-
tionally permissible alternative for minimizing the dangers of per-
jury; therefore, despite its legitimate interest in avoiding perjured 
testimony. the state was not justified in imposing the onerous and 
unnecessary burden of disqualification on the defendant's constitu-
tional right to present witnesses.201 
Third, Washington is important because the Court construed the 
defendant's right to present witnesses in his favor without reference 
to the corresponding rights of the prosecution. Justice Harlan in-
vited the Court to invalidate the Texas rule not because it was 
arbitrary, but because it discriminated against the accused. The rule 
prohibited accomplices from testifying for one another yet permitted 
them to testify for the prosecution. Harlan could conceive of "no 
justification for this type of discrimination between the prosecution 
and the defense in the ability to call the same person as a wit-
ness ... .''202 He was unwilling to say, however, whether the disquali-
fication would be invalid if it applied "across-the-board"203 to the 
prosecution as well as the defense. 
The Court, while agreeing with Harlan that the rule was discrim-
inatory,204 refused to rest on that narrow ground. It distinguished 
between the discriminatory effect of the rule and its "arbitrary" 
effect. Even if the rule disqualified accomplices from testifying for 
both parties in the case, it was nonetheless "arbitrary" because it 
imposed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's constitutional 
right to present a defense. 
Finally, the case is important because it was decided on the specific 
words of the compulsory process clause, rather than on the general 
notions of "fairness" underlying the due process clause.200 Justice 
because Rosen involved a prosecution witness rather than a defense witness, and on 
its facts presented no sixth amendment issue. To say that truth is "more likely" to 
be arrived at by letting the testimony come in is to say, at the very least, that 
leaving credibility to the jury is an alternative that adequately protects against 
unreliable testimony. 
201. The "alternative-means" or "less drastic means" test is only a variation of 
"compelling state interest" analysis. To say that the state bas an adequate and less 
drastic alternative at its disposal is simply to say that the state has no compelling 
state interest in adhering to the harsher alternative. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968). 
202. 388 U.S. at 24. Harlan evidently believed that an accomplice is just as likely 
to perjure himself for the state (to win leniency) as for his friends. 
203. 388 U.S. at 25. 
204. 388 U.S. at 22. 
205. Another court had anticipated Harlan's approach a few months earlier by 
refusing to commit itself to a particular construction of the compulsory process 
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Harlan, who concurred in the result, argued that the conviction 
should be reversed on its "peculiar" facts because it denied the defen-
dant a fair trial. Rejecting the ad hoc approach of due process adjudi-
cation, the Court provided guidance for future cases by giving 
definite meaning to the more specific terms of the sixth amendment. 
III. THE PRESENT SCOPE OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The Supreme Court, after giving the compulsory process clause 
an expansive construction in Washington, did not return to the 
clause or to Washington for several years. Indeed, the significance 
of Washington seems not to have been fully appreciated by the 
practicing bar or the courts.206 Surprisingly, the Court itself again 
reached for less convincing grounds to resolve issues to which the 
compulsory process clause was more directly applicable. 
Brooks v. Tennessee207 is a good example. The defendant was 
tried and convicted under a statute that permitted defendants to 
testify in their defense only at the outset of their case, before hear-
ing the testimony of their other witnesses. The statute was de-
signed to minimize perjury by making it difficult for the defendant 
to tailor his testimony to conform to the testimony of his other wit-
nesses. Brooks, who did not wish to testify first, was denied permission 
to testify at the close of his case. He challenged the validity of the 
statute on the ground that it abridged his constitutional right to 
decide when to present himself as a witness for the defense. 
The Supreme Court, over the dissents of Justices Burger, Black-
mun, and Rehnquist, invalidated the statute. The parties neither 
argued the compulsory process clause's applicability nor cited Wash-
ington, and the Court analyzed the problem under other clauses of 
the Constitution. It concluded that by prohibiting the defendant 
from testifying at the close of his case the statute violated both his 
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel: the 
former by penalizing him for remaining silent at the outset of his 
case208 and the latter by interfering with his lawyer's "tactical de-
clause, instead invalidating the accomplice rule as a denial of the fair trial required 
by the due process clause. Bonner v. Be_to, 373 F,2d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 196'7). 
~06, See, e.g., United States v. Lacouture, 495 F,2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974): 
"Lacouture did not subpoena [the witness], and had she done so, her [compulsory 
process] rights would have been exhausted by [the witncss1 physical availability at 
court •••• " But see State v. Leong, 51 Hawaii 581, 465 P ,2d 560 (1970) (state com-
pulsory process provision). 
207. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
208. 406 U.S. at 607-12. 
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cision" to call him as a witness at the close of his defense.200 
Neither of the Court's reasons for invalidating the statute as 
applied to Brooks is convincing. The statute could have affected the 
defendant in one of two ways: It could have coerced him into taking 
the stand at a time when he would have otherwise remained silent or 
prevented him from testifying at a time when he wished to speak in 
his own behalf. Had the statute forced Brooks to testify when he pre-
ferred to remain silent it would have arguably abridged his privilege 
against self-incrimination. However, it had precisely the opposite 
effect on him. It prevented him from making an exculpatory state-
ment at a time when he preferred to speak. It did not abridge his 
right to remain silent. On the contrary, it compelled him to remain 
silent at the point in the development of his evidence at which he 
deemed his testimony most relevant.210 
Nor did the statute violate his right to counsel. The Court cited 
but failed to explain the relevance of Ferguson,211 in which the 
defendant's counsel was at least precluded from questioning the de-
fendant during the latter's statement. The Tennessee statute in 
Brooks, on the other hand, did not prevent counsel from doing any-
thing for his client, but rather prevented the latter from doing some-
thing for himself, namely, testifying at a time when his testimony 
was needed.212 
Whatever its errors in relying on the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel, the Court was clearly correct 
in invalidating the statute. The defe~t in Brooks was the same as in 
Washington: The statute "arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the 
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally 
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and 
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the de-
fense.''213 The accomplice in Washington was disqualified on the 
209. 406 U.S. at 612-13. Justice Stewart concuned only in the right to counsel 
rationale. 406 U.S. at 613. 
210. "Petitioner Brooks never took the stand, and it is therefore difficult to see 
how his right to remain silent was in any way infringed by the State. Whatever may 
be the operation of the statute in other situations, petitioner cannot assert that it 
infringed his privilege against self-incrimination-a privilege which he retained in-
violate throughout the trial." 406 U.S. at 617 {Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see 
Amsterdam, A Selective Survey of Supreme Court Decisions, 9 CRIM. L. BUI.I.. 389, 404-06 
(1974). 
211. 406 U.S. at 612. See text at notes 171-80 supra. 
212. "The crucial fact here is not that counsel wishes to have a witness take the 
stand at a particular time, but that the defendant-whether advised by counsel or 
othenvise-..:..wishes to determine at what point during the presentation of his case he 
desires to take the stand." 406 U.S. at 618 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
213. 388 U.S. at 23. 
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assumption that he would commit perjury by trying to exonerate his 
friend, while the defendant in Brooks was disqualified on the assump-
tion that he would commit perjury by tailoring his testimony to fit 
that of his prior witnesses. In Brooks, as in Washington, the Court 
suggested an alternative less drastic than disqualification, namely, 
permitting the testimony while leaving credibility to the jury.214 
The only difference between the two cases is that the witness in 
Washington was the defendant's accomplice, while in Brooks it was 
the defendant himself. But the compulsory process clause draws no 
distinction benveen the defendant and other "witnesses in his favor." 
While it is true that defendants at common law were incompetent 
to testify in their own behalf, that was not the issue in Brooks. The 
question was whether the state, having deemed the defendant fully 
competent, could arbitrarily regulate the timing of his testimony. 
Even if the defendant's competency to testify in his own behalf 
had been the issue in Brooks, the result would have been the same 
under the compulsory process clause. It is now widely accepted that 
the defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense.215 
Some courts ground the right in due process, 216 others in the right 
to counsel.217 It should be clear since Washington, however, that the 
right of the accused to call witnesses in his favor, including himself, 
rests upon the compulsory process clause. The most important wit-
ness for the defense in most criminal cases is the defendant himself. 
If, despite its unambiguous language, the compulsory process clause 
were held not to include the defendant, it would leave a major gap 
in the defendant's case. 
That defendants were deemed incompetent to testify in their own 
behalf in 1789 is immaterial. In invalidating the accomplice rule 
214. "This is not to imply that there may be no risk of a defendant's coloring 
his testimony to conform to what has gone before. But our adversary system reposes 
judgment of the credibility of all witnesses in the jury.'' 406 U.S. at 611. 
215. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (hearing requirements prior 
to revocation of parole); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1971) (state assembly 
contempt resolution and confinement without notice or opportunity to respond); 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) (dictum); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 
366, 391 (1898) (dictum); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1897) (dictum); Fowle 
v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53 (9th Cir. 1969); People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 
540, 545, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1970). The right of allocution (the right to address 
the court on the issue of punishment) can be considered part of the right to testify 
in one's own defense. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217-20 (1971). But cf. 
United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 938-40 (9th Cir. 1974). 
216. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (Clark, J., concurring). 
217. See, e.g., Pigg v. State, 253 Ind. 329, 331, 253 N.E.2d 266, 267 (1969). One court 
has even supported the right by quoting the fifth _amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), affd., 352 F.2d 
639 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (alternative holding). 
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in Washington the Court made it clear that the compulsory process 
clause does not codify the common law of 1789 in all of its detail, 
but rather stands for the general principle that-absent good reasons 
to the contrary-the defendant in a criminal proceeding should be 
permitted to present a case in his favor.218 Accordingly, the right of 
the defendant to testify in his mm behalf depends not on whether 
he could have done so historically, but on whether the state presently 
has a compelling interest in keeping him off the stand. In analyzing 
the rule that prohibits the defendant from testifying for the defense 
one must conclude (as have the federal government and all of the 
states) that the rule is arbitrary by contemporary constitutional stan-
dards.219 No legitimate interest is served by denying the defendant 
the benefit of his mm testimony that is not served by permitting him 
to testify and leaving his credibility to the jury. The language and 
purpose of the compulsory process clause are clear: The defendant 
has a constitutional right to call any material "witness," including 
himself. 
The Court, despite its lapse in Brooks, has been generally faithful 
to the promise of Washington since it was decided. The Court re-
ferred once to compulsory process by way of dictum;220 during the 
1972-1973 term it reversed four separate convictions by reference to 
Washington and on grounds consistent with a broad view of com-
pulsory process;221 and a few months ago, in the landmark case 
United States v. Nixon,222 it accepted and enlarged upon principles 
of presidential responsibility to the accused first announced by John 
Marshall in United States v. Burr.228 Although still vacillating be-
tween compulsory process and due process as a ground for its de-
cisions, the Court has said and done enough to support the conclusion 
that it recognizes a comprehensive right of the accused to present a 
defense through witnesses. As explored below, the right entitles a 
defendant to discover the existence of potential witnesses;224 to put 
them on the stand;225 to have their testimony believed;226 to have 
218. See note 193 and text at notes 194-95 supra. 
219. Georgia in 1962 became the last state to abolish the disqualification. 2 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579 (Supp. 1972). 
220. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1968). 
221. Warclius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284 (1973); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972); Webb v. Te..._as, 409 U.S. 95 
(1972). 
222. 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 23, 19i4). 
223. See text at notes 128-62 supra. 
224. See section IlIA infra, 
225, See section IIIB infra, 
226. See section IIIC infra. 
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their testimony admitted into evidence;227 to compel witnesses to 
testify over claims of privilege;228 and to enjoy an over-all fair 
balance of advantage ·with the prosecution with respect to the presen-
tation of witnesses.229 
A. The Right To Discover Exculpatory Witnesses 
Brady v. Maryland280 clearly established the defendant's constitu-
tional right to discover exculpatory evidence in the governmen,t's 
possession. Yet, despite the considerable attention given this right 
by both courts and commentators, there has been little inquiry into 
its constitutional source.281 Despite the strong precedent of the Burr 
opinions, the general assumption has been that the defendant's right 
of discovery rests on the general fairness requirement of due process. 
A sound argument can be made, however, that reliance on due 
process derives from a failure to distinguish the pre-Brady cases, deal-
ing with the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused, from the post-Brady discovery cases. United States v. Nixon232 
and other recent cases suggest that the Court is beginning to recog-
nize that certain kinds of discovery have a sounder conceptual basis 
in the compulsory process clause.283 
I. The Basis of Constitutional Discovery 
The original suppression cases, starting with Mooney v. Holo-
han,284 correctly relied upon due process. They did not purport to 
create affirmative rights in the accused, but to condemn deliberate 
misconduct by the prosecution. The defendant in Mooney challenged 
his conviction for murder by alleging that the prosecution had sys-
tematically manufactured false evidence against him and deliberately 
suppressed exculpatory evidence. The state responded by arguing 
that even if his allegations were true, they did not present a federal 
question. It argued that unless the prosecutor denies the defendant 
notice of the charges against him, or a hearing in which to present 
227. See section IIID infra. 
228. See section IIIE infra. 
229. See section IIIF infra. 
230. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
231. A. AMSI'ERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF 
CRIMINAL CASES-II § 270 (2d ed. 1971), is probably the best survey of the constitutional 
sources of discovery. 
232. 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 23, 1974). 
233. Cf. State v. Lerner, - R.I. -, 308 A.2d 324 (1973) (state compulsory process 
provision). 
234, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
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his case, his other actions "in and by themselves"235 can never violate 
due process. The Supreme Court rejected that "narrow view,"236 and 
went on to say, while remitting the petitioner to his unexhausted 
state remedies, that due process prohibits the prosecution from taking 
any action that offends "fundamental.conceptions of justice."237 
The suppression principle has since been applied to other kinds 
of misconduct. No longer must the defendant show that the prose-
cutor manufactured or suborned perjury: It violates due process for 
the prosecutor to exploit false testimony bearing on the defendant's 
innocence, whether he suppresses its falsity or permits it to go uncor-
rected.238 The rationale in both circumstances is the same, namely, 
that prosecutorial abuse produces "tainted" convictions,230 and that 
reversal is a necessary sanction to deter future "prosecutorial mis-
conduct."240 
The Brady rationale is completely different: The difference is 
between punishing suppression by the prosecutor and permitting 
discovery by the accused. The defendant Brady, unlike Mooney, 
made an affirmative pretrial request to examine certain statements 
in the government's possession. The prosecution gave Brady some of 
the material but failed to disclose an extrajudicial statement by his 
co-defendant that tended to exonerate Brady.241 Although there was 
no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court said: "[I]rrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution," due process is 
denied when material evidence "favorable to an accused" is withheld 
from a defendant who requests it from the prosecution.242 
235. 294 U.S. at 111-12 (emphasis original). 
236. 294 U.S. at 112. 
237. 294 U.S. at 112. "[I]f a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense 
of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty 
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony 
known to be perjured •.• [such a contrivance] is as inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." 294 U.S. at 112. 
238. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 
(1957). 
239. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
240. "[The due process] standard is well calculated to prevent the kinds of prose• 
cutorial misconduct which vitiate the very basis of our adversary system, and yet 
provide a firm line which halts short of broad, constitutionally required, discovery 
rules . • •• Mooney simply imposes sanctions upon specified forms of prosecutorial 
misconduct." Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117-18 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
241. 373 U.S. at 84. In his statement to the police the co-defendant took responsi-
bility for the actual killing. The statement, if believed, would not have affected 
Brady's conviction of first-degree murder, but might have persuaded the jury not to 
impose the death penalty. 
242. 373 U.S. at 87. Justice White, concurring, argued persuasively that the Court's 
discussion of discovery was pure dictum. 373 U.S. at 91-92. The Court has since 
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While Brady represented a major departure from earlier cases, 
the Court tried to trace its roots to the due process clause by reinter-
preting the earlier cases to conform to the new result. The due process 
principle of Mooney, it explained, was "not punishment of society 
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the 
accused."243 Brady, the Court implied, was not a new step, but simply 
an explicit application of what the suppression cases had meant 
all along.244 The Court would have done better, however, to ac-
knowledge that it was dealing with two separate principles.245 By 
obscuring the fact that Mooney involved deliberate prosecutorial 
misconduct the Court disparaged the theme of deterrence that proved 
useful in the past and would prove useful again in the future.246 
Moreover, by straining to derive Brady from the suppression cases 
the Court overlooked the separate constitutional interests that under-
lie discovery. 
Compulsory process provides a more appropriate constitutional · 
rationale for the principles of criminal discovery than does due 
process. Compulsory process was intended to permit the defendant 
to request governmental assistance ("process") to obtain exculpatory 
evidence ("witnesses in his favor"). Brady contains both elements: 
First, the defendant made an affirmative pretrial request for the in-
formation.247 The suppression cases, by contrast, involve passive 
defendants whose rights are measured solely by the propriety of the 
resolved any doubt on that score by unanimously reaffirming the Brady rule. See 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). 
243. 373 U.S. at 87. 
244. 373 U.S. at 87. 
245. For a discussion of the difference between the suppression cases based on 
punishing misconduct by the prosecutor and the Brady cases based on giving affirma-
tive discovery to the accused, see A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL &: M. MILLER, supra note 231, 
§ 317, at 2-247-48; Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose, 
40 U. Cm. L. REV. 112, 113-15 (1972); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty 
To Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964). 
246. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
247. Brady emphasized that the defendant had "requested" the exculpatory state-
ment. 373 U.S. at 87. The Court recently reaffirmed the relevance of a defense 
"request." Moore 'V· Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972). Although some lower courts 
have held that the prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory information without 
request, United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1964), it is 
generally assumed that, absent a request, the defendant must make a greater showing 
of materiality. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968). The 
difference in materiality is the difference between compulsory process discovery (request) 
and due process disclosure (no request). Compulsory process provides affirmative 
rights that the defendant can invoke only by making a proper request. See Calvert v. 
United States, 323 F. Supp. 112, 114 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (no denial of compulsory process 
for the government to fail to subpoena defense witnesses on its own initiative, absent 
a defense request). 
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government's conduct.248 Second, the requested information in Brady 
was favorable to the defense, because it tended to prove that the 
defendant had no part in firing the fatal shot.240 The key to the sup-
pression cases, on the other hand, is not the exculpatory nature of 
the suppressed evidence but the prosecutor's knowledge of the false 
or misleading impression created in its absence.260 Third, the defen-
dant in Brady could not obtain the favorable information-a state-
ment obtained by the police during interrogation-except by 
compelling the government to disclose it. Unless forced to light it 
would have remained in the unique possession of the prosecution.2r;1 
In sum, the discoverable information in Brady was precisely the kind 
of evidence that is subject to subpoena under the compulsory process 
clause. 
The courts, since Brady, have begun to recognize the controlling 
effect of the compulsory process clause. The shift from due process 
to compulsory process is perhaps most noticeable in the so-called 
"Jencks" cases. The original case, Jencks v. United States,262 like 
United States v. Burr, involved a defendant's request that the gov-
ernment produce the recorded statements of its witnesses for possible 
use in impeaching their testimony. The Supreme Court held that 
the defendant had a right to obtain the statements in order "to decide 
whether to use them in his defense."253 Although the defendant's 
right to discovery in Jencks turned on nonconstitutional grounds, 
the commands of compulsory process were "close to the surface."2M 
248. It is irrelevant in the suppression cases whether there has been a defense 
request: The focus there is not the defendant's affirmative rights, but the prosecution's 
unilateral obligations. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1968). 
249. It is an essential element of discovery under Brady that the evidence be 
"favorable." Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972). 
250. In the suppression cases, the defendant must show only that the prosecutor's 
conduct was willful, not that the suppressed information would have helped him. See 
Nash v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906, 906-07 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 
36 Ill. 2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473 (1966). Cf. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513-14 
(2d Cir. 1961) (only necessary to show willfnl misconduct that went uncorrected at 
trial). 
251. The defendant's right of discovery is said to be particularly strong with 
respect to evidence that is peculiarly within the control of the prosecution and not 
othenvise available to the defense. Cf. Xydas v. United States, 445 F,2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 293-94 (D.C. Cir, 
1966) (Burger, J., dissenting). In Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P,2d 681, 
114 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1974), the court imposed an active duty on the prosecution to 
utilize tools not available to the defendant to obtain evidence for him, 
252. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Congress subsequently modified the decision. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500 (1970). 
253. 353 U.S. at 668. 
254. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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Since then, following the path of several lower court opinions, 255 
the Court has explicitly acknowledged that "[i]t may be that in some 
situations, denial of production of a Jencks Act type of statement 
might be a denial of a Sixth Amendment right ... , for example ... , 
that criminal defendants have compulsory process to obtain witnesses 
for their defense."256 Any remaining doubts were dispelled by the 
unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon,251 holding that the Pres-
ident's duty to disclose tapes of his personal conversations with the 
Watergate defendants derived in part from their correlative right of 
compulsory process.258 
The "Jencks" cases not only help distinguish the compulsory 
process clause from the due process clause, but also from the sixth 
amendment's confrontation clause. Some commentators and at least 
one Justice have suggested that the defendant's right to discover im-
peaching evidence in the government's possession may rest on his 
right of confrontation.259 The defendant's right "to be confronted 
with the Witnesses against him"260 is said to include the right not 
only to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him, but also 
to discover and introduce evidence that may impeach them. 
This view of the right of confrontation, although tenable, has 
been rejected by the courts. The right of confrontation is exclusively 
a "trial right."261 It requires the government to bring the defendant 
face-to-face at trial with the witnesses who testify against him, thus 
affording an opportunity to cross-examine and impeach them through 
255. In United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952), the court 
held that compulsory process entitled the defendant to discover the pretrial statements 
of a prosecution witness. The Supreme Court cited Schneiderman with approval in 
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 n.13 (1957). See also Sosa v. State, 215 S.2d 736, 
740-41 (Fla. 1968). 
256. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969). 
257. 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 23, 1974). Justice Rehnquist participated in 
neither the consideration nor the decision of the case. 
258. "To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that 
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or by the defense." 42 U.S.L.W. at 5245. The subpoena for the White 
House tapes and documents had been requested by the special prosecutor, rather than 
by the defendants, but the Court made it clear that compulsory process would govern 
any comparable request by the defendants. See 42 U.S.L.W. at 5246 (dictum); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 875 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (the principles of Brady are "clearly 
within the sphere of influence of the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process guarantee"). 
259. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Mascarenas v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789 (1969); A • .AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL &: M. 
M!LLER, supra note 231, § 317, at 2:-246-47; Note, A Defendant's Right To Inspect 
Pretrial Congressional Testimony of Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388, 1396-98 
(1971); 58 MICH. L. REv. 888, 893-98 (1960). 
260. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. 
261. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
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direct questioning. It does not, however, require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial,202 or to 
produce the underlying information on which its witnesses base their 
testimony,263 or to produce their prior statements.204 In so far as the 
defendant seeks impeaching evidence by means other than examining 
prosecution witnesses, he seeks to produce evidence in his favor.206 
Therefore, in so far as he wishes to impeach them by producing their 
prior statements266 or by subpoenaing independent witnesses,207 he 
must rely on his right of compulsory process.268 
2. The Importance of Relying on Compulsory Process 
The rights of compulsory process and confrontation are designed 
to serve separate and distinct interests, and can therefore be exercised 
simultaneously without overlapping. The right to due process, on the 
other hand, is comprehensive; it is broadly framed to include many 
262. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967). 
263. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313-14 (1967); United States v, Williams, 
447 F.2d 1285, 1287-89 (5th Cir. 1971) (en bane); cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972), 
264. Courts finding a sixth amendment right to obtain the prior statements of 
prosecution witnesses have grounded that right in the compulsory process clause rather 
than the confrontation clause. See cases cited note 266 infra. 
265. See Comment, The Right to Production for Inspection of DoC!lments in 
Possession of the Government; Guaranteed by the Due Process Clawe7, 31 S. CAL, L, 
REv. 78, 82-83 (1957). In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Court held 
that the defendant's constitutional right to produce evidence that would impeach a 
principal witness against him rests on his right to discover evidence in his favor 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Cf. Levin v. Clark, 408 F,2d 1209, 1212 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (evidence that impeaches a prosecution witness is "favorable" to the 
defendant within the meaning of Brady). 
266. See, e.g., United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (dictum); United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United States v. Burr, 
25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp, 
731 (S.D. Cal. 1952). Cf. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 699-703 (M.D, Ga. 1974). 
267. Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 &: n.19 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.); 
Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 698-99 (M.D. Ga. 1974). But see Dutton, 400 U.S. at 
109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
268. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), nicely illustrates the difference between 
confrontation and compulsory process. The key witness for the prosecution was a 
juvenile with a prior criminal record. When the defendant tried to impeach the 
witness by questioning him about his criminal record the trial court barred the 
questions on the ground that the juvenile records were privileged information, The 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding, quite properly, that prohibiting the 
defendant from asking the witness material questions about his credibility abridged 
the defendant's right to confront the witness. If, on the other hand, the defendant 
had been allowed to ask the question and had received a negative response, his right 
of confrontation would have been fully satisfied. At that point, he would have been 
forced to impeach the witness not by questioning him but by subpoenaing the 
juvenile records and introducing them as part of his defense. In producing the records 
the defendant would clearly be relying not on his right of confrontation but on his 
affirmative right of compulsory process. 
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of the same interests protected by specific provisions in the Bill of 
Rights. The right to counsel, for example, while specifically protected 
by the sixth amendment, is also part of a defendant's general right 
to due process.269 The same is true of his right to discovery. While 
the Supreme Court could have decided Brady v. Maryland270 on 
compulsory process grounds, it did not act irrationally in deciding 
the case on due process grounds. 
It is entirely proper, therefore, to ask whether a choice between 
compulsory process and due process in the area of discovery-or in 
the other areas where they overlap-is of any consequence. Does it 
really make much difference which clause one relies upon, so long as 
the result and rationale are clearly understood? Perhaps not. None-
theless, there are supporting reasons, both practical and theoretical, 
for the proposition that wherever a court can decide an issue on one 
of two alternative provisions-one general, the other specific-its 
analysis should start with the more specific. 
First, the choice between a general and a specific clause may affect 
the outcome of a case. A court may be reluctant to reverse a convic-
tion where the defendant complains in general that he was denied a 
"fair trial" under the due process clause,271 .and probably will apply a 
more lenient standard of review in cases in which the defendant com-
plains of a more specific violation.272 
Brooks278 and Ferguson274 are instructive examples. The Court 
was closely divided in Brooks; the dissenters were unpersuaded by 
the majority opinion, believing that the majority had decided the 
case on personal preferences rather than on specific provisions in the 
269. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. 
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 630 (4th ed. 1974). 
270. See text at notes 230-33, 241-51 supra. 
271. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565, (1967): "In the procedures before us 
••• , no specific federal right-such as that dealing with confession&-is involved; 
reliance is placed solely on a general 'fairness' approach. In this area the Court has 
always moved with caution before striking down state procedures." 
272. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974): 
This is not a case in which the State has denied a defendant the benefit of a 
specific provision of the Bill of Rights . . • • When specific guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prose-
cutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them. But here the claim is 
only that a prosecutor's remark • • • by itself so infected the trial with unfairness 
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 
See also United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (citations 01nitted): 
"[A]part from trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a 
constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and safeguards are so 
relaxed or forgotten ••• that the proceeding is more a spectacle • • • or trial by 
ordeal ••• than a disciplined contest." Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1970). 
273. See text at notes 207-19 supra. 
274. See text at notes 171-80 supra. 
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Constitution.275 Perhaps the dissenters and Justice Stewart, who re-
fused to join the portion of the majority opinion concerning self-
incrimination, would have been persuaded by an opinion based 
squarely on the compulsory process clause.276 In Ferguson, Justices 
Clark and Frankfurter would have dismissed the challenge to the 
statute prohibiting the defendant from making sworn statements on 
the ground that it failed to present a "substantial federal question."277 
They might have felt differently had the defendant relied specifically 
on the compulsory process clause and shown that the clause was 
intended to permit defense witnesses to testify under oath on an 
equal basis with prosecution witnesses. 
A specific provision with definite standards may also answer ques-
tions left unresolved by a more general provision. An example is the 
question whether defendants have a constitutional right to depose 
witnesses before trial. Such an opportunity, presently granted by 
only a few states, 278 can be extremely important to the accused. It 
provides the only method by which he can compel reluctant witnesses 
to talk about a case before trial, or compel third persons to produce 
documents and tangible objects in their possession.279 By freezing 
testimony into a fixed form at an early stage of the proceedings it 
probably also reduces the incidence of perjury.280 Moreover, it is a 
device that the prosecution already fully enjoys, either directly 
through the subpoena power or indirectly through grand jury and 
police interrogation. 
The compulsory process clause provides no easy escape from the 
unavoidable task of constitutional analysis in this area. The validity 
of denying the defendant the opportunity to depose uncooperative 
275. See 406 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
276. See 406 U.S. at 618 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
277. 365 U.S. at 600. 
278. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(£) (requires demonstration of materiality and un-
cooperativencss); Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1972); TEX. CODE CRIM, P. 
arts. 39.04-.06 (1966), .02-.03, .o7 (Supp. 1973); VT. R. CRIM. P. 15. The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to take pretrial depositions only for the 
purpose of preserving testimony, and not for discovery. FED. R. Cru111. P. 15. See 
United States v. Bronston, 321 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3503, while broad enough to permit discovery 
depositions, has been construed to apply only in "organized crime cases." See United 
States v. Podell, 369 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974). 
279. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal 
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-83 (1960). Subpoenas for documents under rule 17 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, are not available for 
general discovery purposes. See United States v. Ferguson, 37 F.R.D. 6, 7 (D.D.C. 1965). 
280. See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. R.Ev. 293, 
311-12 (1960). For a description of the operation of defense depositions in one state 
see Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967). 
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,'vitnesses in advance of trial will depend in each case on whether 
pretrial interrogation or inspection of evidence is essential to the 
defendant's case, and whether there are adequate alternatives to 
deposing witnesses, such as interrogating them at the preliminary 
hearing or obtaining transcripts of their grand jury testimony.281 
Although the right to compulsory process does not avoid these prob-
lems, it represents a considerable advance over the use of the due 
process clause. It more clearly identifies not only the particular inter-
ests being weighed, but the appropriate ("compelling interest") stan-
dard for weighing them.282 
Second, sound jurisprudence justifies reliance on the more specific 
provision even where it does not produce different results. So much 
of the law of discovery has already developed under the due process 
rubric of Brady that a nominal shift to compulsory process at this 
point would probably not change the outcome of many cases. None-
theless, deciding discovery cases on the narrower ground would help 
advance the desirable process of construing the specific words in the 
sixth amendment. The words reflect underlying purposes; if those 
purposes are served in a particular case they should be applied rather 
than ignored. Indeed, to rely exclusively on the due process clause 
in the face of other applicable and more specific provisions in the 
Bill of Rights is to render the specific provisions mere surplusage. 
To give meaning to compulsory process in the discovery area 
would affect its meaning in other areas, perhaps contributing to im-
proved understanding of the purposes and intended operation of the 
281. Several courts have considered and rejected the compulsory process argument 
for pretrial depositions. See State v. Lampp, 155 S.2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), 
appeal dismissed, 166 S.2d 891 (Fla. 1964); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 541-42, 207 
A.2d 83, 93 (1965); State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966). Cf. State v. McDevitt, 
297 A.2d 58 (Del. Super. 1972) (requiring a witness to submit to pretrial interview 
with the defendant on nonconstitutional grounds). Some jurisdictions compel witnesses 
to submit to a mental examination when the defendant demonstrates its need. See, e.g., 
United States v. Butler, 481 F.2d 531, 533-35 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Falcetano, 107 
N.J. Super. 375, 258 A.2d 391 (L. Div. 1969). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968). 
282. See notes 200-01 supra and accompanying text. The same analysis can be applied 
to requests for grand jury transcripts. By compelling testimony and producing tangible 
evidence the grand jury gives the prosecution great advantages over the defendant in 
preparing for trial. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 47 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Although it would defeat the operation of the grand jury to allow the 
defendant to participate in its proceedings, he can be allowed to share the fruit of 
its work by being given the transcript. Some courts have already suggested that the 
defendant bas a due process right to discover grand jury testimony. See United States 
v. LaVallee, 344 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1965) (dictum); United States v. Eley, 335 F. 
Supp. 353, 358 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Cf. McMahon v. Office of City &: County of Hono-
lulu, 51 Hawaii 589, 591 n.3, 465 P.2d 549, 550 n.3 (1970) (dictum). If there is such a 
right, compulsory process seems the more appropriate basis. See State ex rel. Brown 
v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 794, 167 S. 687, 690 (1936) (defendant entitled to any grand 
jury testimony "material to the administration of justice"). 
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constitutional command in all stages of the defendant's presentation 
of his case. One reason why courts have been slow to recognize the 
relevance of the compulsory process clause to the admissibility of 
evidence283 and to the compelling of privileged testimony284 is their 
failure to apply it in other appropriate areas. The best way to discover 
the meaning of the clause is to begin applying it where it fits. As a 
by-product, that would also help define the meaning of "due process." 
So long as the due process clause carries responsibility for other pro-
visions it will not be free to develop its own individual standards or 
recognize its own particular purposes. 285 
Third, a decision grounded specifically in the Bill of Rights is 
likely to have greater precedential value than a due process decision. 
Although not always the case, 286 the prevailing due process test is 
whether the defendant was denied a fair trial under the "totality of 
the circumstances.''287 This test encourages courts to decide cases by 
lumping all of the facts together without identifying issues of partic-
ular importance or giving particular weight to the interests involved. 
It encourages decisions limited explicitly to their facts, rather than 
opinions containing useful guidelines for future cases.288 
283. See section IIID infra. 
284. See section IIIE infra. 
285. Due process relief should perhaps be reserved for cases in which the govern• 
ment proceeds in bad faith. A good example is the series of cases holding that the 
accused is entitled to be tried by an impartial judge. Although there is no specific 
right in the Constitution to an impartial judge, the Court has invalidated proceedings 
in which the judge "give[s] vent to personal spleen or respond[s] to a personal gricv• 
ance," Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); in which he acts from financial 
self-interest, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); in which he acts from a prosecutorial 
interest, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, Ul6 (1955); in which he retaliates against the 
accused for challenging the verdict, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. '111, '125 (1969); 
and in which he maliciously harasses the accused. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 
(1971) (dictum). 
286. Compare, e.g., the broad prophylactic rule in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, '125 (1969). 
287. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See also Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968). 
288. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302·03 (1973), and its preceden-
tial effect in United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 238 (9th Cir, 1973), cert, denied, 
415 U.S. 923 (1974). 
It is probably no coincidence that some of the judges who advocate deciding 
criminal procedure cases on the totality of their facts by relying on ad hoc notions 
of "fairness" also advocate upholding criminal convictions generally by deferring to 
the lower courts. See, e.g., Malinski v, New York, 324 U.S. 401, 41'1 (1945) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (emphasis added): "The fact that judges among themselves may differ 
whether in a particular case a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not disproof 
that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied. An important safeguard 
against such merely individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the 
state court under review." Justice Rehnquist is another example. He prefers to decide 
criminal procedure cases on the due process clause, rather than on more specific 
provisions of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 
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Finally, reliance on specific provisions in the Bill of Rights in lieu 
of reliance on the due process clause is more consistent with recent 
trends in the "incorporation" debate. Whether to apply the Bill of 
Rights directly to the states through the fourteenth amendment or 
to measure state conduct by the more general standard of due process 
has been a major constitutional issue of our time. While the debate 
is more complex than the present issue-involving as it does the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments-it is relevant 
here for what it says about the relationship between the specifics of 
the Bill of Rights and the due process clause. The prevailing view, 
best represented by the late Justice Black, holds that judges should 
decide cases whenever possible on specific provisions in the Bill of 
Rights; that the specific provisions contain objective "boundaries"289 
and are therefore less "nebulous"290 than due process; and that due 
process, because it has "no permanent meaning,"291 permits judges to 
make "subjective" decisions based on their own "predilections and 
understandings of what is best for the country."292 · 
It is unnecessary here to restate the various arguments regarding 
incorporation. Nor is it necessary to decide whether due process 
indeed denotes simply a "watered-down" version of the Bill of Rights 
or whether the specific provisions actually constrain a court's "predi-
lections" any more than the due process clause.293 The important 
point is that, for the present, Justice Black's view prevails. Until 
the emphasis shifts back to general due process analysis-and perhaps 
even then-courts should look first for guidance to the specific pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights. 
(1973) (finding error in a voir dire not on the basis of the right to trial by jury, but 
on the basis of the right to due process). He also believes that in reviewing criminal 
convictions under the due process clause the Court should apply a looser standard of 
review than when reviewing specific violations. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 42 
U.S.L.W. 4682, 4684 (U.S. May 13, 1974). It is not surprising, therefore, that during 
his two-and-a-half years on the bench he has not cast a single recorded vote in favor 
of reviewing a criminal conviction, and that in the forty criminal cases in which he 
has written opinions he has voted only three times to reverse the conviction below. 
See Jenkins v. Georgia, 42 U.S.L.W. 5055 (U.S. June 25, 1974) (reversing conviction for 
showing the movie "Carnal Knowledge"); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); 
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). 
289. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168-69 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
290. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). 
291. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
292. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). See also 
l\falloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964). 
293. Cf. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey 
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 335-40 (1957). 
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B. The Right To Put Defense Witnesses on the Stand 
The defendant who has discovered his witnesses and produced 
them in court294 ·will seek to put them on the stand. Some courts have 
implied that compulsory process refers only to the means for securing 
the attendance of witnesses at trial and that it does not deal with 
their competence to testify.295 That approach, however, is inconsis-
tent with the historical evidence that the framers intended to guar-
antee a broad right to present a defense.296 The narrow view, in any 
event, was firmly put to rest by Washington v. Texas,291 holding that 
the right to produce witnesses includes the right to have them heard. 
The competence of witnesses in criminal cases to testify for the de-
fense is now clearly a constitutional question, to be resolved in every 
case by compulsory process standards. 
Courts have been slow, however, to recognize the extent to which 
compulsory process "constitutionalizes" the law of evidence. The 
Supreme Court in Washington invalidated a state rule of evidence 
because it had the effect of denying the accused the benefit of mate-
rial testimony in his favor. There remain, however, numerous other 
state and federal rules that preclude witnesses from testifying for 
the defense. They take various forms. Some are rules of competence 
that explicitly disqualify certain witnesses. Others are rules of prac-
tice that effectively discourage witnesses from testifying. Each of them 
raises serious sixth amendment questions. 
294. The right of the defendant to compel the attendance of witnesses is a combi• 
nation of his constitutional right of compulsory process and various state and federal 
laws governing the issuance of subpoenas. The case law on the subpoena power is 
both extensive and technical, and exceeds the practical limits of this article. Since 
the purpose here is to map the broad implications of compulsory process, the specific 
issues surrounding the issuance of subpoenas are not developed here. Such issues, which 
deserve treatment in a separate article, include: whether indigent defendants can be 
required to pay the costs of issuing subpoenas for their witnesses; whether the state 
can set numerical limits on the number of defense subpoenas; whether the state 
can require an advance showing of good cause before issuing defense subpoenas: 
whether the defendant can insist that the state also execute his subpoenas; and 
whether there are territorial limits to the issuance of subpoenas to witnesses outside 
the forum. 
295. E.g., Gajewski v. United States, 321 F,2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 968 (1964); United States v. Maloney, 241 F. Supp. 49, 50 (W.D. Pa. 1965). Cf. 
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974), quoted note 206 supra. 
296. See text at notes ll'l-27 supra. 
297. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See Part II supra. Washington thus implicitly rejects Wig• 
mare's view that the compulsory process clause guarantees the defendant only the 
means for compelling the attendance of witnesses in his favor, and has no bearing on 
their legal competence to testify. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 69 0, 
McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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I. Rules of Competence that Disqualify 
Witnesses from Taking the Stand 
133 
The general rule of competence allows nonexpert witnesses to 
testify only as to matters about which they have personal knowl-
edge.298 An exception is made for "experts." No constitutional prob-
lem arises under the general rule unless "experts" or "personal 
knowledge" is defined so narrowly as to exclude reliable, relevant 
testimony concerning the defendant's innocence. In addition to the 
general rule, however, a variety of specific limitations disqualify wit-
nesses who are fully able and willing to testify from personal knowl-
edge. For present purposes, the specific disabilities may be divided 
into t1V'o groups: those designed to avoid untrustworthy testimony 
and those designed to further independent public interests (e.g., the 
confidentiality of jury deliberations). 
The disabilities apply in civil and criminal cases, both to witnesses 
for the plaintiff and to witnesses for the defendant. They present no 
problems under the compulsory process clause when applied to wit-
nesses in civil cases or to prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. The 
question, however, is whether they are constitutional when applied 
in criminal cases to disqualify witnesses for the defense. The answer, 
as proposed in the following discussion, is that a rule of competency 
that disqualifies a material witness from testifying for the defense is 
invalid unless the testimony is so untrustworthy as to be a waste of 
the jury's time, or its exclusion is necessary to further an important 
state interest that cannot be adequately satisfied by alternati~e means. 
a. Rules that disqualify witnesses to avoid untrustworthy testi-
mony. Rules in the first group declare witnesses incompetent on the 
ground that they are inherently untrusn'lorthy. During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries many such categorical disabilities were 
developed, based on irrebuttable presumptions that the testimony of 
certain witnesses was unreliable. Thus, witnesses were deemed in-
competent if they were "interested" in the outcome of the case (e.g., 
the defendant in a criminal case); "biased" in favor of one of the 
parties (e.g., co-defendants in a criminal case); related to one of 
the parties; children under certain ages; physically disabled; mentally 
deficient; or morally defective (e.g., convicted felons).299 Most such 
disabilities have been abolished or superseded by rules providing for 
298. McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 10 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) 
[hereinafter McCORMICK]. 
299. See 2 J. W1GM0RE, supra note 56, §§ 475-620. 
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individual determination of the testimonial capacity of particular 
witnesses.80° Children, for example, are no longer automatically dis-
qualified because they are below a certain age; a particular child is 
incompetent only if an examination indicates that he is incapable of 
recollecting and communicating what he has observed.301 
Some categorical disabilities, however, survived until recently, 
and others still remain. The "accomplice rule" invalidated in Wash-
ington, for example, declared accomplices incompetent to testify for 
one another on the assumption that they would falsify their testimony 
to exonerate one another.802 An analogous rule, disqualifying persons 
convicted of perjury, has devolved from the larger disqualification 
of persons convicted of infamous crimes.803 The assumption that con-
victed felons are too corrupt to be believed parallels the assumption 
that accomplices are too "interested" to be truthful. Although all 
states have now abolished the general disability for felons, 304 several 
still retain the disqualification for persons convicted of perjury,3011 
on the ground that regardless of moral fitness experience has shown 
such persons to be unreliable precisely as to their sworn testimony. 
The disqualification of perjurers is clearly invalid under the 
compulsory process clause if applied to preclude perjurers from testi-
fying on behalf of criminal defendants.306 The similar ban on accom-
plices was invalidated in Washington as one of a group of "arbitrary 
rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testify-
ing on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy 
of belief."307 Both rules operate in the same categorical fashion by 
attempting to reduce the risk of untrustworthy testimony by disquali-
fying whole groups of :witnesses who may or may not be unreliable. 
300. See id. §§ 492-501. 
301. In Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 339 P.2d 389 (1959), for example, a statute 
created a presumption against the competence of children under ten, but the court 
held that a child of five could testify if she were determined capable of observing 
facts and relating them accurately. For the current rules for insane persons see 2 
J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 492, at 584. 
302. 388 U.S. at 21. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 580; text at notes 198-99 
supra. 
303. McCORMICK, supra note 298, § 64. 
304. Id. 
305. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (Recomp. 1960); KY, REv. STAT. § 421.090 (1970); 
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 1 (Supp. 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-11 (1972); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 31-01-08 (1960); OKLA, STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 505 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 682 (1964); S.D. COMP. LAws tit. 19, § 1-4 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (1958); 
WASH. REv. CODE§ 5.60.040 (1956). 
306. Cf. McCORMICK, supra note 298, § 64. In Holman v. Lawhon, 362 F.2d 1 (5th 
Cir. 1966), the compulsory process issue was stated but not decided because the error 
was deemed harmless. 
307. 388 U.S. at 22. See text at notes 198-201 supra. 
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Each is "arbitrary," because the state can adequately satisfy its inter-
ests by a less burdensome alternative, namely, by permitting the 
witness to testify under oath subject to cross-examination, leaving 
the weight and credibility of his testimony to the jury.308 
Washington's importance lies not in disposing of the few cate-
gorical disabilities that remain, but in determining the standard to 
apply in deciding whether an individual witness is capable of testify-
ing in a particular case.309 Unfortunately, given the general satisfac-
tion with the prevailing procedure of examining each witness 
individually, too little attention has been given the· standard that 
courts should apply in determining individual competence. The lead-
ing authority goes so far as · to state that the courts have "very 
properly" declined to lay down any more than generalized rules of 
competence, and suggests leaving the standard to the unreviewable 
discretion of the trial court.310 Such a conclusion, however, ignores 
the clear implication of Washington: If disqualification of whole 
groups of defense ·witnesses by means of arbitrary categories is un-
constitutional, then disqualification of individual witnesses by means 
of arbitrary standards is equally impermissible. It would be unconsti-
tutional, for example, to disqualify a child from testifying for the 
defense on the ground that he lacked a perfect memory, or that he 
lacked the ability to express himself as well as an English professor. 
To disqualify the child under such a standard would be unconstitu-
tional for the same reason that it was improper to disqualify the accom-
plice in Washington: It prevents the jury from hearing a material 
witness for the defense whose testimony may well be reliable. The 
present task, therefore, is to define a standard of competence for 
individual witnesses that is consistent with the purpose of the com-
pulsory process clause. 
As with many guarantees, the standard is not explicitly stated in 
the Constitution. Nor was it clearly set forth in Washington: The 
Court there dealt with a categorical rather than an individual dis-
qualification. But the standard is implicit in the Washington analysis. 
308. See notes 200-01 supra and accompanying text. 
309. The Court in Washington distinguished the Texas accomplice rule from 
"nonarbitrary" rules that disqualify witnesses "who, because of infirmity or infancy, 
are incapable of observing events or testifying about them." 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. This 
approving reference was presumably to those rules of competence that disqualify wit-
nesses only after individual examination shows them to be unreliable. By 1967, when 
Washington was decided, the categorical rules concerning infants and the insane had 
been replaced by rules of individualized competence. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, 
§ 488, at 525 n.2. 
310. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 496, at 588. See also Weihofen, Testimonial 
Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 53, 56 (1965). 
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The Court held the accomplice rule invalid because it imposed an 
unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to present a defense-
unnecessary because the state could have protected itself from un-
reliable testimony without disqualifying the accomplice, simply by 
leaving the credibility of his testimony to the jury. Such a result 
implicitly assumes that perjury penalties, vigorous cross-examination, 
and cautionary instructions are adequate, by constitutional standards, 
to safeguard the state's interests. 
That the jury is deemed an adequate measurer of credibility bears 
directly on the standard for determining the competence of defense 
witnesses. It means that the defendant has a right to present any 
witness whose credibility is genuinely at issue, and that witnesses 
cannot be barred from testifying on his behalf unless they are so 
untrustworthy as to provide no basis short of pure speculation for 
evaluating their testimony. 
b. Rules that disqualify witnesses to further independent state 
interests. Rules in the second group declare witnesses incompetent 
for reasons unrelated to their reliability. Included are rules that 
disqualify spouses from testifying against one another, 811 jurors from 
testifying about their deliberations,812 judges from testifying in trials 
over which they preside, 813 and lawyers from testifying in cases in 
which they serve as counsel.814 These rules do not assume that the 
witnesses are unreliable. Indeed, that the witnesses are inherently 
believable, and therefore sought after, partly explains the perceived 
necessity to protect them from being called. 
The reasons for such disqualifications vary. Spouses are declared 
311. See, e.g., IoWA CoDE ANN. § 622.7 (1946). The defendant under such statutes 
would be unable to call the wife of another man to give exculpatory testimony in his 
case if her testimony would incriminate her husband. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 24 N.C, 
(2 Ired.) 284 (1842); State v. Bradley, 9 Rich. 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 1855). These incom-
petency statutes should be distinguished from the rule, now everywhere abolished, that 
once prevented wives from testifying for their husbands. See Funk v. United States, 
290 U.S. 371 (1933). They should also be distinguished from statutes giving spouses 
a privilege not to testify against one another, or a privilege to conceal their marital 
communications. For a discussion of th~ impact of compulsory process on testimonial 
privileges see section IlIE infra. 
312. See, e.g., Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, rule 
606, 56 F.R.D. 183, 264 (1972) [hereinafter Proposed Fed, R. Evid.J. The Rules were 
promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), but Congress passed a statute requiring express 
congressional approval before they take effect. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 
87 Stat. 9. The House, after extensive hearings, has passed such a bill, H.R. 5463, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which now awaits passage by the Senate, For a recent dis-
cussion see Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 
(1974). 
313, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 605, supra note 312. 
314. See Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 100 (1973); Annot., 52 A,L.R.lld 887 (1973), 
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incompetent to testify adversely about one another (even if their 
testimony would exculpate the defendant) in order to preserve the 
harmony of their marriage; jurors are incompetent to testify about 
their deliberations to spare them the harassment of unhappy litigants; 
lawyers and judges are incompetent to testify in trials in which they 
appear professionally to spare them inconvenience and possible con-
flicts of interest. In each case, the disqualification, like a testimonial 
privilege, is designed to protect independent relationships that have 
no direct bearing on the integrity of the fact-finding process. · 
To decide whether the rules can validly preclude material wit-
nesses from testifying for the defense one must determine whether 
the disqualification is necessary to achieve its particular goal.815 The 
prevailing standard, again, derives from Washington: The state may 
not use disqualification to further its independent interests if less 
drastic means are available.816 
This is not the place to analyze each rule separately to determine 
whether other means, short of disqualification, would adequately 
serve the same purpose. The purposes and the alternatives vary from 
rule to rule. Some problems are more easily solved than others. When 
the defendant wishes to call a presiding judge or a la'wyer as a witness, 
for example, a more appropriate alternative than disqualification· 
would be to declare a mistrial and begin the proceedings with a new 
judge or new counsel, thus permitting the defendant to call the 
witness. 
A more difficult question is whether disqualification is a proper 
instrument to use to force defendants to comply with rules of crim-
inal discovery. The Supreme Court has twice refused to decide 
whether a state may punish disregard of a notice-of-alibi statute by 
prohibiting the defendant from calling an alibi witness whose iden-
tity he has concealed from the prosecution.817 The question raised 
315. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 13 Cal. App. 3d 897, 91 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1970); 
Commonwealth v. Gatewood, 221 Pa. Super. 399, 293 A.2d 80 (1972); State v. Lee, 203 
S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943); State v. Stiltner, 61 Wash. 2d 102, 377 P .2d 252 (1962), 
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 924 (1965). 
316. Cf. text at notes 200-01 supra. 
317. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 83 n.14 (1970). Notice is intended to permit the state adequate time to guard 
against fabricated alibis. An example of a typical notice-of-alibi statute, requiring the 
defendant to disclose the nature of his alibi and his intended alibi witnesses, is 
Proposed Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules· of Criminal Procedure, adopted by the 
Supreme Court on August 1, 1974, 62 F.R.D. 271, 292-93, postponed by Congress 
until August 1, 1975. See Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361 - Stat. -, in 15 
CRIM. L. REP. 2460 (Aug. 28, 1974). Some of the state provisions give the trial 
judge discretion to exclude the alibi witnesses, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 (1967): 
others require the judge to do so, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218(4) (Supp. 1971); 
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by such a sanction is whether adequate alternatives exist to encourage 
pretrial disclosure of the alibi without precluding alibi witnesses 
from being heard.318 The less drastic alternative need not be equally 
efficient, so long as it is adequate. Washington did not suggest that a 
jury determination of the accomplice's credibility was as efficient in 
avoiding perjury as disqualifying the witness; the state would obvi-
ously prefer disqualification because it is fool-proof. By requiring the 
accomplice to be heard, however, the Court implicitly held that 
screening by the jury was an adequate alternative, and that the added 
effectiveness, if any, of disqualification did not justify the additional 
burden it imposes on the defendant.319 
Washington's standard applies to the use of disqualification to 
enforce the alibi rule. Where the defense fails to disclose its alibi 
witnesses because of excusable neglect, or because the witnesses were 
unknown at the time, a short continuance should be enough for the 
prosecution; since the essential purpose of the notice-of-alibi statutes 
is to give the prosecution a short time to prepare its rebuttal, a con-
tinuance should avoid any prejudice. Where the failure is due to 
deliberate misconduct by the defense attorney, a contempt citation320 
or a grievance complaint before his bar association would be a suffi-
cient sanction.321 Where the defendant's own deliberate misconduct 
is the cause, a contempt citation or comment on the credibility 0£ 
the concealed witness would provide adequate safeguards.322 In some 
still others limit the judge to the granting of continuances. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 585 (1969). Disqualification, when applied, is used not to eliminate unreliable 
witnesses but as a sanction to punish the defendant (and to deter future defendants) 
for violating the rule. 
318. For an excellent analysis of the problem in light of Washington v. Texas 
see Comment, supra note 181. 
319. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 
464, 467-68 (1969). 
320. See Comment, supra note 181, at 1359-60. 
321. Cf. Braswell v. Florida, 400 U.S. 873 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting), denying 
cert. to 230 S.2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 
1154-56 (5th Cir. 1972). 
322. Cf. State v. Leong, 51 Hawaii 581, 465 P.2d 560 (1970) (The witness remained 
in the courtroom after the judge announced that "any person who may be a witness 
in this case must leave the courtroom •••• " Held: "[T]he proper recourse against a 
witness who violates an order excluding witnesses should be by contempt proceeding 
for such conduct." 51 Hawaii at 586, 465 P.2d at 563.). For a survey of "e."clusion of 
witness" rules see Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 16 (1967). 
It is not enough to say that a defendant who deliberately violates his disclosure 
obligations thereby "waives" his right to present evidence. The defendant is not 
making a free choice between concealing the witness' identity and putting the witness 
on the stand: The choice is imposed by the state, without regard to his personal 
preferences. The question, therefore, is whether a mandatory choice is "necessary" 
to further a legitimate state interest. It would appear that the choice is unnecessary 
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cases a combination of sanctions may be appropriate. Whatever the 
particular sanction or combination of sanctions utilized to deter non-
compliance with the rule, total preclusion of exculpatory evidence 
is unnecessarily harsh. 
2. Rules of Practice that Discourage Witnesses 
from Taking the Stand 
The right to present a defense can be frustrated not only by rules 
of competence, but by rules of procedure that effectively keep defense 
witnesses off the stand. The injury to the accused is the same whether 
his witnesses are disqualified or effectively intimidated into silence. 
Compulsory process thus prohibits deliberate harassment,323 incar-
ceration,324 and removal325 of defense witnesses when done to prevent 
them from testifying. There are legitimate practices, however, such 
as penalties for perjury and vigorous cross-examination, that probably 
also discourage witnesses from testifying for the defendant. The task, 
therefore, is to find a constitutional standard to distinguish illegal 
intimidation from legitimate dissuasion. 
a. The prevailing standard. The standard for evaluating proce-
dural rules is not different from the standard for rules of competence. 
The question in each case is whether the state has a good reason to 
deny the defendant the benefit of exculpatory testimony. One could 
probably derive the standard indirectly from the competency cases, 
but the Supreme Court has made that unnecessary by its decision in 
Webb v. Texas.326 The Court in Webb reversed a state conviction 
because the trial judge had used such "unnecessarily strong terms" in 
warning a defense witness about the consequences of perjury that 
he "effectively drove that witness off the stand."327 
The only witness who was prepared to testify for the defense had 
a prior criminal record and was currently serving a prison sentence. 
The judge implied that he did not trust the witness to tell the truth; 
he advised the witness of his right to remain silent, and warned him 
if sanctions less than disqualification would adequately induce defendants to comply 
with their disclosure obligations. The state has no legitimate interest in imposing 
the sanction of disqualification on possibly innocent defendants if lesser sanctions 
(e.g., contempt) would serve its purposes without preventing the innocent from 
exculpating themselves. 
323. See, e.g., People v. Pena, 383 Mich. 402, 175 N.W.2d 767 (1970); State v. 
Kearney, 11 Wash. App. 394, 523 P.2d 443 (1974). 
324. See, e.g., Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1970). 
325. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1971). 
326. 409 U.S. 95 (1972). 
327. 409 U.S. at 98. The Court reversed the judgment below per curiam without 
hearing oral argument. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. 
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that if he insisted on testifying and committed perjury the judge 
would personally ensure that he was prosecuted and punished. The 
witness, after hearing the judge's remarks, changed his mind and 
refused to testify. The Supreme Court, quoting from Washington 
without explicitly mentioning compulsory process,828 reversed the 
defendant's conviction because "[i]n the circumstances of this case" 
the judge's remarks deprived the defendant of due process.329 The 
threats were harsher than necessary to advise the witness of his obli-
gation to tell the truth. 
While the Court quoted the judge's warning, it did not examine 
the particular words to determine whether less coercive terms might 
have adequately served the state's purpose; nor did it compare the 
warning with admonitions administered in other jurisdictions. In-
stead, the Court concluded that the warning was "unnecessarily" 
harsh from the fact that it was administered solely to the one witness 
for the defense, while "none of the witnesses for the state had been 
so admonished."330 The warning discriminated against the defendant 
by imposing special burdens on his witnesses not imposed equally 
on witnesses for the prosecution. This discrimination was sufficient 
to shift to the state the burden of justifying the "necessity" for the 
warning. Absent an explanation, the Court concluded that the state 
itself did not consider the warning very important, much less "neces-
sary" to accomplish its purposes.831 
The standard to be derived from Webb is that a practice that 
effectively deters a material witness from testifying is invalid unless 
"necessary" to accomplish a legitimate state interest. Some rules of 
practice would undoubtedly pass the "necessary" test: Promising a 
defendant lenient treatment in return for a guilty plea, for example, 
discourages the defendant from going to trial with his defense; yet it 
is constitutional because it is "necessary" to avoid overloading trial 
courts with criminal cases.832 
328. "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, 
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense •••• " 409 U.S. at 98, 
quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
329. 409 U.S. at 98. 
330. 409 U.S. at 96. 
331. The compulsory process clause was designed in part to equalize the "balance 
of advantage" between the state and the defense with respect to the presentation of 
their cases through witnesses. See section IlIF infra. Where a rule discriminates against 
the accused with respect to witnesses, it thus carries a presumption of invalidity that 
the state has the burden of rebutting. 
332. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 750-53 (1970). The same standard 
also permits the state to follow rules of practice that discourage the defendant from 
testifying as a witness in his own behalf. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 
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The more important part of Webb, however, is the test it used in 
deciding whether the admonition actually caused the witness to with-
draw. While a rule of competence directly prevents the witness from 
testifying, a rule of practice may or may not be the real cause of his 
silence. The lower court in Webb held that the defendant failed to 
sustain his burden of "showing that the witness had been intimidated 
by the admonition or had refused to testify because of it."833 The 
Supreme Court reversed that finding by shifting the burden of proof 
on the issue of causation. It was enough to show that the ·witness 
appeared willing to testify until receiving the warning and then 
withdrew.834 Once the defendant demonstrated that "the unneces-
sarily strong terms by the judge could well have exerted such duress 
on the witness' mind as to preclude him from making a free and 
voluntary choice whether or not to testify,''335 the burden shifted to 
the state to demonstrate the contrary. 
b. The problem of joinder. The most pervasive rules for driving 
prospective defense witnesses from the stand are rules of joinder. 
Most jurisdictions provide that defendants charged with offenses 
arising from the same transaction can be tried together.836 Joinder 
is a rule of convenience designed to expedite trials, reduce congested 
criminal dockets, conserve judicial and prosecutorial time, lessen the 
number of jurors called, and spare ·witnesses multiple appearances.837 
Indeed, because of the public interest in having joint trials the defen-
dant usually bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting 
from ajoint trial.838 
As a procedural convenience, however, the state's interest in 
joinder must yield when it conflicts with the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. Conflict can arise in several ways. For instance, a defen-
dant may challenge joinder as denying his right of confrontation 
when an out-of-court statement, otherwise properly used against his 
co-defendant, also incriminates him without affording an opportunity 
208-20 (1971), the Court held that the state's legitimate interest in having a unitary 
jury trial on the separate issues of guilt and sentence made it necessary to put the 
defendant to a choice that, in some cases, would discourage him from testifying on 
the issue of sentence for fear of incriminating himself on the issue of guilt. 
333. 409 U.S. at 97. 
334. 409 U.S. at 97. 
335. 409 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added). 
336. See generally Note, ]oinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 513, 513-14 (1967). 
337. See Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1969). 
338. See I c. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 223 (1969). 
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for cross-examination.339 Conversely, joinder may conflict with the 
defendant's right of compulsory process when witnesses who would 
othenvise testify become unwilling or unable to testify for him at a 
joint trial. The defendant in that case can challenge the joinder for 
driving his witnesses from the stand.340 
J oinder is also improper when it deprives the defendant of ex-
culpatory evidence that, although admissible with respect to him 
alone, is kept out_of the joint trial because its admission would im-
properly prejudice his co-defendants. Byrd v. Wainwright341 involved 
a defendant tried with co-defendants who had given pretrial con-
fessions that tended to exculpate him. Although the confessions were 
voluntary and probative, the co-defendants were able to exclude them 
from the joint trial on Miranda grounds. The Fifth Circuit court of 
appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that joinder had 
violated his constitutional right to present a defense by depriving him 
of exculpatory testimony that would have been admissible in his 
behalf at a separate trial.342 
More typically, joinder may deprive a defendant of testimony by 
co-defendants who, while willing to testify for him at a separate pro-
ceeding, refuse to take the stand at a joint trial. Thus, in United 
States v. Shuford,343 a co-defendant admitted that, although he could 
exculpate the defendant, he would not testify at his own trial for 
fear that impeaching evidence would prejudice the jury against him. 
The court held that the joinder was improper because it effectively 
discouraged a willing and material witness from testifying for the 
defense.344 
The principal difficulty in such cases is deciding whether joinder 
is the real cause of the co-defendant's silence: Would he remain silent 
339. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
340. Talavera v. State, 243 S.2d 595 (Fla. 1971); People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 93, 
97-98, 291 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316-17, 238 N.E.2d 715, 718 (1968); People v. Wells, 272 N.Y. 
215, 5 N.E.2d 206 (1936). Cf. People v. Sher, 69 Misc. 2d 847, 851, 331 N.Y.S.2d 166, 
170-71 (1972); Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228, 232-33, 285 A.2d 865, 867 (1971) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). But see People v. !senor, 17 Cal. App. 3d 324, 334-36, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 746, 753.54 (4th Dist. 1971). 
341. 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970). 
342. 428 F.2d at 1021. Cf. United States v. Martinez, 486 F.2d 15, 22-23 (5th Cir, 
1973) (nonconstitutional grounds). 
343. 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971). 
344. "We think that the denial of the severance, resulting in withholding this 
witness' testimony on such a critical point, so tipped the scales against [the defendant] 
that he failed to receive a fair trial." 454 F.2d at 777. Joinder of offenses can also 
deprive the defendant of a witness if it deters him from testifying in his own behalf 
on one offense for fear of prejudicing himself on the other. See Cross v. United States, 
335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
November 1974] Compulsory Process 143 
even at a separate proceeding? Courts have thus far treated such 
claims for severance with considerable skepticism.345 To require the 
defendant to demonstrate to a certainty that joinder silenced his co-
defendant, however, would seem to conflict ·with the Webb standard. 
Webb held that a warning that "could" intimidate would be pre-
sumed to int~midate, absent a showing to the contrary. Accordingly, 
once the defendant shows that his co-defendant may be able to ex-
culpate him-either by showing that the co-defendant has already 
exculpated him out of court346 or by reference to the nature of the 
offense347-and that joinder "could" tend to silence the ·witness, the 
burden should shift to the government to demonstrate that joinder 
would have no such effect. The defendant is entitled to severance 
whenever it is "more likely than not,"348 or there is a "substantially 
greater likelihood,"349 that his co-defendant would testify for him at 
a separate proceeding. 
Finally, joinder may deny the accused the benefit of a favorable 
inference from his co-defendant's invocation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. A co-defendant cannot be compelled at his own 
trial to take the stand or to testify against himself. Nor can any 
inference be drawn at his mvn trial from his refusal to testify.350 
Accordingly, in a joint trial a defendant may lose the benefit of any 
natural inference that might otherwise arise from a co-defendant's 
refusal to testify. Tried separately, on the other hand, the defendant 
is free to comment on his witness' refusal to testify, for the inference 
does not violate the witness' privilege unless the witness himself is 
on trial.351 In short, in so far as joinder deprives the defendant of 
345. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 338, § 225, at 458 &: nn.82-83. 
346. See, e.g., United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965). 
347. See, e.g., de Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962) (only one of 
two co-defendants was likely to be guilty, and each was the only witness able to ex-
culpate the other). 
348. United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965): "Speculation about 
what [the co-defendant] might do at a later Echeles trial undoubtedly would be a 
matter of some concern to Echeles, but he should not be foreclosed of the possibility 
that [the co-defendant] would testify in his behalf merely because that eventuality was 
not a certainty." 
349. United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
350. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). . 
351. It can be argued that just as the prosecution cannot draw an inference against 
the accused because a witness who should favor him remains silent, the defendant 
should not be able to draw an inference in his favor when a witness who should 
favor the state remains silent. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). The situations, however, are not comparable. An inference drawn against the 
accused because of a witness' silence would deprive the defendant of his constitutional 
right to cross-examine the witness about the inference. See Cota v. Eyman, 453 F.2d 
691, 696-97 &: n.5 (9th Cir. 1971) (Browning, J., dissenting). An inference may be 
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favorable inferences, it may abridge his right of compulsory process.M2 
The favorable inference problem arises where two co-defendants 
present mutually inconsistent defenses and only one is willing to 
testify in support of his defense.31i3 De Luna v. United States3M is an 
example. Defendants de Luna and Gomez were jointly tried for 
possessing narcotics. Although each claimed that his co-defendant was 
the culprit, only Gomez was willing to testify in his own defense. In 
doing so, he urged the jury to draw an inference against de Luna and 
in his own favor from de Luna's refusal to testify. The Fifth Circuit 
court of appeals reversed de Luna's conviction on the ground that 
comment on his silence violated his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Yet it observed that Gomez had a constitutional right to benefit 
from any favorable inference that might be drawn from de Luna's 
silence: 
These were not casual or isolated references; they were integral to 
Gomez's defense. And considering the case from Gomez's point of 
view, his attorneys should be free to draw all rational inferences 
from the failure of a co-defendant to testify, just as an attorney is 
free to comment on the effect of any interested party's failure to 
produce any material evidence in his possession or to call witnesses 
who have knowledge of pertinent facts. Gomez has rights as well 
as de Luna, and they should be no less than if he were prosecuted 
singly. His right to confrontation allows him to invoke every in-
ference from de Luna's absence from the stand.31i5 
The court was correct in holding that the right to a favorable 
inference has a constitutional basis, but mistaken in concluding that 
it derives from the "right of confrontation."356 Confrontation gives 
the accused the right to be brought face to face with the witnesses 
whose testimony is used against him. The defendant Gomez did not 
suggest that de Luna was a witness "against him" whom the prosecu-
tion had to produce for cross-examination. On the contrary, he argued 
drawn in favor of the accused because the prosecution has no right of confrontation 
to cross-examine the witness to test the inference. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 
536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
352. Cf. United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissenting): 
Talavera v. State, 243 S,2d 595 (Fla. 1971): Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228, 
232-33, 285 A.2d 865, 867 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
353. See United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289, 302 (5th Cir. 1973). Contra, 
United States v. Marques, 319 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Weinfeld, J.) (assertion 
of privilege against self-incrimination never carries an implication of guilt). 
354. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). 
355. 308 F.2d at 143. 
356. See United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1044 n.8 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., 
dissenting). 
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that he had an affirmative right to produce de Luna as a witness for 
the defense; he argued that he had a right to present de Luna's testi-
monial silence as evidence "in his favor." Accordingly, it was his right 
to compulsory process for witnesses in his favor, rather than his right 
to confront the witnesses against him, that supported his right to 
present the favorable inference and to claim a separate trial for 
that purpose.857 
c. The problem of trial order. Another practice that discourages 
witnesses from testifying for the defense is the scheduling of trials. 
A defend~t may argue that if his case were severed and he were 
tried after his co-defendants, they would testify in his favor. The 
argument assumes that the co-defendants would exculpate the de-
fendant were they not fearful of incriminating themselves; that once 
acquitted or convicted, their privilege of remaining silent disappears; 
and that once their privilege disappears, they can be compelled to 
testify for the defense. 
The argument raises several problems. Whether the co-defendants 
are likely to exculpate the accused may be difficult to determine in 
advance; the claim may simply be a ruse for delay. Furthermore, 
delay of the defendant's trial may be indefinite. Even if the co-
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination does not survive a 
plea of guilty or an acquittal, it survives a mistrial and probably 
survives a conviction, so long as appeals and collateral relief are 
available. Consequently, even were the court prepared to postpone 
the defendant's trial until after his co-defendants had been tried, it 
could not assume that they would then be available to testify. 
Nonetheless, where a certain sequence of trials is demonstrably 
likely to deny the accused an exculpatory witness, the court's ordi-
nary discretion over trial order must yield to the commands of the 
compulsory process clause. For that reason some states specifically 
provide that where the state's evidence against one of CTV'O co-defen-
dants in a joint trial is insufficient, the trial judge may acquit him at 
the close of the state's case, thus making him "competent'' to testify 
for the defense. 358 
Since the state's interest in trial sequence is largely tactical, a 
lesser showing of need should suffice to obtain a later trial than to 
obtain a severance. A showing that the co-defendant has already 
357. Cf. text at note 340 supra. If the analysis above is correct, it casts doubt on 
the constitutionality of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513, supra note 312, which 
would prohibit a criminal defendant from commenting upon or seeking an inference 
from a witness' assertion of privilege. 
358. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 309 (Recomp. 1959). 
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made out-of-court statements exculpating the defendant, for ex-
ample,359 or that the co-defendant is about to plead guilty800 (par-
ticularly where there is additional exculpatory evidence) should 
justify the delay. The circumstances of the offense may also justify 
proceeding first against the co-defendant. Thus, where the defendants 
are minor figures in a conspiracy who are relying on the principal 
figure to exculpate them, the trial court may order the principal 
defendant tried first and further surpervise the trial sequence in 
order to minimize the likelihood of prejudice to any defendant.801 
Judicial discretion over trial sequence, as with all discretion, should 
be exercised wherever possible to afford defendants an opportunity 
to obtain witnesses in their favor.362 
C. The Right To Have Defense Witnesses Believed 
The ability to put defense witnesses on the stand is important 
only if their testimony can be properly received by the jury. Rules 
of competence that once disqualified witnesses have increasingly 
given way to the general rule that all persons are competent, and 
that their particular infirmities instead affect the weight and credi-
bility of their testimony. Accordingly, comments and cautionary 
instructions on credibility have come to have a greater impact on 
the defendant's case than questions of competen~e.808 
Rules of credibility can have an impact similar to rules that dis-
courage defense witnesses from taking the stand.864 Consider the 
threatening remarks of the judge in Webb, who implied that he 
expected the witness to commit perjury.865 Such remarks can have 
one of two effects: They either wrongfully keep the witness off the 
359. See United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965): "[W]e do not 
feel it would have been egregious had the trial judge, after granting the motion for 
separate trial, also directed the Government to proceed first with the case against [the 
co-defendant]." 
360. See Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970). 
361. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 266 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. La. 1967). In 
Feehery v. State, 480 S.W .2d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), the court considered ordering 
a more favorable sequence of trials but concluded that even if the co-defendant liad 
testified for the defense his testimony would not have been material. 
362. Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 105-06 (1st Cir. 1974) (Coffin, J., dissenting) 
(hearing on revocation of defendant's probation should have been scheduled after his 
pending criminal trial to enable him to testify in his own behalf at the revocation 
hearing without fear of incriminating himself). Cf. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 
I, 8-9 (1970) ("appropriate" to delay a civil proceeding until termination of a related 
criminal proceeding, if delay would enable the civil parties to obtain testimony from 
witnesses who might otherwise invoke their privilege against self-incrimination). 
363. Weihofen, supra note 310, at 90. 
364. See text at notes 323-35 supra. 
365. See text at notes 327-28 supra. 
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stand by discouraging him from testifying,366 or, if he does testify 
and the jury hears the remarks, wrongfully diminish the credibility 
of his testimony.367 
Compulsory process is unquestionably concerned with the credi-
bility of defense witnesses. One of its principal purposes was to 
eliminate the imbalance in credibility resulting from the former 
practice of prohibiting defense witnesses from giving sworn testi-
mony.368 It guarantees the defendant the right to place his witnesses 
under oath so that their testimony might carry the same weight and 
credibility as sworn testimony for the state. The question, therefore, 
is not whether the compulsory process clause applies to rules govern-
ing the credibility of defense witnesses, but what its standards are 
for evaluating such rules. 
The Supreme Court set at least a minimum standard in Cool v. 
United States869 by invalidating ~vo jury instructions on the credi-
bility of a defense witness. The defendant's sole witness, an alleged 
accomplice, testified that the defendant was innocent of any responsi-
bility for the crime. The trial court instructed the jury that it should 
disbelieve the accomplice unless it found his testimony true beyond 
a reasonable doubt.370 The court instructed further that the un-
corroborated testimony of an accomplice is enough to support con-
viction, without revealing that such· uncorroborated testimony will 
also support acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction, holding that the first instruction violated the defendant's 
"Sixth Amendment right ... to present exculpatory testimony,"371 
and that the second instruction was "fundamentally unfair."s72 
While the Court did not articulate a governing standard in Cool, 
the two instructions were presumably invalid under the compulsory 
process clause because they arbitrarily discriminated against a de-
fense witness with respect to his credibility. The first instruction, 
requiring the jury to disregard the exculpatory testimony unless the 
jury found it true beyond a reasonable doubt, was invalid because it 
required the defense witness to satisfy a higher threshold of credi-
bility than that required of prosecution witnesses. The second in-
366. Cf. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 225 Pa. Super. 489, 311 A.2d 720 (1973). 
367. Cf. United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1973). 
368. See text at notes 52-61, 117-27 supra. 
869. 409 U.S. 100 (1972), decided the same day as Webb. As in Webb, the Court 
reversed the judgment below per curiam, without hearing argument, and the Chief 
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. 
370. 409 U.S. at 102-03 &: n.3. 
371. 409 U.S. at 104. 
372. 409 U.S. at 103 n.4. 
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struction, implying that uncorroborated testimony was sufficient 
to convict but insufficient to acquit, was invalid because it suggested 
that the same testimony counted for more when offered for the 
prosecution than when offered for the defense. In either event the 
jury was denied the discretion to weigh credibility. The instructions 
made it more difficult, as a matter of law, for the defendant than for 
the prosecution to prevail. Both instructions unjustifiably rendered 
a witness for the defense less credible than one for the prosecution. 
The discriminatory instructions in Cool were obviously invalid, 
because of their similarity to the former discrimination against the 
defendant with respect to sworn testimony and because the state 
made no effort to justify the discrimination.878 It is more difficult, 
however, to evaluate rules that, although applicable to prosecution 
and defense witnesses alike, unnecessarily discredit defense witnesses 
in individual cases. A good example is the rule allowing impeach-
ment with evidence of prior crimes. This practice can drastically 
affect the defendant's case: It may deter him from calling witnesses, 
including himself, who have committed prior crimes,874 and may 
discredit the prior offenders who do testify in his favor.876 On the 
other hand, the fact that a rule of evidence may operate to discredit 
a defense witness is not enough to invalidate it, for the same thing 
occurs when a defense witness is impeached with prior inconsistent 
statement5-:a practice the Supreme Court has approved.876 Perhaps 
because some rules that discredit testimony are valid, some courts 
have concluded that as long as they are nondiscriminatory and leave 
some discretion to the jury, matters of credibility cannot be chal-
lenged on compulsory process grounds.877 That standard, however, 
produces the unacceptable result of permitting the jury in some 
cases to draw wholly arbitrary inferences against witnesses for the 
defense. The task, therefore, is to define the standard that distin-
guishes the proper impeachment of witnesses from their improper 
discrediting. 
One standard would be to presume that impeaching evidence 
and cautionary instructions that effectively discredit defense witnesses 
373. For a discussion of the state's burden to justify rules that discriminate against 
witnesses for the defense see text at notes 496-502 infra. 
374. See United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.) 
(dictum). 
375. See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at TTial: Of Balancing and Other 
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. '163, 774-78 (1961). 
376. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
377. See, e.g., United States v. Nolte, 440 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1971); State 
v. Cartagena, 40 Wis. 2d 213, 161 N.W .2d 392 (1968). 
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are invalid unless the state can demonstrate that they serve a signifi-
cant probative purpose. Such a standard would permit impeachment 
of the defendant's witnesses with prior inconsistent statements, for 
that form of impeachment has been demonstrated to be the most 
effective way to show that a witness is lying or mistaken.878 How-
ever, it would not permit a defense witness to be impeached with 
evidence of prior crimes unless the state could demonstrate a sig• 
nificant link between the prior criminal conduct of a witness and his 
propensity to falsify testimony in an unrelated trial.879 
The above standard is consistent with compulsory process 
analysis. The "alternative means" analysis implicit in Washington 
prohibits the state from furthering its interests by burdening con-
stitutional rights where less drastic alternatives adequately serve its 
interests. A less drastic alternative is adequate by that analysis, even 
if less effective, if the added effectiveness of the more drastic alterna-
tive is insufficient to justify the latter's burden on constitutional 
rights. The analysis assumes, in other words, that constitutional 
rights cannot be burdened in the name of insignificant or incremental 
state interests. Unless the state can demonstrate a significant interest 
in using impeachment evidence and cautionary instructions to dis-
credit a defendant's case, the incremental interest served by those 
devices must yield to the defendant's right to present a defense.880 
D. The Right To Introduce Exculpatory Evidence 
The defendant who has qualified his witnesses under an appro-
priate standard of credibility must next introduce their testimony 
into the record. While the accused has an admitted constitutional 
378. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1017, at 994-95 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
379. See People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 343, 217 N.W,2d 22, 29 (1974) (Swainson, 
J., ooncurring). At least one court has held that impeaching a defendant with prior 
crimes abridges his constitutional right to testify in his own favor. State v. Santiago, 
53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). But cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), 
permitting introduction of evidence as to defendant's prior crimes for purposes of 
recidivism statute where jury was instructed that it should not consider the prior 
crimes as any evidence of the defendant's guilt on the charge on which he was being 
tried. The Court in Spencer, however, explicitly emphasized that it was not deciding 
whether such evidence is valid if it conflicts with one of the defendant's specific rights 
under the Bill of Rights. 385 U.S. at 565. The argument here is that the use of such 
evidence conflicts with his specific right to testify in his own favor and to call wit-
nesses to testify in his behalf. Cf. United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292, 1308 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (en bane) (dictum); People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 471, 474-76, 347 N.Y.S.2d 
336, 340-42 (1973). 
380. The incremental interest served by using the more drastic alternative comes at 
"too high a price." Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 620 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the effect of the order of proof, see text at notes 207-08 supra, on 
the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf). Cf. text at note 319 supra. 
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right to present evidence in his favor,381 some confusion exists con-
cerning both the source and scope of the right. 
The right to offer evidence is usually held to be grounded in the 
due process clause, either because the controlling cases were decided 
before Washington v. Texas or because of faulty advocacy. The more 
precise source of the right is the compulsory process clause-the 
opportunity to place defense witnesses on the stand and have them 
heard includes a right to admit their testimony into evidence. Indeed, 
this conclusion follows directly from Washington. Since the state 
cannot apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude material 
witnesses from taking the stand, it may not apply a rule of evidence 
that places them on the stand but arbitrarily excludes material 
portions of their testimony. The effect is the same whether the 
exclusion nominally operates as a rule of "competence" or as a rule 
of "evidence." The controlling issue in each case is whether the 
rule improperly precludes the trier of fact from considering material 
testimony in the defendant's favor. 
The more difficult problem is to define the scope of the defen-
dant's constitutional right to present evidence in the light of existing 
rules of evidence. For the purpose of analysis exclusionary rules of 
evidence fall into two (somewhat overlapping) categories: rules that 
exclude evidence because it is not probative and rules that exclude 
otherwise probative evidence because it is not sufficiently reliable. 
Rules in the first category, including standards of relevance and ma-
teriality, do not appear to raise compulsory process problems so long 
as the existing standards remain broadly defined.882 The defendant 
has a constitutional right to present "witnesses in his favor." Testi-
mony that is irrelevant in the sense that it does not logically tend to 
exculpate him is not testimony "in his favor"; testimony that is im-
material in the sense that it-or the issue to which it relates-cannot 
effect the outcome of the case is testimony of no constitutional 
significance. , 
The serious constitutional problems arise with rules in the second 
group, which exclude otherwise probative evidence on the ground 
that it is unreliable. Included are the opinion rule, which excludes 
381. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 4-2 U.S.L.W. 5190, 5198 (U.S. June 25, 1974); Hamling 
v. United States, 4-2 U.S.L.W. 5035, 5046 (U.S. June 25, 1974): Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J.); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 
610 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 489 (1972) ("opportunity ••• to present witnesses and documentary evidence''), 
382. State (and federal) standards of materiality and relevance could conflict with 
mmpulsory process if redefined so narrowly as to prevent the defendant from intro• 
ducing probative evidence "in his favor" that might influence the outcome of the trial, 
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testimony not based on personal observation or first-hand knowledge; 
the best evidence rule, which excludes copies of ·writings offered as 
proof of their material terms; and, most importantly, the hearsay rule, 
which excludes out-of-court statements offered to support the truth 
of the statements made. 
The controlling case in the area is Chambers v. Mississippi,383 in 
which the Supreme Court invalidated a state hearsay rule on the 
ground that it abridged the defendant's right "to present witnesses in 
his own defense."384 Chambers was tried for a murder to which a 
third person, McDonald, had repeatedly confessed out of court. 
When Chambers offered McDonald's confessions to prove his own 
innocence the trial court excluded them as hearsay. They did not 
fall ·within the res gestae exception because they were made a few 
hours after the murder; and they did not fall within the exception 
for declarations against interest because they were against 
McDonald's penal (rather than pecuniary) interest.385 Accordingly, 
by majority rule among the states, and by conventional hearsay 
standards, the confessions were unreliable and thus inadmissible. 
The Supreme Court reversed Chambers' conviction, reasoning 
that when a state rule of evidence conflicts with the constitutional 
right of the accused "to present witnesses in his own defense," the 
rule must be measured by fed~ral standards.386 Applying federal 
standards of reliability to the confessions, the Court concluded that 
they bore "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness"387 and must be 
admitted. For a variety of reasons developed below, it is difficult to 
derive a clear standard from Chambers, but it has been called poten-
tially "the most important constitutional law case in the field of 
criminal evidence that has come down in the last few years.''388 
Broadly construed, it appears to recognize that the accused in a 
criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to introduce any 
383. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Justice White concurred separately. Justice Rehnquist 
dissented. This author argued the case for the petitioner in the Supreme Court. 
384. 410 U.S. at 302. The Court cited Washington as the source of the defendant's 
right to present a defense, but spoke of it in terms of "due process" rather than 
compulsory process. There are several explanations: First, the author of the Chambers 
opinion, Justice Powell, opposes incorporating the specifics of the Bill of Rights 
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (opinion of Powell, J.). Second, the defendant had not 
mentioned the compulsory process clause as the basis of the right in the court below. 
385. 410 U.S. at 299. 
386. 410 U.S. at 302. 
387. 410 U.S. at 302 (" ... and thus [were] well within the basic rationale of the 
exception for declarations against interest''). 
388. Proceedings of the 1973 Sentencing Institute for Superior Court Judges, 112 
Cal. Rptr. app. 97 (1973) (remarks of Judge Otto M. Kaus). 
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exculpatory evidence, unless the state can demonstrate that it is so 
inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no rational basis 
£or evaluating its truth. 
The first problem with Chambers is reconciling the significance 
of the holding with the self-effacing tone of the opinion: The deci-
sion that the defendant had a constitutional right to introduce 
evidence deemed inadmissible under state hearsay rules was un-
precedented. Yet the opinion explicitly emphasizes that "we estab-
lish no new principles of constitutional law."380 I£ the contradiction 
between the decision and the opinion is indeed genuine, the legal 
profession will have to choose whether to follow what the Court did 
or what the Court said it was doing. 
There are several ways to resolve the contradiction. Whether 
Chambers announces a "new" constitutional principle depends on 
whether the case is narrowly or broadly stated. While no state had 
previously been prohibited from applying hearsay rules to exclude 
evidence in the defendant's favor, the broad principle that prohibits 
a state from suppressing exculpatory evidence was not "new"; indeed, 
that was the precise holding in Brady v. Maryland.300 In that sense 
the Court could conclude that the result in Chambers, however 
unique, was the product of "old" and accepted doctrine. 
Furthermore, in disavowing new "constitutional principles," the 
Court may simply have meant that it was deciding the case on its 
facts.391 The Court, when it enters uncertain and unexplored terri-
tory, frequently limits its judgment to the particular facts under 
consideration.392 This permits it to indicate what it believes to be 
the correct result without committing itself to a definitive rule for 
unforeseen variants of the immediate case, and allows lower courts 
and commentators to assist in refining the underlying "principles." 
In that sense, while making new law in the Chambers case itself, the 
Court did not use the case as a vehicle to announce new "principles." 
It left to others the task of defining the general principles underlying 
the law of that case. 
The second question raised by Chambers is whether the discus-
sion of exculpatory evidence, standing alone, is constitutionally 
supported. The case involved two separate errors: a refusal to permit 
the defendant to introduce exculpatory hearsay and a refusal to 
389. 410 U.S. at 302. 
390. See text at notes 241-51 supra. 
391. "[W]e bold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case 
the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." 410 U.S. at 303, 
392. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 33'1 (1969). 
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permit him to cross-examine the adverse testimony of one of his 
witnesses.893 The errors were essentially the converse of each other: 
The first was a denial of the defendant's sixth amendment right to 
present "witnesses in his favor" and the second a denial of his com-
panion sixth amendment right to confront the "witnesses against 
him." Although the Court discussed the errors in those terms, it did 
not have to decide whether either error alone justified reversal; it 
simply held that the two errors combined to deprive the defendant of 
a "fair trial" under the due process clause. 
To accept the consolidated decision too quickly, however, would 
be a mistake. The Court apparently blended the two constitutional 
arguments into a single "fair trial" decision for a procedural reason 
that had nothing to do with the independent nature of the argu-
ments. The major weakness in the defendant's case was his delay 
in raising his constitutional objections in the state courts.394 Instead 
of making separate constitutional objections to the errors at the time 
they occurred, he waited until after the jury verdict, and then argued 
that the exclusion of exculpatory evidence and the denial of cross-
examination combined to deprive him of a fair trial under the 
fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, without denying the dual bases 
of his contention, the Court evidently believed that the manner in 
which they had been raised required that they be treated as a single 
"fair trial" issue.895 
393. Cross-examination was precluded by the state's "voucher" rule, a common law 
rule denying to a party the right to impeach his own witness. "The rule rests on the 
presumption-without regard to the circumstances of the particular case-that a party 
who calls a witness 'vouches for his credibility.' " 410 U.S. at 295. 
394. The defendant made timely objections at trial to the various rulings on hear-
say and cross-examination, but based his objections on state law. 410 U.S. at 304, 310. 
He asserted the federal constitutional ground only after the jury returned its verdict. 
Justices White and Rehnquist, each of whom filed a separate opinion on the issue, 
differed as to whether the defendant had properly raised his federal claims. Both 
assumed that the defendant had failed to make a "contemporaneous objection," but 
they differed as to whether such an objection was required by state law. Justice White, 
concurring, decided that state law did not require a contemporaneous objection. 410 
U.S. at 307. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, decided that state law did require such an 
objection. Both, however, were mistaken in their initial assumption that the defen-
dant's failure to cite the Constitution during the trial was the failure to make a 
"contemporaneous objection.'' They confused the Mississippi requirement that an 
objection be contemporaneous-which the objections in Chambers surely were-with 
the additional requirement in some jurisdictions that the grounds for an objection be 
stated specifically. Whatever the scope of the contemporaneous-objection rule in 
Mississippi, it was fully satisfied by the defendant's general objections during trial. In 
short, the failure to cite the Constitution has no bearing on whether the federal 
claims were properly raised at trial unless it is shown that general objections are 
insufficient under Mississippi law, and that state law requires that objections be not 
only contemporaneous but specific. 
395. 410 U.S. at 290 n.3. 
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The Court in fact implied that either constitutional error alone, 
if properly raised, would justify reversal. The Court divided its 
discussion of the "fair trial" issue into two distinct and self-contained 
sections-one dealing with the defendant's right to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him, the other with the defen-
dant's affirmative right to introduce evidence in his favor-and em-
phasized that each had independent support in the Constitution. Not 
surprisingly courts have concluded that the two bases of the opinion 
are independent. 396 
The third and final problem is to define the standard for testing 
the admissibility of evidence in the defendant's favor. Over the 
objection of the dissent to the "further constitutionalization of the 
intricacies of the common law of evidence,"397 the majority held that 
the defendant had a federal right-despite state hearsay rules to the 
contrary-to introduce hearsay statements deemed trustworthy by 
federal standards. Unfortunately the ovenvhelming reliability of the 
particular hearsay in Chambers makes it difficult to determine what 
the Court would do in cases involving more questionable evidence. 
The out-of-court confessions by McDonald were inherently reli-
able for a variety of reasons: McDonald made his confessions spon-
taneously within a few hours of the murder; he made them to close 
acquaintances whom he had no reason to mislead; he gave the same 
confession to three different persons; he gave the confessions knowing 
that they were self-incriminating and likely to lead to criminal prose-
cution; his confessions were corroborated by eye-witness testimony 
that placed him at the scene of the crime, armed with what could 
have been the murder weapon; and he was present at trial and 
therefore available for cross-examination under oath about the truth 
of his extrajudicial statements. 
McDonald's out-of-court confessions were so inherently reliable 
that, had they incriminated rather than exculpated Chambers, they 
could have been used against Chambers without violating his right of 
confrontation. The confrontation clause, in that sense, is the con-
verse of the compulsory process clause: The latter guarantees the 
accused a basis for introducing evidence "in his favor," and the 
former guarantees the accused a basis for challenging the evidence 
396. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1973) (constitutional 
right to cross-examine adverse witness); Kreisher v. State, 303 A.2d 651 (Del, Super, 
1973) (right to introduce hearsay); Commonwealth v. Nash, - Pa. -, 324 A.2d 344 
(1974) (constitutional right to introduce exculpatory hearsay); Commonwealth v. Hackett, 
225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973) (right to introduce hearsay). 
397. 410 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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"against him."398 The confrontation clause creates a presumption 
in favor of cross-examination, and allows exceptions only where 
the unexamined statement against the accused carries such "indicia 
of reliability" that cross-examination would serve no additional 
purpose.soo 
In its confrontation cases the Court had already permitted use of 
the Chambers variety of hearsay against the accused. In California 
v. Green400 it approved use of out-of-court statements against the 
accused where the declarant is available for "full and effective cross-
examination at the time of trial."401 Similarly, a plurality in Dutton 
v. Evans4°2 held that a spontaneous declaration against penal interest, 
corroborated by independent evidence and made without any ap-
parent motive to mislead, could be used against the accused, because 
its inherent reliability made cross-examination unnecessary.403 The 
Chambers Court specifically referred to those earlier cases in rejecting 
the contention that McDonald's confessions were too unreliable to 
be admitted in favor of the accused.404 
At the very least, therefore, Chambers stands for the proposition 
that evidence that is sufficiently reliable by constitutional standards 
to be introduced "against" the accused is sufficiently reliable to be 
introduced "in his favor." Read together with Green and Dutton, 
Chambers might also support a principle of mutuality, namely, that 
the measure of reliability is the same, whether viewed under the 
confrontation clause or the compulsory process clause: Evidence 
reliable enough to incriminate is also reliable enough to exculpate, 
and only that evidence reliable enough to incriminate is reliable 
enough to exculpate.405 
398. "The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confronta-
tion Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining 
process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis 
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'" Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 
(1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). 
399. "It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown that Williams 
was not in a position to know whether or not Evans was involved in the murder." 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). See generally Davenport, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional 
Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378 (1972). 
400. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
401. 399 U.S. at 158-59 (alternative holding). See also Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 
622, 626-27 (1971). 
402. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
403. See generally Comment, The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay Rule 
and the Confrontation Clause, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 1167 (1974). 
404. 410 U.S. at 300-01. 
405. United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Bowles 
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Although mutuality has superficial charm, it ignores the differ-
ences between the right of confrontation and the right of compulsory 
process, and confuses their standards of reliability. The confronta-
tion clause is a guarantee that the accused will be able to cross-
examine the witnesses against him or, if not, that he will have a 
satisfactory substitute for testing the accuracy of their statements. 
Accordingly, when the state offers incriminating evidence against 
the accused that cannot be cross-examined, it must demonstrate that 
the evidence has such independent indicia of reliability that cross-
examination would serve no real purpose. 
The situation under the compulsory process clause is the con-
verse. When the defendant offers critical evidence in his favor as 
part of his sixth amendment right to present a defense, he has no 
constitutional obligation to demonstrate its reliability. Nor has the 
prosecution a constitutional right to "confront" the defendant's evi-
dence. To the contrary, the prosecution has a constitutional obliga-
tion to present some good reason for excluding exculpatory evidence. 
The prosecutor must show more than that the exculpatory evidence 
is inadmissible under a local rule; he must demonstrate that exclu-
sion is necessary to further a compelling state interest. 
The state undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in the reliability 
of criminal evidence. The question, however, is whether it may 
insist on using the rigorous standards of "confrontation" to test the 
reliability of the defendant's evidence. The high standard required 
by the confrontation clause for incriminating hearsay arises from 
a specific right of the accused. When the issue is the admissibility of 
exculpatory evidence the prosecution can assert no analogous right 
to offset the defendant's compulsory process guarantee. The test for 
exculpatory hearsay, therefore, should be whether an alternative to 
actual confrontation of the declarant will adequately serve the state's 
purposes without excluding the defendant's material evidence. 
The prosecution has several alternatives. When a witness relates 
the hearsay in court he can be placed under oath and questioned 
before the jury about the accuracy of what he heard. To that extent, 
the prosecution can "confront" the witness to test the reliability of 
v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), illustrate the desire to create mutuality 
between the prosecution and the defense with respect to criminal evidence. But see 
Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 385 (1967): "During 
this period of change there may well be instances where hearsay offered by the govern• 
ment will be excluded while like hearsay offered by the defendant will be admitted. 
Mutuality is not a doctrine usefully applied since the investigative resources of govern-
ment and defendant are often disparate. Moreover, the confrontation doctrine, insofar 
as it is applicable, is available to the defendant only." 
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his recollections. Although the declarant of the out-of-court state-
ment itself cannot be confronted, the prosecutor can comment and 
the judge can instruct on the weight the jury should give the evi-
dence. The weak.er the hearsay, the stronger the permissible com-
ment and the less the likelihood that the jury will be misled.406 
There is only one point at which the jury should not be allowed 
to consider the evidence-where the evidence is so inherently un-
reliable that it cannot rationally be evaluated. At that point, as with 
the testimony of children and the insane,407 the prosecution can 
exclude the evidence because it leaves the jury no basis short of 
speculation for determining its truth. Exclusion here is based not on 
the standards of confrontation but on the more fundamental notion 
that a criminal trial-indeed, any trial--ceases to be a judicial pro-
ceeding when the outcome rests on evidence that cannot be rationally 
considered.408 
The scope of the defendant's right to present exculpatory evi-
dence can be measured by its implications for two established rules 
of evidence. The first is the rule that a party may introduce presump-
tively reliable hearsay statements only if the declarant is unavailable 
to testify directly.409 The rule is designed to further the state's 
legitimate preference for oral testimony given openly in court by 
requiring that, whenever possible, the evidence come directly from 
a live witness.410 
The validity of such rules under the compulsory process clause 
depends on how broadly the "unavailability" requirement is defined. 
Some jurisdictions prohibit the defendant from using hearsay as 
substantive evidence whenever the declarant can testify in person, 
whether or not the declarant is willing to include and affirm the 
exculpatory statement in his direct testimony.411 Accordingly, if the 
406. Compare the plurality's statement in Dutton: "[T)he statement contained no 
express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on its face a warning to 
the jury against giving the statement undue weight." 400 U.S. at 88. 
407. See text following note 310 supra. 
408. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (a denial of due 
process may occur where eyewitness identification at trial follows a pretrial "photo-
graphic identification procedure [that] was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise 
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"); Thompson v. 
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (denial of due process to convict on the basis of 
evidence from which court could not rationally infer guilt). Rule 45(b) of the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence would permit the trial judge to exclude otherwise probative 
evidence only if he determines that it may "create substantial danger of ••• confusing 
the issues or of misleading the jury • • • .'' · 
409. McCORMICK, supra note 298, § 253. 
410. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a). See McCORMICK, supra note 298, 
§ 253. 
411. See, e.g., Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). 
158 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:71 
declarant repudiates his out-of-court statement, the defendant may 
not introduce the statement to establish its truth.412 The rule in those 
jurisdictions is invalid: It results in disallowing exculpatory evidence 
that, given the declarant's presence, can be verified by cross-exam-
ination.413 In other jurisdictions the declarant is deemed "unavail-
able" to testify to the statement if he repudiates it in his courtroom 
testimony;414 having given the witness an opportunity to affirm the 
out-of-court statement the defendant is then free to introduce the 
statement to prove its truth.415 The rule in those jurisdictions is 
valid because it serves the state's legitimate preference for direct 
testimony without abridging the defendant's right to present evi-
dence; the rule regulates the manner and timing of defense testimony 
without excluding it altogether. 
A second rule deems third-party confessions and other declara-
tions against penal interest generally admissible as an exception to 
the hearsay rule, but requires that such confessions be corroborated 
when offered by the defendant to show that he is innocent.416 The 
rule attempts to accommodate t\V'o conflicting assumptions: On the 
one hand, declarations against penal interest are likely to be true, 
and on the other, friends of the accused may confess falsely out of 
court to exonerate him.417 Unfortunately, the resulting balance 
conflicts with the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence. 
First, the corroboration requirement improperly discriminates 
against the accused. It makes declarations against penal interest 
412. In such jurisdictions prior statements may be introduced to prove that the 
witness' testimony is inconsistent, but not to prove the truth of what is asserted. 
See McCORMICK, supra note 298, §§ 34, 251, 253. 
418. If a hearsay statement is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in the declarant's 
absence, then, necessarily, it must be sufficiently reliable to be admitted in his 
presence; the availability of the declarant for cross-examination greatly enhances the 
basis for testing the statement's truth. Cf. Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 
(1946). Indeed, the defendant should have a right, even under the strict principle of 
mutuality, to introduce any prior inconsistent statement for its truth-regardless of its 
reliability-if it can be tested by cross-examining the declarant in court, cf. Chambers 
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973), for such statements arc now considered 
sufficiently reliable under the confrontation clause to be introduced against tl1e ac-
cused. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 153-64 (1970). But see People v. Gant, - Ill. 
3d -, -, 317 N.E.2d 564, 568 (1974) (dictum). 
414. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1235 (1966). 
415. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, supra note 312, for example, exclude 
certain presumptively reliable hearsay statements so long as the declarant is "available" 
to testify directly (rule 804), but permit introduction of such statements for their 
truth as prior inconsistent statements once the declarant repudiates them in his direct 
testimony (rule 80l(d)(l) ). 
416. See, e.g., Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923); Prop. Fed. 
R. Evid. 804(b)(4), supra note 312. 
417. See Advisory Comm. Note to Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(4), supra note 312, 
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generally admissible without corroboration, but places an extra 
burden on confessions that exculpate the accused. It imposes a 
higher threshold standard of reliability on evidence when offered 
in the defendant's favor than on the same kind of evidence when 
offered against him.418 Such discrimination is presumptively invalid 
until the state sustains the burden of demonstrating that third-party 
confessions favoring the defendant are more likely to be false than 
third-party confessions against him.419 
Furthermore, even a nondiscriminatory corroboration require-
ment would invalidly restrict the defendant's right to present evi-
dence. The corroboration requirement assumes that uncorroborated 
confessions are not only inherently unreliable, but that the only way 
to avoid misleading the jury is to exclude them. The second assump-
tion is constitutionally suspect. While some uncorroborated confes-
sions may be so questionable as to leave the jury with no rational 
basis for evaluating their truth, an unqualified assumption that all 
uncorroborated confessions are beyond the capacity of the jury to 
evaluate is improper. A defendant has a right to introduce material 
evidence in his favor whatever its character, unless the state can 
demonstrate that the jury is incapable of determining its weight and 
credibility and that the only way to ensure the integrity of the trial 
is to exclude the evidence altogether. 
E. The Right To Compel Witnesses To Disclose 
Privileged Information 
Rules of privilege that permit witnesses to withhold certain ' 
evidence from the court present a final obstacle to the full presenta-
tion of the defendant's case. Until the middle of the seventeenth 
century the power to produce witnesses included the power to 
compel them to testify,420 for there were few, if any, testimonial 
privileges entitling them to remain silent once in court.421 Today, 
however, the defendant's desire to compel testimony may conflict 
with a variety of state and federal privileges, both constitutional 
418. Some hearsay may be inadmissible against the accused for reasons having 
nothing to do with whether it is corroborated, because it violates his right of con-
frontation. However, where the right of confrontation has been satisfied, confessions 
implicating the accused may be introduced even though uncorroborated. See, e.g., 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule). 
419. See discussion of Cool v. United States, supra notes 369-72; text at notes 496-
502 infra. 
420. See 8 J. WrGMORE, supra note 297, at 64-68. 
421. The first privileges-the privilege against self-incrimination and the lawyer-
client privilege-did not exist before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, re-
spectively. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 185, 197-203. 
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and statutory. Thus, the defendant's right of compulsory process may 
conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination,422 the lawyer-
client privilege,428 the privilege for government informers,424 the 
confidentiality of presidential communications,425 the confidentiality 
of investigative governmental reports,426 the confidentiality of gov-
ernment personnel files and personal information submitted to the 
government,m the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings,428 the 
confidentiality of legislative deliberations,420 the privilege of foreign 
diplomats to decline to respond to subpoenas,430 and the privilege of 
newsmen to withhold the identity of their sources.431 
The compulsory process clause is directly concerned with any rule 
that effectively denies the defendant the benefit of exculpatory evi-
dence-whether it operates as a rule of competence, a rule of evi-
dence, or a privilege. Privileges, however, are sufficiently different 
from other rules to deserve separate analysis. Indeed, the Court in 
Washington, while striking do·wn a rule of competence on the ground 
that it abridged the defendant's right to present a defense, specifi-
cally reserved rules of privilege for future analysis on the ground 
that they are "based on entirely different considerations from those 
underlying the common-law disqualifications for interest."482 
Privileges differ from most rules of evidence and competence in 
terms of their purposes. Rules of competence, and exclusionary 
rules such as the hearsay rule in Chambers, are designed to promote 
422. See, e.g., Walden v. State, 284 S.2d 440, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); State v. 
Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 55 (Me. 1974) (based on state equivalent of compulsory process 
clause). 
423. In Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18, 20-21 (5th Cir. 1968), however, the court held 
that the action of the trial court in allowing an attorney to refuse to produce letters 
left in his possession was neither so "broad nor arbitrary" as to violate the right to 
compulsory process. 
424. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 76 Misc. 2d 547, 350 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
425. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5246 (U.S. July 23, 1974) 
(dictum); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
426. See, e.g., United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952); 
State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 553-57, 67 A.2d 298, 304-06 (1949). 
427. See, e.g., People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc. 2d 55, 347 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
Cf. People v. Bridgeforth, 51 III. 2d 52, 59-62, 281 N.E.2d 617, 621-22 (1972). 
428. See, e.g., State v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 S. 687 (1936). 
429. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 699-703 (M.D. Ga. 1974); Christoffel v. 
United States, 200 F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
430. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 7 F. Cas. 710 (No. 3914) (N.D. Cal. 1854). 
431. Cf. Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974). For an ex• 
haustive analysis of the factual and legal underpinnings of the newsman's privilege, 
including its relation to compulsory process, see V. BLASI, PRESS SUBPOENAS: AN El>t• 
PIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (n.d.); Murask.y, The Journalist's Privilege: Bram:burg 
and Its Aftermath, 52 TEXAS L REv. 829, 892-98 (1974). 
432. 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
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the integrity of the fact-finding process by excluding potentially 
unreliable or misleading evidence. Privileges, on the other hand, 
are designed to promote relationships and interests outside the court-
room by permitting witnesses to keep even reliable evidence secret. 
The extrajudicial interests they serve, such as the relationship be-
n\l'een a husband and wife and ben\l'een a client and attorney, are 
deemed more important than the unfettered determination of truth 
in judicial proceedings.4ss 
The question under the compulsory process clause is how to 
resolve the conflict between the extrajudicial interest in preserving 
confidentiality and the defendant's interest in disclosure. For the 
following analysis the various privileges are placed in three cate-
gories: privileges possessed by the government; the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which is possessed by individuals but controlled 
by the government's power to grant them immunity fro_m prosecu-
tion for their testimony; and private privileges, which are neither 
possessed nor controlled by the prosecution. Although each will be 
analyzed separately, the conclusion herein applies to all three cate-
gories: No interest protected by a privilege is sufficiently important 
to oun\l'eigh the defendant's right to establish his innocence through 
the presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence. 
I. Government Privileges 
The government possesses a number of testimonial privileges 
that permit it to keep confidential such matters as advice and opinion 
delivered in the course of decision-making, materials relating to 
national defense or international relations, investigatory material 
compiled for the purpose of law enforcement, sources of information 
about criminal activity ("informers"), and information routinely 
submitted under a promise of confidentiality.434 The interests served 
by these privileges are important, even compelling. Indeed, in so 
far as secrecy is necessary to the proper functioning of the national 
executive-for example, in military and diplomatic affairs-it may 
be constitutionally protected.435 
433. Privileges are quite similar in purpose to some rules of competence. See text 
at notes 311-22 supra. The principal difference is that privileges can be waived by 
the party possessing them, while rules of competence may not. 
434. See the specific exemptions from government disclosure in the Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See also Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 509-10, supra 
note 312. 
435. For the constitutional underpinning of privileges essential to the operation 
of the executive branch see United States v. Nixon, 42 U.SL.W. 5237, 5244-46 (U.S. 
July 23, 1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 6 n.9 (1953); Nixon v. Sirica, 
487 F.2d 700, 712-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
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Conflict benveen the need for secrecy and the right of a defendant 
to compel disclosure may arise in several ways. The defendant who 
alleges entrapment may move to disclose the identity of government 
informers.436 The defendant who believes he is the victim of dis-
criminatory prosecution may move to disclose the confidential con-
tents of the investigative file in his case.437 The defendant who wishes 
to impeach government witnesses at trial may move to disclose their 
confidential communications with government personnel.438 The 
defendant who believes he was the victim of an unlawful surveillance 
may move to disclose the existence of electronic devices whose place-
ment is a state secret.439 
In some cases the conflict can be avoided by a narrow construc-
tion of the privilege. In Jencks v. United States,440 for example, the 
defendant requested to be given the prior statements of government 
witnesses in order to impeach their credibility at trial. The Court 
held that the government's privilege to conceal pretrial statements of 
prosecution witnesses terminates when they testify. The privileges of 
state governments can be narrowly construed as well. In so far as 
federal courts recognize state government privileges,441 they can 
narrow them to avoid conflict with the defendant's interest in dis-
closure. Similarly, the state courts can minimize conflict with the 
defendant by construing their own government privileges nar-
rowly.442 
Where the conflict is unavoidable, however, the government must 
choose benveen its interests in prosecuting the defendant and pre-
serving the privilege. Thus, if the government prefers to prosecute 
Presumably there are comparable "legislative" and "judicial" privileges wherever 
secrecy is essential to the operation of the other branches of government. See NL"on 
v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716-17 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
436. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61-64 (1957). 
437. See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973). 
438. See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 692-95 (M.D. Ga. 1974); United 
States v. Mitchell, reported in N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1973, at 3, col. 3 (S.D.N.Y.). 
439. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180-84 (1969). 
440. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
441. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967): United States v. Woodall, 
438 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1970) (en bane); United States v. Krol, 374 F.2d 776, 
'178 (7th Cir. 1967). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26. State government privileges applied in 
federal prosecutions are "private" rather than "government" privileges (as those terms 
are used here), because they are neither possessed nor controlled by parties to the 
prosecution. 
442. See, e.g., People v. Bridgeforth, 51 Ill. 2d 50, 67, 281 N.E.2d 617, 625 (1972) 
(Schaefer, J., dissenting). 
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it must waive its privilege regarding the exculpatory evidence.443 If 
the government prefers to assert its privilege it must proceed with-
out the testimony of ·witnesses impeachable by the privileged evi-
dence, or, if the governm~nt withholds evidence forming an essential 
element of either the prosecution's or the defendant's case, it must 
waive the prosecution.444 Compulsory process does not deny the 
government's interest in secrecy, but prohibits the government from 
invoking secrecy at the defendant's expense.445 
The principle that requires the government to choose between 
443. "The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which 
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable 
to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to 
deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense." Reynolds 
v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). 
While we must accept it as lawful for a department of the government to suppress 
documents ••• we cannot agree that this should include their suppression in a 
criminal prosecution, founded upon those very dealings to which the documents 
relate, anil whose criminality they will, or may, tend to exculpate. So far as they 
directly touch the criminal proceedings, the prosecution necessarily ends any 
confidential character the documents may possess . . • . 
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.). Cf. United 
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) ("the prosecution must decide 
whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished [is] greater 
than the disclosure of such 'state secrets' as might be relevant to the defence'') (L. 
Hand, J., restating the holding in Andolschek); McCORMICK, supra note 298, § 109, 
at 234. 
444. The defendant's remedy depends on the prejudice he suffers from the assertion 
of privilege. If the assertion prevents the defendant from introducing evidence to 
impeach a witness against him the court should strike the witness' adverse testimony, 
or (if the prejudice is incurable) declare a mistrial. The Jencks Act, for example, 
provides for striking a government witness' testimony from the record "[i]f the 
United States elects not to comply with an order of the court" to produce a "statement 
or report" in its possession "which was made by a Government witness (other than 
the defendant)." 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). Alternatively, the court may "in its discretion 
• • • determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared." 18 
U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1970). If the assertion of privilege prevents the defendant from 
challenging the government's entire case or from establishing an affirmative defense 
of his own, the court must dismiss the prosecution. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 
U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). 
445. United States v. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 23, 1974), is no authority 
for the proposition that a court will order the executive branch to disclose evidence 
that it prefers to withhold at a cost to the prosecution. The executive branch for the 
purpose of that prosecution was not President Nixon, who preferred to withhold the 
evidence, but special prosecutor Jaworski, who preferred to produce it. The privilege 
was not a "government" privilege (as that term is used here) because it was asserted 
not by the prosecution but by the President as a third party to the suit with no control 
over the case. The Court ordered the evidence produced only because that was Jaworski's 
choice. The case would have been entirely different had Jaworski himself withheld the 
evidence by asserting some government privilege, or even the President's privilege to 
protect his confidential communications. In that event, having determined that the 
defendant was entitled to the evidence, the Court would probably have issued a con-
ditional order that unless the evidence were produced, the case would be dismissed. 
By doing so the Court would have left the ultimate choice between production and 
prosecution to the executive branch, where the choice effectively and properly belongs. 
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privilege and prosecution is inherent in the defendant's right of com-
pulsory process. It is well reflected in the resolution of Aaron Burr's 
subpoena for the Wilkinson letters.446 Probably the best illustration, 
however, is the line of cases involving the defendant's right to 
compel the government to produce its informers. In Roviaro v. 
United States441 the Court held that the informer was an important 
witness whom the defendant had a right to produce, and that if the 
government refused to reveal his identity to preserve his usefulness as 
an informer the case would have to be dismissed. The defendant was 
charged with illegally transporting narcotics, and with selling them 
to an unidentified government informer. The transaction between 
the defendant and the informer had allegedly been partly observed 
and overheard by two government agents. The defendant requested 
the prosecution to identify the informer so that the informer could 
be called to testify about the transaction. The government refused, 
asserting its privilege to conceal the identity of its informers, and the 
defendant was convicted. 
The informer would have been a material witness because he 
was the only other participant in the alleged crime, and the only 
person, other than the government agents, who observed it. He was 
in a unique position to contradict the government agents about the 
defendant's identity and state of knowledge, and to testify to the 
issue of entrapment. While recognizing that the government had a 
legitimate interest in protecting its sources of information by pre-
serving the anonymity of its informers, the Supreme Court held that 
the defendant had a superior "right to prepare his defense"448 by 
producing witnesses whose testimony "may be relevant and helpful 
to the defense."449 In language suggestive of compulsory process the 
Court put the government to the choice between continuing the 
prosecution and asserting its privilege.450 The Court has since held 
that a defendant has no constitutional right to discover the identity 
of an informer whose testimony relates only to collateral issues, such 
as the manner of arrest or the gathering of evidence against the 
446. See notes 156-62 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
447. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
448. 353 U.S. at 62. 
449, 353 U.S. at 60-61. 
450. "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the contents of his com• 
munication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a 
fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the 
trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, 
dismiss the action." 353 U.S. at 60-61. See also 353 U.S. at 65 n.15. 
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defendant,451 because the controlling issue is whether the govern-
ment's assertion of privilege would deny the defendant a material 
witness on the issue of "guilt or innocence."452 
While explicitly based on the Court's· supervisory jurisdiction 
over the lower federal courts,458 Roviaro's reasoning and language 
suggest that the decision was also constitutionally compelled. The 
Court first concluded that the government had a sufficient interest in 
preserving the confidentiality of its sources of information to support 
a federal "informer's privilege."454 It then defined the scope of the 
privilege, concluding that the privilege did not extend so far as to 
allow concealment of exculpatory testimony from the defendant in 
criminal cases.455 Significantly, however, the Court did not deny that 
a contrary result would serve the government's interest; indeed, the 
most frequent and acute pressure on the government to reveal its 
sources probably comes from criminal defendants. Rather, it held 
that the scope of the privilege is limited by "the fundamental re-
quirements of fairness"456 and "the individual's right to prepare his 
defense.''457 In short, while the Court defined the scope of the federal 
privilege on nonconstitutional grounds by weighing the two con-
flicting interests, one of those interests-giving the defendant the 
"right to prepare his defense"-is constitutionally based and would 
compel the same result on constitutional grounds. 
The lower courts, and at least one member of the Supreme 
451. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 812-14 (1967). But see Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 181-84 (1969). In Alderman the Court held, presumably as a 
construction of the fourth amendment (but see Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 
41, 88-91 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), that illegally seized evidence involving 
state secrets must be disclosed for the defendant's inspection when it allegedly taints 
the state's case. To that extent Alderman limits McCray, which refused to disclose the 
identity of a government informer to testify to an allegedly illegal search. The two 
cases are arguably distinguishable: Alderman involved an admittedly illegal search, 
while the legality of the search was the very issue in McCray. Nonetheless, both 
focus on whether the accused has a constitutional right to demand that the state 
disclose privileged information that relates not to his guilt or innocence but to the 
manner in which the evidence against him was gathered. In the face of the defendant's 
fourth amendment right to inspect the privileged information to show that it tainted 
the case against him, little may remain of the McCray bar of inspection of the same 
information to show that the underlying search was illegal. 
452. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967). Cf. People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 
2d 802, 808, 330 P.2d 33, !!6 (1958) (Traynor, J.). 
453. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 811 (1967), characterized Roviaro as "formu-
lating evidentiary rules for federal criminal trials." 
454. 353 U.S. at 59. 
455. 353 U.S. at 60-61. 
456. 353 U.S. at 60. 
457, 353 U.S. at 61-62. 
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Court,458 have taken the result in Roviaro to be constitutionally 
compelled. Although Roviaro purports to define only a federal rule 
of evidence, state courts have treated it as binding.4u° Federal courts 
have reversed state convictions on the implicit assumption that the 
rule is constitutionally based.460 Some courts have assumed that 
it derives from the defendant's constitutional right to a "fair trial" 
under the due process clause.461 Others have recognized, however, 
that the defendant's right to produce the informer is part of his right 
of compulsory process.462 To prosecute a person while withholding 
material witnesses in his favor is indeed "unfair," not only in some. 
general due process sense, but in the specific sense that it denies him 
access to evidence of his innocence. This is precisely the kind of 
unfairness the framers intended to prohibit by adopting the com-
pulsory process clause. 
2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The privilege against self-incrimination is the privilege that most 
frequently obstructs presentation of the defendant's case. The con-
flict between the defendant's interest in testimony and his witnesses' 
interest in silence arises so frequently because "many offenses are of 
458. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 644-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), 
459. Note, The Privilege of Withholding the Identity of an Informer, 28 U. PITI', 
L. R.Ev. 477, 479 (1967). Some states either explicitly or implicitly read Roviaro as 
constitutionally mandated. See State v. Benge, 110 Ariz. 473, 520 P.2d 843 (1974); 
People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d '748, 752, 349 P .2d 673, 675, 3 Cal. Rptr. I, 4 (1960); 
People v. Lewis, 57 Ill. 2d 232, 311 N.E.2d 685 (1974); James v. State, 493 S.W.2d 
201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. White, 10 Wash. App. 273, 518 P.2d 245 (1973). 
460. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Nelson, 298 F. Supp. 682, 675-87 (N.D. Cal. 1968), affd,, 
411 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1969). Cf. United States ex rel. Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174, 180· 
81 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847 (1964). 
461. McLawhom v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d I, 4-5 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkins v. 
Robinson, 367 F. Supp. 1025, 1029-35 (D. Conn. 1973). 
462. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 10 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1082-83, 295 N.E.2d 538, 541-43 
(1973); People v. Jones, 76 Misc. 2d 547, 350 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1973); Roberts v. State, 
489 S.W .2d 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) (based on statutory equivalent of compulsory 
process clause). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ennis, - Mass. App. -, 301 N.E.2d 589, 592 
n.2 (1973); Henry v. State, - Ala. App,-, 282 S.2d 387, 388 (Crim. App. 1973), The 
compulsory process clause applies not only to the informer privilege, but to any 
government privilege that has the effect of concealing material evidence from the 
accused. See Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (com, 
pulsory process clause requires the government to choose between the legislative privi-
lege of Congress to keep its executive deliberations secret and its prosecution of the 
accused); United States v. Powell, 156 F. Supp. 526, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (compulsory 
process clause requires government to choose between its executive privilege to issue 
passports and its prosecution of the accused); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. 
Supp. 731, 734, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1952); State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 553-57, 67 A.2d 
298, 304-06 (1949) (compulsory process clause requires state to choose between its 
privilege to withhold investigative files and its prosecution of the accused). Cf. text at 
notes 156-62, 445 supra. 
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such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testi-
mony are those implicated in the crime."463 Thus, a defendant 
·wrongly charged with conspiracy may call the other named con-
spirators to testify that he had nothing to do with their scheme. 464-
A defendant wrongly charged with a crime that someone else com-
mitted may call the other person to testify to his innocence.465 In 
each case the defendant's constitutional right to obtain witnesses in 
his favor conflicts with the constitutional privilege of his witnesses 
to refrain from incriminating themselves.466 
The conflict between the defendant's sixth amendment right and 
the witness' fifth amendment right may appear irreconcilable. In 
apparent response, some courts have held that the defendant's right 
must yield to the ·witness' privilege against self-incrimination, and 
that the defendant may be tried without the benefit of the exculpa-
tory testimony.467 
The conflict between defendant and witness, however, can be 
avoided. A witness can be compelled to testify so long as the govern-
ment does not later use his words against him in a criminal prosecu-
tion.468 The fifth amendment is not a privilege to remain silent, but 
a privilege against a subsequent prosecution of the witness based on 
his own words. Significantly, the privilege, while possessed by the 
individual, is controlled by the government. It is a privilege against 
prosecution, which can be negated by an offer of "use immunity," or 
the guarantee to the witness that his testimony will not be used 
against him. 
The government's peculiar control over potentially exculpatory 
·witnesses imposes a constitutional obligation on it to immunize them 
to obtain evidence in the defendant's favor. The government's 
interest in withholding use immunity is insufficient to outweigh the 
defendant's sixth amendment interest in producing exculpatory 
testimony. The grant of use immunity permits the defendant to com-
463. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). 
464. See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1968). The risk that guilt will be wrong-
fully attributed is particularly great in conspiracy cases. See Dennis v. United States, 
384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966). 
465. See, e.g., Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 
U.S. 921 (1967). 
466. See Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033, 1037-38 (D. Neb. 1972), revd. on 
other grounds, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973); Walden v. State, 284 S.2d 440 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1973); Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). But see 
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974). 
467. See, e.g., Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033, 1038 (D. Neb. 1972). 
468. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972). 
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pel testimony in his favor, without preventing the government from 
prosecuting the witness on evidence gathered from independent 
sources. 
The constitutional right of the accused to obtain immunity for 
his witnesses falls squarely ·within the language and purpose of the 
compulsory process clause. The clause guarantees the accused official 
"process" for compelling witnesses to appear and testify in his favor. 
It was adopted to give the defendant at least as much access as that 
of the prosecution to governmental devices for obtaining testimony. 
The grant of immunity, like the subpoena power, is an exclusively 
governmental device that is routinely available to the prosecution 
for obtaining testimony in its favor. Unless the defendant can be 
distinguished from the prosecution in significant ways, the defendant 
has a presumptive right to obtain immunity for his witnesses on an 
equal basis ·with the prosecution. 
The compulsory process argument for a defendant's right to 
obtain immunity for his witnesses finds some support among com-
mentators469 and lower courts.470 It also finds recent support in the 
Supreme Court's language and reasoning in Kastigar v. United 
States,411 a case immediately concerned not with the defendant's right 
to immunize his witnesses but with the prosecution's constitutional 
power to compel its witnesses to testify under grants of use immunity. 
In Kastigar a prosecution witness challenged the immunity statute 
on the ground that use immunity was insufficient to protect him 
against self-incrimination. He contended that compelling him to 
testify would necessarily supply the prosecution with information 
that could be used in prosecuting him. The Court disagreed, hold-
ing that the statute prohibited the government from using the 
witness' words, or evidence derived therefrom, for prosecutorial 
advantage. "We conclude," the Court said, "that [use] immunity ... 
leaves the witnesses and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially 
the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment 
privilege."472 
469. Comment, Right of the Criminal Defense to the Compelled Testimony of 
Witnesses, 6'1 CoLUM. L REv. 952, 956 n.19 (196'1); Comment, A Re-Examination of 
Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEc1s. '14, 79 (1972). 
Cf. McCORMICK, supra note 298, § 143, at 308 (the right may be based on due process). 
470. See United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (opinion of 
Bazelon, C.J.) (dictum); Talavera v. State, 243 S.2d 595 (Fla. 1972). But see United 
States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Lysczyk v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); State v. Shaw, 6 Ariz. App. 33, 429 P.2d 667 (1967), 
471. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
4'12. 406 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 3'18 
U.S. 52, 79 (1964). 
November 1974] Compulsory Process 169 
In discussing the government's interest in compelling witnesses 
to testify against the accused the Court recognized that the defendant 
has a constitutional interest under the compulsory process clause in 
compelling witnesses to testify in his favor.473 More importantly, how-
ever, the Court4s reasoning demonstrates that the government's inter-
est in avoiding the grant of immunity is insufficient to justify with-
holding its benefits from the accused. The government's strongest 
argument against immunizing defense witnesses has been that its com-
pelling interest in prosecuting the guilty justifies withholding amnesty 
from potential defendants.474 Kastigar makes clear, however, that the 
fifth amendment does not require that a witness receive unqualified 
amnesty before being compelled to testify; it is satisfied if he receives 
immunity from having his words used against him: 
[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege ... has never been construed 
to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. 
Its sole concern is to afford protection against being "forced to give 
testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to . . . crim-
inal acts.' " Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well 
as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this 
protection. . . . [T]he testimony cannot lead to the infliction of 
criminal penalties on the ·witness.4711 
Kastigar's analysis applies with equal force to the grant of use 
immunity to defense witnesses. The prosecution surrenders nothing 
by granting it: The incriminating statements that it cannot use 
against the immunized ·witness are statements that, absent immunity, 
would never have been made. The prosecution can hardly complain 
about immunizing defense witnesses because, as the Supreme Court 
said, the prosecution is in substantially the same position with 
respect to a witness after granting him immunity as before. 
Admittedly, the grant of use immunity may cause the prosecution 
some inconvenience in future proceedings against the witness because 
it requires the prosecution to prove that it gathered its incriminating 
evidence from independent sources. The inconvenience can be 
minimized, however, in several ways: granting the prosecution a 
continuance to gather independent evidence before hearing from 
the witness, certifying the government's evidence under seal before 
473. "The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are 
recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with 
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor." 406 U.S. at 443-44. 
474. See State v. Buchanan, 110 Ariz. 285, 518 P.2d 108 (1974). 
475. 406 U.S. at 453, quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956), 
quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). 
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the witness testifies, ordering the defendant to submit his proposed 
questions for the witness in advance, and requiring the witness to 
give responsive answers. 
In any event, the inconvenience is no greater than when the 
prosecution grants immunity to its own witnesses. If convicting the 
guilty justifies immunity for government witnesses, exonerating the 
innocent should justify immunity for defense ·witnesses. The public 
interest in each case is to determine the truth, and the standard for 
granting use immunity in each case should be the same, namely, 
,vhether it is "necessary to the public interest."476 Once the state 
makes immunity available to the prosecution it should not be per-
mitted arbitrarily to withhold it from the defense.477 
3. Private Privileges 
Most testimonial privileges are neither possessed nor controlled 
by parties to the prosecution. While they arise less frequently in 
criminal litigation than the privileges already discussed, they are 
perhaps more difficult to accommodate with the defendant's right 
to present a defense. 
Private privileges vary considerably in scope and purpose. Some, 
such as the privileges between lawyer and client, doctor and patient, 
and clergyman and penitent, protect confidential communications 
by giving the privilege to the person imparting the information. 
Others, such as the newsman's privilege, protect confidential com-
munications by giving the privilege to the person receiving the 
information. The privilege for husbands and wives takes a number 
of forms. Some states protect communications between husband and 
wife by giving the communicant a privilege to keep them secret; 
some protect the marital relationship directly (rather than protecting 
interspousal communication) by giving the witness a privilege not to 
476. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(l) (1970). 
477. See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
388 U.S. 921 (1967), suggesting that the accused may be denied due process if the 
prosecution grants transactional immunity to its witnesses while denying such immunity 
to defense witnesses in the same case. It is sometimes said that granting immunity is 
an executive function that is beyond the courts' power to enforce. See Ellis v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 791, 797 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The statement is misleading. Courts 
may force witnesses to testify by means of contempt citations, and can protect them 
from future prosecution by dismissal. Furthermore, even if they have no statutory 
power to grant immunity themselves, courts can force the prosecution to grant 
immunity by threatening othenvise to dismiss the case. See United States v. Paiva, 
294 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D.D.C. 1969). Nonetheless, it remains true that the prosecution 
can always avoid granting immunity to the witness by accepting dismissal. In that 
sense, while the courts decide whether the defendant has a right to immunity, the 
prosecution ultimately decides whether the right is to be satisfied via immunity or 
dismissal. 
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testify against his spouse; others protect the marital relationship in 
the opposite way, by giving the party a privilege to prevent his spouse 
from testifying against him; at least one state gives the witness a 
privilege not to testify in favor of his spouse.478 Each of the privileges 
is an experiment in using secrecy in the courtroom to foster a rela-
tionship outside the courtroom. 
a. Privileges that can be constitutionally narrowed. When a 
privilege conflicts with a defendant's constitutional right to present 
his defense, the personal or societal interest in secrecy must be 
measured by federal standards. A privilege that denies the defendant 
the benefit of exculpatory testimony for insufficient reasons is un-
constitutional as applied. 
The privilege for communications between physician and patient 
provides a good example. Its premise is that a doctor can diagnose 
and treat his patients only when fully informed about their condi-
tion. The privilege encourages candor by assuring the patient that 
disclosures to his physician will remain secret. But while the state 
has an interest in effective medical treatment and a rational basis 
for believing that confidentiality in the doctor's office will further 
that interest, it cannot demonstrate a compelling interest in permit-
ting physicians to suppress exculpatory information in a criminal 
proceeding. Even if the privilege actually promotes patient candor 
by suppressing medical information in civil cases, where it is in-
voked most often, society's interest in such candor is not likely 
to be harmed by permitting the physician to testify in the exceptional 
criminal case.479 Some states have already narrowed the privilege to 
bar its use in criminal cases, whether or not the evidence is excul-
patory or incriminating, much as the Supreme Court narrowed 
the privilege for presidential communications in United States v. 
Nixon.480 Others have barred use of the privilege whenever its 
478. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528-29 (1960) (witness has a 
privilege not to testify against his spouse in a criminal proceeding) (dictum); United 
States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973) (defen-
dant has a privilege in a joint trial to prevent his wife from testifying against him, 
even though her testimony would exculpate his co-defendant); Steeley v. State, 17 
Okla. Crim. 252, 187 P. 821 (1920) (defendant on trial for killing his wife's lover 
was barred from introducing his wife's privileged communications to him as evidence 
of his state of mind); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (1974) (a witness has a privilege not to 
testify in favor of his spouse). 
479. The privilege has been criticized as misconceived. The drafters of the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, see note 312 supra, have recommended abolishing 
the general privilege for communications between physician and patient, on the 
ground that they serve no real purpose. They would retain the privilege where the 
physician is a psychotherapist. See Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 504, supra. 
480. 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 23, 1974). See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 998 (1966). 
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application would frustrate the "proper administration of justice."4Bl 
Those states have defined the scope of their physician-patient 
privileges on nonconstitutional grounds by weighing the interest 
in secrecy against the interest in protecting the innocent. The 
same analysis, however, produces the same result on constitutional 
grounds, because one of the conflicting interests-the defendant's 
right to present a defense-is also constitutionally based. In sum, 
private privileges are unconstitutional as applied whenever the addi-
tional benefit derived from extending them to exculpatory informa-
tion in criminal cases is insufficient to justify their burden on the 
defendant's right to present a defense. 
b. Privileges that can be constitutionally modified. A constitu-
tional exception to the physician-patient privilege for exculpatory 
evidence is relatively easy to justify because the issue arises so seldom. 
The information doctors routinely seek from patients is rarely rele• 
vant to the guilt or innocence of third persons. The infrequent testi-
mony of a physician at a criminal trial will hardly deter the general 
flow of information between physicians and their patients. 
In marked contrast are privileges designed in part to promote 
communications concerning guilt and innocence. Privileges for com-
munications between lawyer and client and clergyman and penitent, 
for example, are designed to protect communications about activity 
that is frequently criminal. Clients and penitents involved in crime 
might be reluctant to consult counsel and clergy if the latter could be 
forced to reveal incriminating information in defense of third 
persons. The confidentiality that is at the core of these relationships 
might be destroyed if the privilege were not to apply in criminal 
proceedings. 
A wholesale criminal-trial exception to the lawyer-client and 
See also Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1458 (1966). Cf. People v. Christiano, 53 Misc. 2d 433, 278 
N.Y.S.2d 696 (Westchester County Ct. 1967) (discovery of hospital records), 
United States v. Nixon provides another example of a "private" privilege narrowed 
by the commands of compulsory process. The privilege was asserted by a person who was 
not a controlling party to the prosecution. See note 445 supra. The Court held that the 
"generalized interest" in the confidentiality of presidential communications must yield 
to the "constitutional need [reflected, in part, in the compulsory process clause] foi;f 
relevant evidence to criminal cases." 42 U.S.L.W. at 5246 n.19. The Court reasoned that 
the interests served by the privilege would not be "vitiated by disclosure of a limited 
number of conversations" because "we cannot conclude that advisers [to the President] 
will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks ••. because of the possibility 
that such conversations will be called for in the conte.xt of a criminal prosecution." 42 
U.S.L.W. at 5246. Cf. Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency 
Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. R.Ev. 40, 43-44 (1974); Kurland, United States v. Nixon: 
Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. R.Ev. 68, 73-74 (1974), 
481. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1969). 
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priest-penitent privileges is unnecessary, however, for compulsory 
process purposes. The privileges are unconstitutional, if at all, only 
in so far as they prevent the confidential communication from being 
used for the defense. The privileges can be modified to permit dis-
closure for the defense while prohibiting the disclosed information 
from being used against the client or penitent in future civil or 
criminal proceedings. 
The importance of distinguishing disclosure of a communication 
for the defendant from disclosure against the client is illustrated 
by Myers v. Frye.482 Defending against a charge of murder, the de-
fendant subpoenaed letters he had written his accomplice, because 
he believed they would establish his defense of insanity. The court 
refused to produce the letters on the ground that the accomplice had 
delivered them to his lawyer and that they were protected by his 
lawyer-client privilege. The court was concerned that the letters 
might incriminate the accomplice, and allowed that concern to out-
weigh the defendant's constitutional interest in producing evidence 
in his favor. The proper disposition would have been to order pro-
duction of the letters under a protective order that they never be 
used against the accomplice. A modified disclosure of that kind 
would have satisfied the defendant's right of compulsory process 
without substantially interfering with the relationship between the 
accomplice and his lawyer. 
The state's interest in encouraging candor can be substantially 
served by guaranteeing the client that his communications, if dis-
closed, will never be used against him in civil or criminal pro-
ceedings. The added benefits to the client of complete secrecy are 
insufficient to justify a burden on the defendant's constitutional 
right to present a defense. To apply the privilege that broadly is 
unnecessary and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
c. Privileges that cannot be accommodated. There remains a 
group of privileges that cannot be narrowed or modified in light of 
the right of compulsory process without defeating their purpose, such 
as the absolute privilege in some states for newsmen to conceal their 
sources, the statutory privilege of witnesses in some states to remain 
silent in the face of incriminating questions unless granted transac-
tional immunity, and certain federal privileges applicable in state 
criminal proceedings.483 They cannot be waived or controlled by the 
482. 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968). 
483. Although the federal courts in criminal proceedings have no obligation to 
apply state-created privileges, see cases cited note 441 supra, the state courts are 
undoubtedly bound by state privileges, such as the newsman's privilege, see Brown v. 
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party initiating the prosecution and cannot survive even limited dis-
closure to the defense. Any disclosure of a federal "state secret" or a 
newsman's source, except perhaps in camera, would defeat the state's 
strong interest in the privilege. 
Conflict between compulsory process and such absolute privileges 
may be resolved in two ways: Either the accused must go fonvard 
with his defense without the benefit of the privileged information 
or the prosecution must strike the portion of its case to which the 
information relates. The decision may depend on the materiality of 
the privileged information and the possibility of curing prejudice by 
permitting the jury to draw a favorable inference from the witness' 
silence. Ultimately, however, where the defendant can show that the 
i'.nformation is indispensable to rebuttal or to an affirmative defense 
the court must dismiss the charges. 
Dismissal finds support in the so-called "lost evidence" cases, in 
which the government fails to preserve exculpatory evidence for use 
at trial. Although earlier cases viewed dismissal as a penalty for offi-
cial misconduct and imposed it only where the prosecutor lost or 
destroyed the evidence in "bad faith,"484 the recent cases recognize 
that dismissal also protects the defendant's affirmative right to put 
on a defense.485 Accordingly, dismissal may be required even where 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974), as well as federal privileges made 
applicable to the states. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2. Some states provide by statute 
that witnesses have a right of privacy in the face of incriminating questions, which 
can be overcome only by grants of transactional immunity. See, e.g., People v. Breindel, 
73 Misc. 2d 734, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 914-04 (Supp. 1973); KY. 
R.Ev. STAT, ANN. § 432.070 (1966); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 50.20 (McKinney 1971). Since 
such statutory privileges go beyond what is required by the fifth amendment, they 
may be viewed as state-created private privileges. 
484. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
485. See United States v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dictum): 
"[T]he Government does not necessarily e."onerate itself from the penalty of the 
Uencks Act] by pleading so-called 'good faith.' Instead, the trial judge's effort must 
be to see that the defendant has access to previous statements of a witness to the full-
est extent possible under the terms of the statute, in order to further the interests of 
justice in the search for truth." 
The defendant in Johnson v. State, 249 S.2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), dismissed, 
280 S.2d 673 (Fla. 1973), moved that the prosecution produce the fatal bullet for the 
purpose of cross-examining the prosecution's ballistics expert. The court held that 
the defendant had an absolute right under the confrontation clause to the production 
of the lost bullet, and that whatever the reason for its absence, the prosecution witness 
could not testify without it. Although the Johnson court discussed the defendant's 
right to produce the bullet as if it were part of his constitutional right to "confront" 
the expert witness, the court must have intended to refer to the defendant's constitu-
tional right to produce evidence in his favor. See Commonwealth v. Cromartie, 222 
Pa. Super. 278, 281 n.2, 294 A.2d 762, 764 n.2 (Spaulding, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 954 (1972). The defendant's right of confrontation in Johnson was fully 
satisfied by the production of the expert witness in court for face-to-face cross-examina-
tion about his report. See United States v. Wi11iams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971), 
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the prosecutor has acted in good faith, if the defendant can show that 
the government's loss of the evidence frustrates his constitutional 
right to present ·witnesses in his favor.486 Thus, the defendant in one 
case requested the government to return his personal tax records so 
that he could show that his failure to file a proper return was not 
willful.487 Although the government had lost the records through 
no fault of its own, the court dismissed the indictment on the ground 
that the defendant could not defend himself without them: 
[I]t would, in the opinion of the court, be a denial of a constitu-
tional trial to compel the defendant to go to trial in the absence 
of records sought to be produced by the motion. 
. . . The fact that the records were lost and were not ·willfully 
withheld from the accused may place the government in a more 
favorable moral light, but this is no comfort to the accused, nor 
does it aid him in the preparation of his defense to the charges 
contained in the indictment.48B 
The same result should follow whether the information is un-
available because of loss or unavailable because of privilege. The 
good faith of the prosecution is irrelevant in both cases. The con-
trolling fact is that the defendant has been or is being deprived of 
information that may refute the state's case or affirmatively prove 
the case in his favor. Indeed, the rationale for dismissal is even 
greater where the exculpatory information still exists. The court in 
the "lost evidence" cases has the difficult task of evaluating the 
materiality of evidence that is no longer available for judicial inspec-
tion. In privilege cases, however, the court can view the evidence 
in camera.489 It can refrain from the extreme step of dismissal until 
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972). What was abridged by the loss of the bullet was the 
defendant's affirmative right to discover and produce evidence in his favor. The 
government's failure to preserve material evidence in the defendant's favor-including 
evidence to impeach the witnesses against him-violates his right of compulsory pro-
cess because it precludes him from effectively producing the evidence in court. Cf. 
United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969); United States v. Mendez-Rodri-
guez, 450 F.2d I, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1971); Application of Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 
864-65, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1959). But see People v. Eddington, 53 Mich. App. 200, 
207-09, 218 N.W.2d 831, 835-36 (1974) (the "lost evidence" cases raise no compulsory 
process issues). 
486. See United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1974) (Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
487. United States v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957), appeal dismissed, 
260 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958). 
488. 147 F. Supp. at 878-79. 
489. If a newsman, or a witness who has received use immunity, wrongfully 
refuses to make an in camera disclosure, the court will have to decide whether the 
circumstantial evidence indicates that the evidence withheld is material and excul-
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it has made a reviewable determination that the exculpatory evidence 
is material to the defendant's case. 
Further support for dismissal in the face of absolute privilege can 
be found in cases under the confrontation clause, involving conflict 
between the defendant's right to cross-examine the witnesses against 
him and the testimonial privileges of the witnesses to remain silent. 
The defendant in Davis v. Alaska,490 for example, was prohibited at 
trial from examining a juvenile delinquent about his motives for 
testifying for the prosecution because of the witness' personal privi-
lege to preserve the confidentiality of his juvenile record. The Su-
preme Court reversed on the ground that the assertion of privilege 
violated the defendant's right to confront a material witness against 
him. Without questioning the state's interest in creating a privilege 
for juvenile offenders, and without denying that cross-examination 
would frustrate that interest, the Court held that the defendant's right 
of confrontation was "paramount,"491 and that if the state wished to 
preserve the juvenile's privilege, it could do so "by refraining from 
using him [as a witness] to make out its case .... "492 
The same analysis applies to conflicts between claims of privilege 
and the "paramount" right of compulsory process. The only dif-
ference is the range of remedies. In confrontation cases, where the 
defendant poses his sensitive question in order to impeach a witness 
against him, the state can satisfy his interests while preserving the 
testimonial privilege by excusing the witness from testifying. In 
compulsory process cases that remedy is adequate only if the defen-
dant seeks the privileged evidence in order to impeach a witness 
against him;493 if he seeks the evidence to rebut the state's case or to 
support an affirmative defense, the only remedy that adequately satis-
fies his interests while preserving the privilege is dismissal of the 
prosecution. In each case the state is forced to choose between pre-
serving the private privilege and presenting an effective case. Indeed, 
patory. For a good example of the compulsory process standard used to determine 
whether a case must be dismissed because of a missing witness see United States v. 
Perlman, 430 F.2d 22, 25-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970). It can be 
argued, although no case has directly so held, that some privileges require such ab• 
solute secrecy that they would be defeated even by in camera disclosure to the judge. 
Cf. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81, 84 (1973); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 
IO (1952); Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 509(c), supra note 312. 
490. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
491. 415 U.S. at 319. 
492. 415 U.S. at 320. 
493. See notes 268, 444 supra. 
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in many cases, as in Davis itself, the ultimate consequences are the 
same; the prosecution dismisses its case directly or dismisses it in-
directly by eliminating a witness whose testimony is "crucial."494 
Dismissal in the face of an asserted privilege also finds support in 
cases concerning the government's privilege to conceal the identity 
of its informers. The courts use the language of "waiver" in discuss-
ing the government's obligation to choose between preserving the 
anonymity of its informers and prosecuting the accused.495 In so far 
as the government prosecutes, it must waive its privilege; in so far 
as it asserts the privilege, it must waive the prosecution and, if neces-
sary, dismiss its case against the accused. 
In the context of compulsory process, "waiver" is really a choice 
exacted by the Constitution. The prosecution is not making a free 
choice between privilege and prosecution; indeed, it would prefer 
to make no choice at all. Nor is the prosecution making a necessary 
choice between mutually exclusive alternatives: The assertion of 
privilege is theoretically compatible with a simultaneous decision to 
prosecute. The obstacle, of course, to what would otherwise be a 
free choice is the constitutional judgment embodied in the com-
pulsory process clause that the government must not convict any 
person who can prove that he is innocent. Whether the state sup-
presses such proof under a government privilege or a private privilege 
is immaterial. Both types of privilege are created by the state. If the 
crucial interests underlying government privileges must yield to the 
defendant's right of compulsory process, so must the interests under-
lying private privileges. Under the constitutional command, there-
fore, the state can either produce the evidence or give the defendant 
the equivalent of his defense by dismissing the charges. Dismissal is 
simply an alternative means for satisfying the commands of com-
pulsory process. 
F. The Right to a Fair Balance of Advantage with the Prosecution 
with Respect to Presenting Witnesses 
One of the prevailing themes of compulsory process is that the 
defendant should have comparable opportunities with the prosecu-
tion to present a case through witnesses. The history of compulsory 
process is the story of the development of the adversary process and 
the demise of the inquisitional method.496 Inquisition was found 
494. 415 U.S. at 317, quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965). 
495. See text at note 443 supra. 
496. See Part I supra. 
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not only unfair to the accused, but an inefficient way of determining 
truth. Recognizing the importance of parity, colonial New Jersey 
framed its compulsory process provision to give the accused an ex-
plicit right to the "same" opportunities to present witnesses enjoyed 
by the prosecution.497 
The framers of the sixth amendment recognized the value of 
parity,498 but rejected New Jersey's formulation in favor of the 
broader design of the majority of state provisions.499 The sixth 
amendment makes the defendant's right to present a defense inde-
pendent of the particular advantages or disadvantages of the prosecu-
tion. 500 Were his rights based on a principle of parity the state could 
deny him witnesses whenever it was willing to deny them to the 
prosecution. Rather, the defendant has an unconditional right to 
present a defense through witnesses that cannot be limited by the 
state ·without very good reasons. 
The compulsory process rights of the accused, although inde-
pendent, are affected by the trial posture of the prosecution for two 
reasons: First, where the state gives certain opportunities to the 
prosecution, it is unlikely to be able to justify denying them to the 
defense. Illustrative is a case in which a witness was subpoenaed 
from France to testify for the prosecution under a statute that au-
thorized federal courts to issue foreign subpoenas for witnesses 
"whose testimony in a criminal proceeding is desired by the Attorney 
General."501 The witness challenged his subsequent contempt con-
viction on the ground that the statute violated the compulsory pro-
cess clause by permitting only the prosecution, and not the defense, to 
subpoena witnesses from abroad.502 
497. See text at note 99 supra. 
498. See text at note 123 supra. 
499. See text at notes 117-27 supra. 
500. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), for example, the Court held that 
whether or not the accused's accomplice was competent to testify for the prosecution, 
it was unconstitutional to disqualify him from testifying for the defense. See text at 
notes 202-05 supra. 
501. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), involving Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 117, § 1783, 62 Stat. 949, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1970). The statute was 
amended to its present form to permit the court to subpoena witnesses from abroad 
if necessary "in the interest of justice." The amendment was designed to authorize 
the production of witnesses "irrespective of whether the subpoena is desired by the 
prosecution or the accused. It thus achieves equality of treatment in accord with 
American traditions of fair play in regard to the accused," S. REP. No. 1580, 88th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1964). 
502. 284 U.S. at 442. 
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The Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional question 
because it concluded that the witness had no standing to assert the 
rights of the defendant. Had it reached the issue, however, it pre-
sumably would have declared the statute unconstitutional for arbi-
trarily denying the defendant the right to subpoena witnesses in his 
favor. The defect in the statute was not that it discriminated against 
the accused, for the defendant has no explicit right to be treated 
equally with the prosecution. Rather, the statute was defective be-
cause it denied the defendant the subpoena power for no apparent 
reason. The unilateral grant of subpoena power to the prosecution 
raises a presumption that the defendant has been denied the benefit 
for no valid reason, and requires the state to come forward with a 
justification sufficient to overcome the defendant's specific constitu-
tional right. 
Second, the compulsory process rights of the accused are affected 
by any allocation of advantage to the prosecution with respect to 
·witnesses that seriously distorts the adversary nature of the criminal 
process. All of the various procedural rights in the Bill of Rights are 
implicitly designed to strengthen the adversary posture of the ac-
cused.508 Indeed, in pursuit of their common end they overlap and 
complement one another. The defendant's right of compulsory 
process for witnesses is thus complemented by the right to be in-
formed of the charges against him, which is designed in part to give 
him a chance to marshal facts and witnesses in his defense;504 the 
right to be released on bail before trial, designed in part to enable 
the defendant to identify and consult with his witnesses;505 the right 
to counsel, designed in part to assist the defendant in locating and 
preparing his witnesses;506 and the right to a speedy trial, designed 
503. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.). 
504. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 42 U.S.L.W. 5190, 5198 (U.S. June 26, 1974); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 &: n.54 (1,967). 
505. Cf. United States v. Reese, 463 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Kinney v. Lenon, 
425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970). 
506. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932): "[The uncounseled defendant] 
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he 
has a perfect one." One of the principal criticisms of the rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 
U.S. 455 (1942), denying counsel to indigents in noncapital cases, was that it deprived 
the defendant of the assistance of counsel in identifying and consulting with wit-
nesses. See Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A 
Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 53-54 
(1962). For a discussion of the defendant's need for counsel to assist in gathering 
facts see Kamisar, supra, at 59-65; Steinberg & Paulson, A Conversation with Defense 
Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, 7 PRAc. LAW., May 1961, at 25, 25-27. 
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in part to prevent the passage of time from eliminating witnesses or 
erasing their memories. 5o1 
Unlike the other protections, however, which affect witnesses only 
incidentally, the compulsory process clause is principally designed to 
enhance the defendant's ability to present a case through witnesses. 
It rests on the premise that a major imbalance of advantage in favor 
of the state with respect to the presentation of its case through wit-
nesses is likely not only to be unfair, but to frustrate the ultimate 
pursuit of truth. It reflects an implicit judgment by the framers that 
prosecution advantages concerning the presentation of evidence 
should not be allowed to exceed greatly those of the defense. In short, 
it seeks to maintain a basic equilibrium between the defendant and 
the state with respect to the discovery, production, and presentation 
of witnesses. While it does not guarantee the defendant precise 
equality with the prosecution, it prohibits the state from giving so 
much advantage to the prosecution as to frustrate the adversary 
assumptions implicit in the sixth amendment. 608 
The notion that an adversary procedure is implicitly protected 
by the compulsory process clause helps to explain the othenvise 
puzzling decision in Wardius v. Oregon.509 Oregon required the de-
fendant to give the prosecution advance notice of his proposed alibi 
and alibi witnesses. The notice-of-alibi statute made no provision 
for reciprocal discovery by the defense. In fact, Oregon did not pro-
vide for any discovery by the accused and specifically did not require 
the prosecution to identify the witnesses it intended to call to rebut 
the defendant's alibi defense. The defendant in Wardius failed to 
507. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). Cf. Jones v. Wainwright, 490 
F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1974). 
508. Wholly apart from their explicit meaning, constitutional provisions have 
implicit meanings that arise from their structural relationship to one another. See 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112-13 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.): 
And when a question concerning the constitutionality of some aspect of criminal 
procedure arises, this Court must consider all those provisions and interpret them 
together. The Fifth Amendment ••• is not an isolated, distinct provision. It is 
part of a system of constitutionally required procedures, and its true meaning 
can be seen only in light of all those provisions. "Strict construction" of the 
words of the Constitution does not mean that the Court can look only to one 
phrase, clause, or sentence in the Constitution and expect to find the right 
answer. Each provision has a clear and definite meaning, and various provisions 
considered together may have an equally clear and definite meaning. 
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Blasi, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 
176 (1970). Thus, while explicitly making the defendant's rights independent of the 
prosecution, the compulsory process clause (in conjunction with the other procedural 
protections of the sixth amendment) implicitly as.sumes that a minimum balance of 
advantage will be maintained between the prosecution and the defense, consistent with 
an essentially adversary process. 
509. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
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give the required notice and was barred from testifying himself in 
support of his alibi and from calling witnesses to do so. 
The Supreme Court was urged to invalidate the statute on the 
grounds that it violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination and the presumption of innocence by requiring him to dis-
close his defense before hearing the state's case; that disqualifying 
·witnesses from testifying for the defense was an excessive sanction 
for failure to comply with the statute; and that the statutory scheme 
abridged the defendant's right to discover evidence in the govern• 
ment's possession. Rejecting these arguments, and approving an 
earlier decision that notice-of-alibi provisions serve the valid purpose 
of preventing the defendant from surprising the prosecution with an 
easily fabricated alibi, 510 the Court held that the defendant has a 
constitutional right of reciprocal discovery when the government 
obtains substantial discovery from him.511 Despite the rational basis 
for Oregon's practice,512 the Court held that "[i]t is fundamentally 
unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case 
while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise 
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he dis• 
closed to the State."513 ' 
Although the Court based its decision on the general "fairness" 
required by due process, its reasoning is more consistent with the 
specific fairness required by the compulsory process clause. The 
Court emphasized that the "unfair" characteristic of the statute was 
the resulting "imbalance of discovery rights"514 between the defen-
510. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. '78 (1970). 
511, For the validity under the compulsory process clause of rules that use dis• 
qualification as a sanction see text at notes 317-22 supra. For the existence under the 
compulsory process clause of an independent right of discovery see section IlIA supra. 
512. Oregon, in one sense, was perfectly rational to provide for discovery of the 
defendant's alibi witnesses without providing for reciprocal discovery of the state's 
rebuttal witnesses and witnesses in chief, Alibi witnesses present unique problems 
that make pretrial discovery more important for the prosecution than for the defense: 
A defendant with friends may easily fabricate a false alibi, thus making it very 
difficult for the prosecution to rebut such testimony without advance notice and 
preparation. The defendant, on the other hand, has less need to discover the identity 
of the state's rebuttal witnesses. Rebuttal witnesses are rarely called; when they do 
appear, their testimony is seldom devastating, and when their testimony is crucial, 
it is likely to be testimony that the defendant can predict from his knowledge of the 
alibi. The defendant also has less need to discover the identity of the state's witnesses 
in chief. By time of trial he has notice of the charges against him and can generally 
predict the nature of the supporting testimony. In Wardius, therefore, the state's 
discriminatory discovery procedures were not irrational. 
513. 412 U.S. at 476. 
514. 412 U.S. at 475 n.9. 
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dant and the state. Pretrial discovery is a device that "enhances the 
fairness of the adversary system"515 and "enhance[s] the search for 
truth" when it gives "both the defendant and the State ample oppor-
tunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt 
or innocence."516 When available to one party and not the other it 
disturbs the "balance of forces between the accused and his ac-
cuser."517 The statute was thus unconstitutional because "in the 
absence of a strong showing of state interests,"518 it created unilateral 
benefits for the prosecution with respect to witnesses. 
Wardius' ultimate impact is difficult to predict at this point. It 
has potential implications for much of criminal procedure. Its under-
lying principle is not limited to discovery but applies to every dis-
ruption of the existing balance between the state and the accused 
with respect to presenting a case through witnesses.619 The signifi-
cance of the decision will depend on how it is applied in individual 
cases, which depends, in tum, on the degree to which its connection 
with the implicit premises of compulsory process is recognized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment is a com-
panion and. counterpart to the confrontation clause. The confronta-
tion clause governs the manner by which the state presents its case 
against the accused, requiring the prosecution to bring the defendant 
face to face with the witnesses against him and make them available 
for cross-examination. The compulsory process clause governs the 
presentation of the defendant's case, empowering him to produce 
and examine witnesses in his favor. Together they provide a con-
stitutional basis for the law of evidence in criminal proceedings. 
Together "[they] constitutionalize the right to a defense as we 
know it."520 
The compulsory process clause, however, has not until recently 
been given the broad application it was originally intended to have. 
Courts have focused on its narrow wording, and have concluded 
that it refers only to the right of the accused to subpoena witnesses 
515. 412 U.S. at 474. 
516. 412 U.S. at 474, quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970). 
517. 412 U.S. at 474. 
518. 412 U.S. at 475. 
519. The classic study of the balance of advantage between the defendant and 
the prosecution is Goldstein, supra note 279. 
520. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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in his favor. They are now beginning to recognize, however, that it 
implicitly governs the entire presentation of the defendant's case. 
In that respect it is broader and more important than the right of 
confrontation. 
Compulsory process is more important to the accused than con-
frontation because in most cases it can substitute for confrontation, 
while confrontation cannot replace the functions served by com-
pulsory process. The essential difference between the two is their 
allocation of the burden of producing witnesses. Confrontation allo-
cates to the prosecution the burden of producing witnesses against 
the accused, while compulsory process allocates to the accused the 
burden (and the means) of producing witnesses in his favor. Thus, 
unless a prosecution witness has become unavailable, the right of 
confrontation only relieves the defendant of the burden of issuing 
subpoenas for the witnesses whose out-of-court statements are intro-
duced against him. Abolition of the right of confrontation would not 
automatically result in trials by affidavit and hearsay; it would simply 
shift to the defendant the administrative burden of producing the 
adverse declarants for cross-examination, along with producing the 
separate witnesses in his favor.621 Abolition of compulsory process, on 
the other hand, would be more drastic: It would leave the defendant 
face to face with the witnesses against him, but with no means to 
produce the witnesses in his favor. 
The compulsory process clause is also broader than the con-
frontation clause. Confrontation is exclusively a trial right. It has 
nothing to do with the manner in which the defendant gathers, 
preserves, or produces evidence. It merely guarantees him the right 
to insist that evidence against him be presented at trial through 
direct testimony or its equivalent. Compulsory process, on the other 
521. A good illustration is the preference for the right of compulsory process 
over the right of confrontation in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. 
Since disciplinary proceedings are not "criminal" proceedings within the strict 
requirements of the sixth amendment, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 
(1972), the Court has been free to fashion a constitu_tional law of prison procedure 
under the looser standards of the due process clause. Significantly, the Court has con-
cluded that while prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to confront the witnesses 
against them (or receive the assistance of counsel), they are entitled in disciplinary 
proceedings "to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [their] defense 
when permitting [them] to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety 
or correctional goals." Wolff v. McDonnell, 42 U.S.L.W. 5190, 5197 (U.S. June 26, 
1974). The same line between confrontation and compulsory process has been drawn 
in the context of the preliminary hearing, where the sixth amendment has yet to be 
found fully applicable. Cf. United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1973): 
Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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hand, is more than a trial right. It gives the defendant the right to 
discover the existence of witnesses in his favor, to produce them in 
court, to introduce their statements into evidence, and, if necessary, 
to compel them to testify over claims of privilege. In sum, it consti-
tutionalizes the defendant's right to be heard in his defense. 
